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DECONSTRUCTING THE FRAMERS' RIGHT TO
PROPERTY: LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS AND
ECONOMIC RIGHTS
BarbaraStark*
[E]verything I know of my family comes from that time when I
steeped myself in land transfers, sea logs and records of hogsheads of
molasses and rum.... [That] set in motion a hunger for connectedness, a belief that with sufficient passion and intelligence we can deconstruct the barriers of time and geography.
BharatiMukherjee'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Deconstruction is a method for exposing hidden assumptions, that
which is taken for granted, unquestioned.2 This Article draws on this
method first to explain how the right to property, as understood by the
Framers, became the hidden, unquestioned assumption of the Bill of
Rights. 3 Second, this Article draws on deconstruction to "unpack ' 4 the
right to property to reveal the lesser-subsumed economic rights it takes
for granted.5 It argues that the right to property and economic rights are
2. For an excellent introduction to deconstruction, see JONATHAN CULLER, ON
DECONSTRUCrION (1982); PAUL DE MAN, BLINDNESS AND INSIGHT: ESSAYS IN THE RHETORIC OF
CONTEMPORARY CRmCISM (1971); DECONSTRUCrION IN A NUTSHELL: A CONVERSATION WITH
JACQUES DERRIDA (John D. Caputo ed., 1997); JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak trans., First American ed. 1976) (1967); STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT CoMES
NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL
STUDIES 154-55 (1989); READING DE MAN READING 223-43 (Lindsay Waters & Wlad Godzich
eds., 1989); J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practiceand Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J 743 (1987).
3. "From the very beginning, the settlement of North America was closely linked with economic rights." JAIrmS W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 10 (1992).
4. By "unpack," I mean "deconstrucet" not "in the technical sense used by critical legal
scholars influenced by Jacques Derrida ... but in the emerging popular sense of deconstructing a
social phenomenon into its component parts." Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87
MICH. L. REv. 797,797 n.1 (1989).
5. By "economic rights," I do not refer to the rights of capital, that is, the protection of
property and contract rights, unlike some contemporary American authors. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, The Burger Courtand Economic Rights, 33 TULSA L.J. 41, 44 (1997); Richard A. Posner, The
Constitutionas an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 4, 25 (1987); Note, Resurrecting
Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due ProcessReconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363,
1364 n.6 (1990). Rather, I use the term as it is used throughout the rest of the world in international human rights law. See, e.g., Asbjom Eide & Allan Rosas, Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights: A Universal Challenge, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A TEXTBOOK 15,
17 (Asbjom Eide et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS]
(viewing economic, social, and cultural rights as raising "question[s] of income distribution" and
"protection of vulnerable groups, such as the poor"); Danilo Turk, The United Nations and the
Realization of Economic, Social, and CulturalRights, in THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 95, 106-07 (Franz
Matscher ed., 1991) (employing the term "economic rights" as part of a set of "economic, social
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iterations of the same rights, from the perspectives of the "haves" and6
the "have-nots," respectively. Recent work by women's historians
makes it possible to use late eighteenth century women, one of the most
conspicuously neglected groups of have-nots at the time,7 as a case
study. This analysis shows how the denial of economic rights by culture
and social custom, as well as by law, progressively distances civil and
political rights. Ultimately, the denial of economic rights makes the legal proscription of civil and political rights unnecessary because, as a
practical matter, these rights become unimaginable.
and cultural rights" that guarantee a minimum welfare system). These rights, including the rights
to food, housing, health, and education, are set out and described in Part V, infra. See generally
Introduction to ECONOMIC RIGHTS vii (Ellen Fmnkel Paul et al. eds., 1992) (containing a collection of essays exploring the "rights to use, possess, exchange, and otherwise dispose of property
[which] are the core of some of the most important and fundamental disputes in Western moral and
political theory"); qf Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221, 242 (1999) (using the term "economic rights" to refer to the capacity to participate in the market).
6. See, e.g., NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMEN'S SPHERE" IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1780-1835 (1977); LINDA GRANT DE PAUW & CONOVER HUNT, REMEMBER THE
LADIES: WOMEN IN AMERICA 1750-1815 (1976); PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER:
THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (1984); CLAUDIA GOLDIN,
UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN (1990);
LINDA KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTIONARY

AMERICA (1980); MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED POWER
AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996); MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW
OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA (1986); STEPHANIE GRAUMAN WOLF, As VARIOUS AS THEIR
LAND: THE EVERYDAY LIVES OF EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICANS

(1993);

WOMEN IN THE AGE

OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 1989). For a detailed
history of women's work, see "TO TOIL THE LIVELONG DAY": AMERICA'S WOMEN AT WORK,
1780-1980 (Carol Groneman & Mary Beth Norton eds., 1987) [hereinafter AMERICA'S WOMEN AT
WORK].For an in-depth account of a small group of "provincial American girls, all ... well born,
well-to-do, Loyalist, and Anglican," see PHILIP YOUNG, REVOLUTIONARY LADIES 5 (1977). For a
thoughtful account of the obstacles faced by earlier women historians, see JANET WILSON JAMES,
CHANGING IDEAS ABOUT WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, 1776-1825 (1981). See generally
RICHARD H. CHIUSED, PRIVATE ACTS IN PUBLIC PLACES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF DIVORCE INTHE
FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW (1994) (discussing a historical account of divorce
law); JOAN WALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLICS OF HISTORY 10 (1988) (presenting a series of articles "historicizing gender by pointing to the variable and contradictory meanings attributed to sexual difference, [and] to the political processes by which those meanings are developed
and contested").
7. As Sylvia Law observes, "[s]ilence, absolute and deafening, is the central theme of the
original founders' discussions of women and families." Sylvia A. Law, The Founders on Families,
39 U. FLA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1987). African Americans, including women, were another major
group of have-nots. Slaves comprised approximately 20% of the colonial population. See HOWARD
ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1492-PRESENT, at 72 (rev. ed. 1995). See generally Linda K. Kerber et al., Introductionto U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY: NEW FEMINIST
ESSAYS 1, 3 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS] (describing
Gerda Lemer's "stubborn insistence that sources could be found to study even the poorest and
most subordinated of women").
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For the Framers, the enjoyment of the right to property, like the
enjoyment of civil and political rights, was explicitly limited to white

men.' Although more than two hundred years of constitutional jurisprudence has extended most civil and political rights to blacks and white
women, disproportionate numbers of these groups lack the economic
rights9 necessary to fully enjoy them.'0 Economic rights are important in
themselves, however, not only because they facilitate the enjoyment of
civil and political rights. Rather, the two kinds of rights are equally crucial to any meaningful conception of human dignity." The two kinds of
rights are also interdependent; that is, each is necessary for the enjoyment of the other.1 2 As this Article demonstrates, this understanding is

8. See ZINN, supra note 7, at 90.
9. In 1995, the median income for men was $22,562 and the median income for women
was $12,130. See ANDREW HAcKER, MONEY: WHo HAs How MUCH AND WHY 185 (1997). The
median income for black families was $25,970 (compared to $45,018 for white families); but the
median ratio-what blacks earn for every $1000 received by whites-is lower than it was in 1975.
See id. at 147-48. As explained in Part IV, infra, economic rights are not synonymous with income, although it is often a significant factor. Other factors, such as the availability of health care,
education, and adequate nutrition, must also be taken into account. See generally AMARTYA SEN,
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 126-27 (1992) (noting that "differences in the social, educational, and
epidemiological conditions" often have an effect upon one's ability to survive that income figures
alone do not reveal); The Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. Economic
and Social Council, 48th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 120, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1996/14 (1996)
(providing empirical data to show a worldwide link between income distribution, education, and
opportunity).
10. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1277, 1286-90 passim (1993) (arguing that the reduced economic capacity of the poor disenfranchises them from the political process, and so the Court should not exercise strong deference when
addressing constitutional questions involving social welfare). For arguments that economic rights
can be grounded in the Constitution, see Charles L. Black Jr., FurtherReflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1104-05 (1986); Paul Brest, FurtherBeyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE LJ. 1623, 1627-28
(1988); Frank I. Michaelman, Forward:On Protecting the PoorThrough the 14th Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7, 33 (1969). For a thoughtful analysis of the Supreme Court's resistance to
grounding economic rights in the Constitution, see Jonathan R. Macey, Some Causes and Consequences of the Bifircated Treatment of Economic Rights and 'Other' Rights Under the United
States Constitution, in ECONOMIC RoirS 141, 141-45 passim (Ellen Frankel Paul et al. eds.,
1992).
11. See UniversalDeclarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, Art. 1 ("All human beings
are born free and equal in dignity and rights."); Art. 22 (referring to "the economic, social and
cultural rights indispensable for [human] dignity"); Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept,77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848, 848-53 (1983) (discussing many aspects of what human dignity encompasses, including economic, political, and civil rights). See, e.g., infra Part V.B.9 (discussing the need for education to develop the human personality's sense of dignity).
12. This is well accepted in the international community. See Indivisibility and Interdependence of Economic, Social, Cultural Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 44/130, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 98, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/130 (1990); Vienna Convention and Programme ofAction, 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1665 (1993).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:963

neither new nor foreign, but buried in the very heart of American constitutional jurisprudence. 3
Part II explains some basic terms in deconstruction as they are used

in this Article. Part I draws on these terms to map the relationship
between property rights and civil and political rights in the early state,
and later federal, bills of rights. Part IV deconstructs the right to prop-

erty itself, exposing its component parts. Part V is a historical case
study, again drawing on deconstruction, which examines the component
parts of the right to property in the lives of eighteenth century women.
II. DECONSTRUCTION

A.

HierarchicalOppositions

The process of deconstruction begins by identifying the opposition
contained in a particular concept. 4 The concept of "day," for example,
actually contains the opposition "day/night." That is, the concept of
"day," referring to a twenty-four hour period of time, such as Tuesday,
actually contains the opposition "Tuesday day" and 'Tuesday night."

The next step is to invert the hierarchies contained in that opposition." By doing so we expose what we have forgotten-the hidden, subordinated conception on which the privileged conception is always dependent. To invert the day/night hierarchy, we treat "night" as the

privileged concept. Imagine, for example, going out at two o'clock in
the morning, to pick up milk for coffee.

13. See John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. REv. 181, 184
(1987); cf James A. McKenna, The Framers of the Constitution Were Our FirstPostmodernists
(Or Why Justice ScaliaIs Wrong), 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 71, 77 (1999) ("The radical postmodernists
seek to 'deconstruct' our political and social hierarchies, to expose them as arrangements of the
powerful, and to thereby transform society. The postmodernists of the 1770s were involved in a
similar project.").
14. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 746. This Part draws heavily on Professor Balkin's article,
Deconstructive Practiceand Legal Theory. See id. Balkin is often clearer than those he interprets.
As Jonathan Culler remarks, "(n]ot only does repetition produce what can then be regarded as a
method, but critical writings that are said to imitate or deviate often provide clearer or fuller examples of a method than the supposed originals." CULLER, supra note 2, at 229.
15. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 746. See also, e.g., THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WOMEN'S
WRITING INTHE UNrrED STATES 241 (Cathy N. Davidson et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter WOMEN'S
WRITING] ("The paradigm of binary oppositions is useful to feminism because it denaturalizes
identity by exposing its structural aspects.").
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B.

The DangerousSupplement

Night, the subordinated conception here, is referred to in deconstruction as the "dangerous supplement.' ' 6 The supplement is dangerous, first, simply because it adds to our understanding, thus exposing
our original understanding as incomplete. 7 Picking up milk at two
o'clock in the morning, we are surprised to see other cars out. Gas stations and grocery stores are open. The stores are much less crowded and
there are no lines. Thus, we understand that our original concept of
"day" is incomplete-it takes for granted that "day" is the better time to
shop even though there are apparently advantages to shopping at night
(i.e., it is easier to park and there are shorter lines).
The supplement is also dangerous because it subverts our confidence in the privileged concept. 8 Inverting the hierarchy invites us to
consider that there may be other advantages to doing things at night.
Perhaps we could get more work done at night, for example, when there
are fewer distractions. In fact, there is a whole alternative economy that
operates when most of us are asleep.
C. Trace and Iteration
The dangerous supplement, the subordinated opposition, can also
be found in the dominant concept as "trace." That is, each of the terms
retains a bit of the other, a reminder of its origins:
The word "trace" is a metaphor for the effect of the opposite concept, which is no longer present but has left its mark on the concept we
are now considering. The trace is what makes deconstruction possible;
by identifying the traces of the concepts in each other, we identify
their mutual conceptual dependence. 9
This "mutual conceptual dependence" becomes clearer when the
same opposition appears in another context. The repetition of the same
in different contexts is referred to in deconstruction as "iterability." 20
"Morning," for example, may bring to mind thoughts of welcome sunlight, wakefulness, energy, coffee, orange juice, or eagerness to face the
day. "Morning," when it is announced on a trans-Atlantic jet, however,

16. See CUU.Et, supra note 2, at 104-05 (discussing Rousseau's concept of the "'dangerous
supplement"').
17. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 751.
18. Seeid. at763.
19. Id. at 752.
20. See id. at 749.
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means something quite different. This iteration of morning may be
bright, there may be orange juice and coffee, yet we feel exhausted and
confused. It is the absence of night-the lack of sleep, darkness, and
dreams-that robs morning of its pleasant associations on such flights.
Indeed, as sleep researchers have demonstrated, waking life literally depends on sleep. 2' Without it, functioning is soon impaired; we become irritable and distracted. If the deprivation continues, there are
likely to be significant health costs.22
Conversely, it is the "trace" of day-the brightly-lit parking lot, the
wide-awake workers and shoppers, and the cars on the road-that gives
nighttime shopping its charm. Deconstruction exposes our unspoken assumptions, what we take for granted when we speak of "day." It also reveals its dangerous supplement, of which we are only peripherally
aware, and its critical role in our lives.
D. Liberatingthe Text
As Jacques Derrida explains, texts are necessarily free of their
authors because texts are public and initiate a series of interpretations
which cannot be predicted.23 As Professor J.M. Balkin puts it:
Our words seem to perform tricks that we had not intended, establish
connections that we had not considered, lead to conclusions that were
not present to our minds when we spoke or wrote .... This curious
habit of our words to burst the seams of our intentions and to produce
their own kind of logic is what Derrida labels the free "play" of text. 24
Because there are an indefinite number of interpretations that can be applied to any given text,2' each is necessarily partial. The integrity of any
interpretive process, therefore, depends on distinguishing misreadings
from readings. As Jonathan Culler points out, however:
[E]very reading can be shown to be partial. Interpreters are able to discover features and implications of a text that previous interpreters neglected or distorted. They can use the text to show that previous read21. See WiLAM C. DEMENT & CHRISTOPHER VAUGHAN, THE PROMISE OF SLEEP 262-71
(1999). The founder and director of the Stanford University Sleep Research Center describes the
importance of sleep to physical and psychological well-being, including immune system functioning. See id. at 5, 262-75; see also, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
41, 94 (1978) (holding that depriving detainees of sleep amounted to inhumane and degrading
treatment).
22. See DEMENT & VAUGHAN, supra note 21, at 263,274-75.
23. See CULLER, supranote 2, at 131.
24. Balkin, supranote 2, at 777.
25. Seeid.at781.
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ings are in fact misreadings, but their own readings will be found
wanting by later interpreters. 26

The point is not to arrive at some "correct," indisputable interpretation.' Rather, the point is to "displace the question, leading one to
consider what are the processes of legitimation, validation, or authorization that produce differences among readings and enable one reading
to expose another as a niisreading." '
Maurice Sendak's In the Night Kitchen,29 for example, may be read
as a deconstruction of "day." Sendak transforms an ordinary kitchen
into a fantastic metropolis, in which industrious bakers work all night
under the stars so that their cake-loving protagonist (along with the rest
of us) can have cake to eat in the morning. 0 In the Night Kitchen exposes our original concept of day as incomplete,3' and it subverts our
confidence in that concept. "Day" is not the only time for productive
work, and it may not be the best. 2 Indeed, our most valued daytime ac-

tivities (such as eating cake) may in fact depend on the unseen nighttime work of others, of whom we may be oblivious. 33 This Article simi-

26. CULLER, supra note 2, at 176.
27. To the contrary, deconstruction is necessarily ongoing. "Any text, even a postmodem
deconstructive text, can be deconstructed." Stephen M. Feldman, Playing with the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REv. 151, 178 (1999). "Rather than conceiving of
patriarchy as a monolithic entity (a tactic that only offers a partial analysis of oppression and so
only suggests partial points of resistance), a feminism based on Foucauldian deconstruction looks
at the multiplicity of power relations in which women are oppressed." Walker, Deconstructionand
Feminism, supra note 15, at 242.
28. CULLER, supranote 2, at 179.
29. MAURIcE SENDAK, IN THE NIGrHT KITCHEN (1970).
30. See id. at 7.
31. "[P]revious interpreters [have] neglected" this reading. CULLER, supra note 2, at 176.
Because several schools banned the book for its depiction of a nude little boy, most critics focused
on this. See, e.g., George M. Eberhart, List: More Silly Reasons to Ban Books, AM. LIBRARIES,
Dec. 1998, at 21 (citing a Minnesota challenge that "reading the book could 'lay the foundation
for future use of pornography"'); Anna Quindlen, A Week's Worth of Ways to Honor Banned
Books, STAR TRm. (Minn.), Oct. 5, 1994, at 19A (citing reviews criticizing books for "'desensitizing children to nudity'); Jim Sollisch, If 'The Cat in the Hat' Came Back-Politically Corrected,SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 24, 1994, at B7.
32. Indeed, the night may be more conducive to creative work, an auspicious time for those
poets and artists whose work may be closer to dreaming. Sleep, however, remains crucial. See
DEMENT & VAUGHAN, supra note 21, at 312-31 (explaining the importance of sleep with respect
to the creative process).
33. Thus, Sendak shows how "night" is the dangerous supplement of "day." This was not his
intention, but that would only matter if the author's intent were necessary to "legitim[ize], validat[e], or authorizfe] that" interpretation. CULLERj supra note 2, at 179. Here, instead, the interpretation is validated by the effectiveness of Sendak's playful and radical inversion; he achieves
precisely that transformation of sensibility to which deconstruction aspires, whether it is his intention or not. The example is particularly apt in this context, moreover, because of the importance
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larly uses deconstruction to show how the Framers' most valued civil
and political rights in fact depended on economic rights, and how those
rights, in turn, depended on the unseen work of the women who were
their contemporaries.

m.

THE BILLS OF RIGHTS

This Part explains how the right to property became the "dangerous
supplement" of our familiar civil and political rights,4 and describes the
critical importance of this right for the Framers. First, it explains the

Framers' familiarity with the notion of rights as interdependent and implicit. 5 Second, it shows that, consistent with this notion of rights,
"property" had a more expansive meaning than it does today. Finally, it
explains how the politics of ratification put other issues in the foreground, leaving the right to property "buried" in the Bill of Rights. Yet

the right to property remained-along with the lesser economic rights
subsumed in that right-in the states' bills of rights,3 6in "natural law," in
custom, culture, and private law-at least for some.

that Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), played in shaping American notions of economic
rights. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a Coherent Jurisprudence
of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L. REV.329, 438 (1995) (using economic rights to refer to freedom
of capital). In Lochner, the Supreme Court struck down a New York law limiting bakers to a 60
hour work week on the ground that it violated constitutionally protected "freedom of master and
employ6 to contract with each other in relation to their employment ....198 U.S. at 64; see also
infra text accompanying note 303 (explaining that the "right to work" includes a "reasonable
limitation of working hours").
34. See Joan Williams, Recovering the Full Complexity of Our Traditions: New Developments in Property Theory, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 596, 604 (1996) (explaining people's intuitions on
the notion of the right to property).
35. As I have just shown, "intent" is not important in deconstruction. See supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text. Rather, the purpose of demonstrating this familiarity here is to show, as
John Leubsdorf has observed, that "[t]he framing of the Constitution took place at what amounted
to several levels of consciousness, so we should not be surprised to find in it concealed conflicts
and accommodations." Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 183-84. In addition, this example should demystify deconstruction in this context. Cf.Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble:Postmodern Newspeak
and Constitutional 'Meaning'forthe Uninitiated,96 MIcH. L. REV. 461 passim (1997) (explaining the theory of deconstruction by using a language other than English but which nevertheless
resembles it).
36. Ironically, the right to property is not set out in the International Covenant on Economic
and Cultural Rights (the "Economic Covenant," the "Covenant"). See International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signatureDec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976); see also infra notes 110-74 (discussing the lesser economic rights subsumed by the right to property). Rather, the Covenant articulated the lesser subsumed economic
rights which are included in the right to property. See discussion infra Part 1V.A.
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The goal of deconstruction, like that of other critical theories, is
not to uncover some empirical "truth," but to enlighten 7 and to increase
our understanding of that which is being deconstructed. Accordingly, it
is an ongoing process, the result of which can always itself be deconstructed." Depending on the context, one concept may be more illuminating than another may. In discussing the historical origins of the bills
of rights, for example, the concept of "mutually dependent oppositions"
eerily tracks the Framers' arguments." The concept of iteration, the
repetition of the same in a different context, clarifies the Framers' understanding of the right to property and its place in the Federal Bill of
Rights. Finally, the relationship of the dangerous supplement to the
privileged conception enables us to crystallize the relationship between
the right to property and civil and political rights. By tracking the right
to property from its privileged position in colonial jurisprudence to its
subordination in the Bill of Rights, we can understand how it becameand how it remains-a dangerous supplement to civil and political

rights.
A. HistoricalOrigins-TheRight to Property
The colonists brought with them a rich tradition of rights. As Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Jack N. Rakove points out, there was "no
shortage of rights consciousness among colonists whose dual motives
for emigration included both tender matters of religious conscience and
the pursuit of property." This "rights consciousness" was grounded in
the notion of natural, inalienable rights, which belonged to man41 in the
state of nature described by John Locke.
37. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 764-67 (comparing deconstruction to other critical theories,
such as psychoanalysis, in which the goal is to increase understanding).
38. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
39. As Professor Leubsdorf points out in a related context, this reflects the ways in which
opposing positions became embedded in the Constitution. See Leubsdorf, supra note 13, at 201;
see also McKenna, supra note 13, at 87-89 (explaining how, like the conflicting moralities and
views of one person, the Framers used their conflicting views to create the Constitution).
40. JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSnTION 295 (1996); cf. PAUL HUNT, RECLAMNG SOCIAL RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATnvE PERSPECTIVES 52 (1996) (stating that New Zealand's legal culture in the 1970s was
"unfamiliar with, and suspicious of, a rights approach").
41. "Man," of course, was Locke's term, as "homme" was Rousseau's. This was deliberately
and profoundly gendered. See KERBER, supra note 6, at 15; JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, EMILE OR
ON EDUCATION 357-59 (Allan Bloom trans., 1978) (explaining what Rousseau viewed as fundamental and innate differences between men and women); infra text accompanying notes 268-79
(describing Locke's view on women); see also AuCE BROWNE, THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
FEMINIST MIND 21 (1987) ("Rousseau's work encouraged women's sense of themselves as a group
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These fights, to which Englishmen were entitled as a birthright,
were well understood: "Life, liberty, and property comprised the fundamental trinity of inalienable rights." 42 As explicitly set out in the Virginia Declaration of Rights:
[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they
cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.43
Men left the state of nature only to better assure these inalienable rights.
That is, they entered into Locke's social contract, through which they
constructed legal rights, to protect and promote their pre-existing natural rights. As Rakove stresses, these legal rights, also referred to as
"positivist" or "English" rights, were seen as part of a continuum on
which natural rights could also be found: "English rights were the legal
application of natural rights." 44
The right to property held a privileged place in colonial jurisprudence. William Penn began his short list of English rights with the right
to property: "'[R]ights and privileges which I call English ... may be
reduced to these three... I. An ownership, and undisturbed possession:
that which they have is rightly theirs, and nobody's else."' 45
What exactly was meant by a right to property? As legal historian
John Phillip Reid has explained, the eighteenth century understanding of
the right to property was much broader than ours:
in society with rights and duties defined by their gender, even though it undermined faith in
women's autonomy and rationality."); but see Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 3
(1978) (opining "[ihat the rights ... describ[ed as] human .... are the rights of men and
women").
42. RAKoVE, supra note 40, at 290.
43. HENKIN, supra note 41, at 6 (quoting the Virginia Declaration of Rights).
44. RAKoVE, supra note 40, at 293. Positivist rights, however, were alienable. They
were created and bestowed by States and could be withdrawn by States. Thus, inalienable
and alienable rights are related to each other in Professor Balkin's system of "mutual conceptual dependence." Derrida calls this concept difference. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 761.
Inalienable rights depend on positivist, alienable rights for their realization. At the same
time, positivist, alienable rights are justified by the natural, inalienable rights they presumably protect. Alienable rights are the dangerous supplement of inalienable rights precisely because they can be alienated, leaving the inalienable right unprotected. But if alienable rights
are forgotten, the justification for alienable rights is lost. For the Framers, the notion of rights
as interdependent was a familiar one. They were comfortable with the notion of supplementary rights, some "present," an unquestioned part of daily life, others submerged, although
"deconstruction" was not to emerge for almost 200 years. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 743
n.1.
45. RAKovE, supranote 40, at 294 (citation omitted).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol28/iss4/6

12

Stark: Deconstructing the Framers' Right to Property: Liberty's Daughter
2000]

DECONSTRUCTING THE FRAMERS' RIGHT TO PROPERTY

The thought has been that when seventeenth-century English and
eighteenth-century Americans defended their right to property, they
were speaking as a governing class seeking to protect their private
holdings, both personal and real. Sometimes they were, and it is important not to ignore that fact. But in legal terminology, "property"
was not necessarily the object itself, but the right and interest or domination lawfully held over the object; it was a species of title, inchoate
or complete, legal or equitable, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or
intangible, visible or invisible, real, personal, or contractual ....Most
commonly, when used in revolutionary constitutional debates ...
"property"referredto rightsof all kinds.46

The "right to property," in short, was used to refer to both property
rights and to civil and political rights, just as "day" refers to the twentyfour hour period including both daylight hours and nighttime hours.47
Accordingly, for the colonists, the right to property was the dominant
conception and civil and political rights were the subordinated opposition.41
At the same time, just as "day" is also used to refer specifically to
the hours of daylight, the right to property was also used to refer specifically to rights in particularproperty. One had to have "property" in
order to vote, for example, and for that purpose property generally
meant land.49 As James W. Ely, Jr., notes, "[w]hen the Constitution was
written, virtually every state imposed a property or taxpaying qualification on suffrage and set higher property qualifications to hold public office.""0 This requirement was met by an amount of property within the

46. JOHN PHiLUP REID, CONSTIrUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE
AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 97 (1986) (emphasis added); see Ren~e Hirschon, Introduction:Property,
Power and Gender Relations, in WOMEN AND PROPERTY-WOMEN AS PROPERTY 1, 6 (Renfe
Hirschon ed., 1984) ("[TIhe nature of 'property' as a category is essentially dynamic. Its form depends on a combination of interacting forces, political, legal as well as economic and cultural and
these change through time.... It is essential, therefore, to take an historical perspective.").
47. See supra Part II.A and accompanying text.
48. James Wilson was the only one of the Framers to "declare] that property was not the
main object of government." JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 96 (1990). See
generally 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911-37).
49. See CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTrrUTION 71 (1937) ("[P]ossession of
freehold in land was then a property qualification for voting for members of the [state] Legislature,
it was peculiarly the small farmers who, in most states, were possessed of the requisite qualification to vote.").
50. ELY, supra note 3, at 47; Jacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity,
and Suffrage in Nineteenth-CenturyAmerica, 107 YALE L.J 473, 473 (1997) (observing that "the

eighteenth century had located a person's capacity for political participation ...(in material
things, such as property)").
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reach of many, if not most, white men. 5' Even those white men without
money could participate in the many claims programs through which
land was distributed to those willing to farm it, which had drawn many
of them to the colonies. 2 Property requirements, of course, effectively
excluded black men5 3 and all women, whose capacity to own property

was strictly limited by law and custom.51. "Scholars agree that from 50 to 80 percent of the adult white males were eligible to vote
in the colonial period." Christopher Collier, The American People as Christian White Men of
Property: Suffrage and Elections in Colonial and Early NationalAmerica, in VOTING AND THE
SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF VOTING AND VOTING RIGHTS IN

AMERICA 19, 20 (Donald NV. Rogers ed., 1990). "In all colonies, men had to own property in order
to qualify for the suffrage .... [Specific property requirements differed] but [the] most widely used
was the forty pound freehold .... [P]otential voters had to own property-usually real estate-that
was worth forty pounds, or that returned forty shillings a year... in rent or interest." Id. at 22-23.
See generally JACQUELINE JONES, AMERICAN WORK: FOUR CENTURIES OF BLACK AND WHITE
LABOR 143 (1998) (noting that an "estimated 80 percent of all Americans ... remained legal dependents at the end of the Colonial period ... includ[ing] all women, children, servants, and
slaves, as well as landless white men").
52. "Most colonies outside New England adopted the 'headright' system as a means of distributing land. By this device an amount of land was awarded to each person emigrating to the
colony.... Although headrighting was gradually eliminated, individuals could still purchase land
for a modest payment" ELY, supra note 3, at 11. For a compelling account of "the homesteading
system and the spatial grid for land settlement in the United States (a product of Jeffersonian
democratic and Enlightenment thinking)," see DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF
POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 255 (1990). As Harvey
observes, this "change in space relations ... led to a redistribution of wealth and power." Id.
Women, however, were explicitly excluded from this redistribution.
53. Most black men were slaves and were rarely able to satisfy the property requirements
necessary for suffrage. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATIER OF COLOR: RACE AND
THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 170 (1978) (noting that slaves were prohibited from owning or acquiring property). Those free black men who were able to meet the requisite property threshold necessary for voting, often faced legal impediments in the North as well
as in the South. See id. at 150, 203. In New York, for example, because the state constitution
"gave the franchise to all free propertied men, without reference to color.., in 1785 ... emancipation would have given all blacks the same civil rights enjoyed by whites." Id. at 139. This was
rejected by the state legislature, which approved a plan for gradual emancipation instead. See id.
Similarly, in South Carolina, "[o]ne of the most significant legal incapacities placed upon the free
black was the legislative declaration that he could not vote." Id. at 203.
54. Slave women were subject to the same restrictions as slave men, and free black married
women were subject to the same restrictions as white married women. See Cheryl I. Harris, Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 309,
321 (1996). According to Blackstone, "[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one per[s]on in
law: that is, the very being or legal exi[s]tence of the woman is [s]uspended during the marriage
... and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture." 1 WILLAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1966) (1765); see also
infra text accompanying note 245. "[Some colonies] ... excluded persons [from voting] on the
basis of sex and race. But these ... were articulated less frequently, if only because (as a consequence of coverture or slavery) they were so often subsumed within the freehold qualification itself." Cogan, supra note 50, at 477; accord Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality
Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1285 (1991).
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From the Framers' perspective, however, propertied white men
were the threatened minority in need of protection. As James Madison,
principal drafter of the Bill of Rights, explained, "'in all populous
countries the smaller part only can be interested in preserving the rights
of property."'' 5 These property owners were crucial to the survival of
the new Republic56 because they alone had a real stake in it.5 Thus, for
Madison, as Jennifer Nedelsky explains:
Good government must be able to protect both the "rights of persons"
and the "rights of property"... The problem was that if political rights
were granted equally to all, the rights of persons and the rights of
property would not be equally protected. The propertied could be relied upon to respect the rights of persons, in which they also had an
interest. But the propertyless had no corresponding interest in property.... The problem of providing equal protection for the rights of

persons and the rights of property in a manner consistent with republican principles was, Madison said, the most difficult of all political
problems. 558
Rakove, similarly, describes Madison's:
palpable fear that economic legislation was jeopardizing fundamental
rights of property. Paper-money laws, debtor-stay laws, and the specter
While single women usually had more legal rights to own and transfer property, they
were rarely able to acquire property because of their limited access to work and education. See
discussion infra Parts V.B.4, V.B.9. In addition, there was a significant social stigma associated
with "spinsterhood." See discussion infra Part V.B.6.b. See generally LEE VIRGINIA CHAMBERSSCHILLER, LIBERTY, A BETTER HUSBAND (1984) (discussing the social history of single women in
America between 1780-1840). Nevertheless, free black women often chose to remain unmarried,
as did white widows of independent means. See SUZANNE LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF
PEERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE INA SOUTHERN TOWN 1784-1860, at xviii (1984).
55. RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 314 (citation omitted).
56. See 1 POLrrICAL PARTIES AND ELEcTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA
170 (L. Sandy Malsel ed., 1991).
The evolution of the colonial franchise was based upon a growing awareness that
only those with some kind of stake in society could be counted upon to act as responsible electors.... Not until 1736 was the amount of property necessary for voting specified as either 100 acres of unimproved land or 25 acres improved with a house or a lot
and house in town.
Id.
57. It was the view of the Framers that property owners would play a central role in the new
government. Hamilton, like the other Framers, believed that "the representative body... [would]
be composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions" and that, as such,
those individuals were best suited to respect property rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 35, at 168 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
58. NEDELSKY, supra note 48, at 5; see also THE FEDERALST No. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("Government is instituted no less for protection of the property
than of the persons of individuals.").
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of Shays's Rebellion in Massachusetts all alarmed him terribly. So did

the grim prospect [that] ... a factious majority might eventually form
from "those who will labour [sic] under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh a for more equal distribution of its blessings." 9
Madison became the champion of that propertied minority, which had
the most to lose from a "more equal distribution.""W
B. The States and the Union
After the American Revolution, Congress drafted the Articles of
Confederation. Ratified by the states in 1781, these empowered Congress to declare war and to settle boundary disputes. 6' Crucially, however, the Articles of Confederation did not give Congress the power to
enforce its decisions, to collect taxes, or to enter into foreign trade
agreements. 62 It became increasingly clear that the states would have to
unite if they were to thrive in the larger world of nation States. 63 But
their recent experience with the King's strong, centralized government
had left the newly independent states wary of a federal union.' 4

59. RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 314 (quoting Madison); accordNEDELSKY, supra note 48, at
4 ("Almost all the new state governments had issued paper money and passed debtor relief laws
which were widely perceived as [taxes] on property rights.").
60. Madison understood, and occasionally sought to preempt, the concerns of this potential
"factious majority." In a debate regarding the jurisdictional amount, for example, Madison argued
that, "in the minds of many citizens [there is] the greatest apprehension that persons of opulence
would carry a cause from the extremities of the union to the supreme court, and therefore prevent
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY
the due administration of justice ....
RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 189 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
61. See PAGE SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 73,
76 (1978); see generally Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two FederalStructures: The Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 249 (1997) (comparing the Articles of
Confederation to the Constitution with respect to differences between state and federal power).
62. See SMITH, supra note 61, at 73-81.
63. See THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 62 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Without unification, for example, the states risked ruining each other through vigorous competition. See id. (stating that "[c]ompetitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention"); NEDELSKY, supra note 48, at 4 (explaining that the Federalists wanted "a central government strong enough to take a respected place among the nations of the world and capable of
avoiding and controlling the unjust propensities of the state governments"). For an extended discussion of the "fascinating set of exchanges with established institutions" that ultimately resulted
in the Constitutional Convention, see Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional
Founding,62 U. CH. L. REv. 475, 489 passim (1995).
64. As David Currie has observed, "[p]aranoid antifederalists already perceived in the new
Constitution a danger of consolidation of authority.... History, of course, has proved them right."
David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789.
1791, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 775, 851 n.444 (1994).
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Well aware of the states' concerns, the Framers carefully restricted
the powers of the new federal government when they drafted the Con-

stitution.6' James Wilson, described by one scholar as "with Madison,
perhaps [the Constitution's] principal architect," 66 explained that in the
states the people had "'invested their representatives with every right
and authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve,"' 67 but in the
''

Federal Constitution "'everything which is not given is reserved."'

Thus, a federal bill of rights would actually be redundant-it would
prevent the federal government from infringing on rights which it had
no authority to restrict in the first place. 9
Although the Bill of Rights was to become necessary-politically,"

if not legally 7'-this background suggests plausible explanations for the
otherwise mysterious omission of the right to property.7 2 First, the real

65. See generally id. (providing an in-depth analysis of the concerns and matters coming
before the First Congress and the Framers of the Constitution); Ackerman & Katyal, supranote 63
passim (discussing the process by which the Framers of the Constitution broke with tradition to
form and effectuate a framework of government that was the first of its kind).
66. SrarTH, supra note 61, at 238. For an extended discussion of Wilson's role in championing the political liberty of the people, see NEDELSKY, supranote 48, at 96-140.
67. RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 320. Similarly, Madison described the Tenth Amendment
"'as excluding every source of power not within the Constitution itself."' Currie, supra note 64, at
853 n.455 (quoting Madison); cf GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (3d ed.
1996) ("The tenth amendment.., was a pale echo of the first provisions of the Articles of Confederation ... and it was countered by the clause granting Congress the authority to make 'all laws
necessary and proper' to effectuate the enumerated powers.").
68. RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 320 (quoting Wilson).
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("I
go further and affirm that bills of rights ... are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution
but would even be dangerous.... For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do?"); accord Leonard W. Levy, Bill of Rights, in ESSAYS ON THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTrruriON 258, 266 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 2d ed. 1987) (stating that "[e]xcluding a bill of
rights from the Constitution was fundamental to the constitutional theory of the framers").
70. According to Levy, Madison's support was due, in part, to his belief that the Bill of
Rights would "'kill the opposition everywhere."' Levy, supra note 69, at 258 (quoting Madison).
Rakove persuasively rebuts the strong version of "the usual story [that] the concessions that Federalist leaders offered to secure ratification in ...closely divided states ...did not establish a binding contract to provide a bill of rights." RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 330. For Madison's own list of
the reasons for completing "the nauseous project of amendments," see CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 281-82. See generally THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: THE
COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES (Patrick T. Conley & John P.
Kaminiski eds., 1992).
71. But see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1132-33 (1991) (arguing that the Bill of Rights was legally necessary).
72. The Fifth Amendment protects only against deprivation of property (along with life and
liberty) without "due process of law," and assures "just compensation" if property is taken after
such due process. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Thus, it protects only those who already have property; it affords no rights to those who do noL See id.; see also CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, su-
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safeguards for individual rights from overreaching government were in

the states' bills of rights. 73 Second, it was unnecessary for the Federal
Bill of Rights to assure the right of property because it existed independently of the federal government as a prior, inalienable right.74 This
was not merely theoretical; rather, the right to property was a given, an
unquestioned, permanent part of the normative landscape. Thus, as Ely
observes, "[flor all their devotion to property rights, the framers were

content to rely primarily on institutional and political arrangements to
safeguard property owners." 75
In fact, Madison's proposed amendments included an addition to

the Preamble, which stated in pertinent part, "[t]hat government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which
consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring
and using property .. ," But Madison's colleagues rejected his proposal to modify the preamble because they preferred to leave the text of
the Constitution intact. They doubted that they had the authority to alter the Constitution,7t or that it needed altering.79 They were content and
pra note 60, at 22 ("[N]o Person ought to be taken imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold ... or
deprived of his... Property, but by due process of Law.").
73. See CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 189. A number of state constitutions explicitly protected the right to property in 1789. See SoURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIONS (William F. Swindler ed., 1978). They include: Connecticut (1662 Charter) see 2 id. 131-32; Delaware (1776 Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules) see id. at 198;
Massachusetts (1780 Constitution) see 5 id. at 93; New Hampshire (1784 Bill of Rights) see 6 id.
at 344; Pennsylvania (1776 Constitution) see 8 id. at 278; Vermont (1786 Constitution) see 9 id. at
497; and Virginia (1776 Bill of Rights) see 10 id. at 49; see generally THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONsTrTUmONs, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OFTHE UNITED STATES: PART
I (Government Printing Office 2d ed. 1878). The Vermont Constitution, incidentally, was the first
to provide for just compensation in cases of eminent domain. See Levy, supra note 69, at 299; see
also Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and InternationalHuman Rights Law:
Toward an "Entirely New Strategy," 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 92-94 (1992) (discussing the significant role that states played with respect to public welfare and entitlements).
74. As Levy notes, the Framers protected natural rights inconsistently. See Levy, supra note
69, at 272. "Liberty," for example, was zealously protected. See, e.g., CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 3-4 (setting forth the first twelve proposed amendments to the Constitution).
75. ELY, supra note 3, at 47.
76. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 11 (emphasis added). As Rakove
points out, Madison could not "imagine how rights of property could ever be codified with the
same ease and precision with which procedural rights could be guaranteed." RAKOVE, supra note
40, at 334.
77. See CREATING THE BILL OFRIGHTS, supra note 60, at xiv-xv.
78. See, e.g., id. at 137 (reporting the statements of Mr. Tucker).
79. See id. at 138. As John Page remarked, "'[w]e the people' had a neatness and simplicity,
while its expression was the most forcible of any he had ever seen prefixed to any constitution. He
did not doubt the truth of the proposition brought forward by the committee, but he doubted its
necessity in this place." Id.
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Madison had no choice but to accede to the will of the majority." His

precious right to property remained buried in the "institutional and political arrangements"'" of the new Constitution.2
C. Deconstructingthe Bill of Rights
The process of deconstructing the Bill of Rights begins by identi-

fying the opposition it contains. The Bill of Rights inverted the traditional hierarchy of rights in colonial jurisprudence, privileging civil and
political rights over the right to property. 3 Thus, the right to property
became the subordinated concept, the "dangerous supplement" to the
civil and political rights set out in the Bill of Rights. 4 First, it adds to
our understanding, exposing our original understanding of civil and political rights as incomplete. It is obvious now, as it was obvious then,

that civil and political rights cannot be enjoyed without "'the means of
acquiring and possessing property.'"" "Life, liberty, and property" are
the "trinity of inalienable rights";16 they are interdependent, and none is

worth much without the others. 7 Civil and political rights mean little
without property, especially without the satisfaction of basic human

needs that property implies. 8

80. See ELY, supra note 3, at 47.
81. Id.

82. See id. "[The primacy of the Federalist concern with protecting property so shaped the
structure of the Constitution that it was characterized as much by this implicit priority as by the
absence of its formal institutionalization." NEDELSKY, supra note 48, at 7.
83. See NEDELSKY, supranote 48, at 5. For an account of the meetings in which Madison's
proposal to revise the Constitution was rejected in favor of Sherman's proposal to annex a separate
Bill of Rights, see CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 104-07.
84. See Williams, New Developments, supra note 34, at 605; cf.NEDELSKY, supra note 48,

at 5 ("Civil rights, which included both the rights of persons and of property, were to be distinguished from political rights."). Nedelsky concedes that "in 1787, however, the choice implicit in
these categories was still preliminary." Id.
85. Levy, supranote 69, at 262 (quoting the Virginia Declaration of Rights).
86. RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 290.

87. See G.A. Res. 44/130, supra note 12, at 2. See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405
U.S. 538, 552 (1972) ("[A] fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other.").
88. See, e.g., HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN

POLICY 24 (1980) ("'No one can fully... enjoy any right... if he or she lacks the essentials for a
reasonably healthy and active life.
); ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FoUR
ESSAYS ON LmERTY 118, 122-24 (1969) (describing the notion of "negative" freedom); see also
Bums H. Weston, The Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of
Foreign-Owned Wealth, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 519,

546 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) (concluding that "[tihe great challenge lies less in
'proving' the rightness or wrongness of the competing special claims (and values) involved, but in
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The right to property is also dangerous because it subverts our con-

fidence in civil and political rights. What is the "civil right" to sit at a
lunch counter worth, for example, if you cannot afford lunch? 9 Madison
avoided any concrete, contextualized consideration of this question,
noting merely that those with property, as well as those without it, had
an interest in civil and political rights.' He did not consider how that
interest might differ for the two groups, perhaps because he had property. While the Framers were certainly not all rich,9' they were for the
most part comfortably middle-class. 9 The Framers understood the right
to property from their own perspective, that is, from the perspective of
those who had it.?
The text of the Constitution, for example, is replete with traces of
the right to property, taking it for granted that there are "Post Offices

formulating, clarifying, and applying policies that will simultaneously satisfy developmental goals
and attract beneficial private capital and technology").
89. For a compelling account of the lunch counter sit-ins and their importance in the Civil
Rights Movement, see TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS
1954-63, at 391 (1988); see also DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN 238 (1998) (discussing the
struggle for lunch counter rights). The slogan for the Legal Aid Society in the 1970s, "You can't
call a lawyer if you haven't got a dime," may be understood as an iteration of this idea.
90. See NEDELSKY, supra note 48, at 5.
91. Forrest McDonald demonstrated this in his critique of Charles Beard. See FORREST
MCDONALD, E PLuRIBus UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1790, at
198-99 (Liberty Press 1979) (1965); accord WARREN, supra note 49, at 75, 75 n.1 (describing the
financial difficulties of George Washington and George Mason).
92. As Mark Tushnet concludes:
Basically, of course, Charles Beard had it right. Not that the members of the Constitutional Convention were financially interested in any direct sense in creating a
strong national government. ... But ... that we cannot fully understand the Constitution unless we see how its underpinnings in political theory were connected to the
Framers' vision of social order and disorder, and he was right to emphasize that to the
Framers, the economy was the pivot of the social order.
Mark V. Tushnet, The Constitution as an Economic Document: Beard Revisited, 56 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 106, 106 (1987). Derrick Bell's fictitious Geneva Crenshaw puts it bluntly when she addresses the Framers:
"Are you not concerned with the basic contradiction in your position: that you ... in
fact represent and constitute major property holders? Do you not mind that your slogans of liberty and individual rights are basically guarantees that neither a strong government nor the masses will be able to interfere with your property rights and those of
your class?"
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 31 (1987)
(quoting CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 64-151 (1913)).
93. This is a postmodern clich6. As Steven Feldman notes, all textual understanding arises
from "one's current horizon of sociocultural prejudices and interests." Feldman, supra note 27, at
155.
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and post Roads"' as well as "Courts" and courthouses.95 The Second
Amendment, similarly, assumes that citizens have "Arms."96 The Third
Amendment assumes that citizens have "house[s]" in which soldiers

may not be quartered in times of peace. 97 The Eighth Amendment assumes that citizens
can afford to pay bail or fines as long as they are not
"excessive.""3 While not yet a rich nation, even in the beginning the
United States was far from a poor one.9 This is not to suggest, of
course, that there was no poverty in the colonies.'0l But poverty was not
considered as permanent as it had been in Europe; poor whites were not
so rigidly confined to their class."°' Poverty was considered more of a
choice than a fate, at least for white men.'2 Most white men could acquire property, 3 and once acquired, the law would assure their "'own-

ership, and undisturbed possession.'"'

94. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. By letter of March 6, 1796 to Madison, Jefferson noted that
the power to "establish" post roads could mean either "make the roads" or designate which existing roads would serve as post roads. See WARREN,supra note 49, at 479 n.1.
95. See U.S. CONST. art. 1M,§ 1.
96. See U.S. CONST. amend. II; see also EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY
AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 379 (1975) (explaining that
"[t]irearms were great levelers, and the use of them by ordinary men against established authority
was in itself enough to generate leveling thoughts"); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to
the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. L. REv. 461,467-69 (1995) (citing Madison and Jefferson, both
of whom noted with approval the widespread ownership of guns by Americans).
97. See U.S. CONST. amend. 111.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 60, at 3031.
The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no
objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What
is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges? What is understood by
excessive fines?
Id. at 187 (quoting Mr. Livermore).
99. "The bulk of Americans, in 1787, were actually neither rich nor poor, but... possessing
sufficient means to raise a family in reasonable comfort." WARREN, supranote 49, at 72.
100. See generally CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1941) (describing "four groups whose economic status
had a definite legal expression: the slaves, the indentured servants, the mass of men who could not
qualify for voting under the property tests imposed... and women").
101. But see MORGAN, supranote 96, at 384 (quoting James Madison's reply to Thomas Jefferson's suggestion that the poor in France appropriate the surplus lands held by the French nobility in which he stated that "'[a] certain degree of misery ... seems inseparable from a high degree
of populousness').
102. As McDonald put it, at the time of the formation of the union: "[M]ost New Hampshireites had already achieved the taxless, shiftless utopia which most Americans cherished as a secret
dream, and for which 'republicanism' and 'unalienable rights' were merely euphemisms."
MCDONALD, supranote 91, at 199.
103. See WARREN, supranote 49, at 72-73.
104. RAKOVE, supra note 40, at 294 (quoting William Penn).
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Libraries have been filled with volumes describing and analyzing
civil and political rights and the white men who defined and exercised
them.05 A recent article in the HarvardLaw Review, for example, rigorously examines the impact of Madison's arguments in The Federalist
No. 10 on his audience; that is, the other participants in the Constitutional Convention. 6 While this attempt to examine Madison's theory in
context'O7 is a welcome and important addition to the canon, "context" is
once again limited to the men who attended the Convention and the
texts they promulgated.
This Article, in contrast, attempts to situate the Framers in a
broader, more concrete, social context."' Who prepared their meals?
Who made and mended their clothes? Who bore their children? Who
nursed them when they were ill and took care of a thousand other details
of daily life so that the Framers could focus on the larger intellectual
questions that so engaged them and their chroniclers?"°
By deconstructing the right to property, we see what propertied
white men never had to see," ° what they took for granted, and what the
"rights culture" they bequeathed us has blinded us to. Deconstruction
reveals first, the lesser economic rights subsumed in the right to property; and second, the complex and dynamic relationship between these
subsumed economic rights and civil and political rights. Examining the
relationship between the two kinds of rights in the context of concrete
social history shows first, and most obviously, that the Framers' enjoyment of civil and political rights depended on their own enjoyment of
economic rights. Second, and much less obvious, their enjoyment of
these subsumed economic rights was in part assured by women's unseen
work. Finally, least obvious and most disturbing, the Framers' enjoy105. Frequently cited examples include BEARD, supra note 100; ELY, supra note 3;
MCDONALD, supra note 91; NEDELSKY, supra note 48; RAKOVE, supra note 40; REID, supra note
46; WARREN, supra note 49.

106. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison'sAudience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611,649-53 (1999).
107. See id. at 616.
108. See generally Barbara Stark, InternationalHuman Rights Law, Feminist Jurisprudence,
and Nietzsche's "Eternal Return": Turning the Wheel, 19 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 169, 196-97
(1996) (describing Adrienne Rich's demand to reject abstraction in favor of a concrete reconstructive project).
109. For a brilliant deconstruction of "the connection between patriarchy and the privileging
of the rational, the abstract, or the intellectual," see CULLR, supranote 2, at 58.
110. Cf. Barbara . Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (1993) (explaining the "trans.
parency phenomenon," that is, "the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about
norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific").
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ment of some of these rights was actually predicated on women's denial

of them;... they enjoyed these rights more because women enjoyed them
less.
A.

Economic Rights as an Iterationof the Right to Property

For the Framers, the right to property included lesser economic
rights; that is, those rights which property implies, those rights which
one possessing property has no more need to articulate than one possessing liberty need articulate a right "not to be bound." These subsumed rights include the right to an adequate standard of living, including food and shelter, and the right to work." 2 The Framers took
these rights for granted and fiercely resisted any threat to take from
them "'that which ... [was] rightly theirs, and nobody's else.... Because white women and slaves were for the most part incapable of
owning property, they could not take these lesser included economic

rights for granted." 4 Being permitted to hire her time, for example, was
a precious privilege for a slave woman." '
Two hundred years later, in the 1960s, these lesser economic rights
were similarly important to those emerging from colonialism in the
Third World." 6 States which had recently been property themselves

111. See discussion infra Parts V.B.4, V.B.9 (describing how men's property was increased
by the denial of women's right to work and how the purpose of women's education was to enable
mothers to educate their sons).
112. The right to work is one of "the means of acquiring property." Levy, supra note 69, at
262.
113. RAKOVE, supranote 40, at 294 (citation omitted).
114. Indeed, except for a small number of free black women, black women were property. See
PATRICIA J. WnLmLMS, THE ALCHFMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 162 (1991). Married white women
were like property. See id. For a brilliant and moving effort to come to terms with the dual legacies
of her great-great-grandparents, an eleven-year-old slave and the white lawyer who impregnated
her, see id. at 216-17.
115. See Davis, supra note 5, at 243 ("While many masters permitted persons they enslaved
to trade, hire their time, and amass small savings, these were all customary practices, without legal
force.").
116. See, e.g., Craig N. Murphy, What the Third World Wants: An Interpretationof the Development and Meaning of the New InternationalEconomic Order Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 226, 226 (Paul F. Diehl ed., 1989) (discussing the goals of Third
World governments for rectifying their economic problems); Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 300, U.N. Doc. A/9946
(1974) ("reaffirm[ing] its conviction of the urgent need to establish or improve norms of universal
application for the development of international economic relations on a just and equitable basis."); Declarationon the Establishment of a New InternationalEconomic Order, G.A. Res. 3201,
U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 527, U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974) (establishing a new
international economic order aimed at "correct[ing] inequalities and redress[ing] existing injustices, mak[ing] it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the develop-
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joined in the arduous process of defining "economic rights,"" 7 articulating the substance and content of those lesser subsumed rights which
the Framers had taken for granted."' A United Nations Committee was
formed to draft a legal instrument assuring these rights,"9 and the former
colonized States-the global have-nots, those who did not already pos-

sess property-were full participants in the process. This culminated in
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

(the "Economic Covenant").

The Economic Covenant has been rati-

fied by 141 other nations, including every other Western industrialized
democracy and Japan.'
By drawing on the Economic Covenant, we can invert the hierar-

chical opposition that underlies our own Bill of Rights and unpack the
right to property. What lesser economic rights are subsumed in that
right? What does the right to property mean from the perspectives of the

ing countries and ensur[ing] steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and
justice for present and future generations"). The emergence of new nation states in the late 1950s
and early 1960s may be understood as another iteration of colonial struggle. In deconstruction, as
noted above, "iterability" refers to the repetition of the same in a different context. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 751.
117. For a detailed description of the drafts, recommendations, and problems faced by the
Commission on Human Rights, which had been requested to draft a Covenant by the General Assembly, see MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 16-22 (1995).
118. The specifics, of course, vary as a function of culture. Cf. WOMEN AND PROPERTY, supra
note 46, at 2 (describing the ways in which western notions of property differ from those of other
social groups).
119. In 1952, the United Nations realized that two instruments, rather than the single instrument originally envisioned, would have to be drafted to implement the Universal Declaration. For
a description of the "complete reversal of its original position" by the General Assembly, pursuant
to which it requested the Commission to draft two covenants on human rights, see G.A. Res. 543
(VI), U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., 375th plen. mtg., at 201 (1952). See generally Barbara Stark, United
States' Ratification of the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED STATES: LOOKING INWARD AND LOOKING
OUTWARD (David Forsythe ed., 1999).
120. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. The Economic Covenant, is the "other" half of the International Bill of Rights. See, e.g.,
Barbara Stark, The "Other" Half of the International Bill of Rights as a Postmodern Feminist
Text, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 19 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993) ("The Economic Covenant [is] the 'other' half of the International Bill of

Rights.").
121. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (ast modified
July 31, 2000) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm>; see also Ambassador J. Ke,neth Blackwell, Book Review, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 485, 498 (1992) (reviewing HOWARD TOLLEY,
JR., THE U.N. COMMIssION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987)) (describing the United States as the only
country that had ratified the Civil and Political Covenant but not the Economic Covenant).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol28/iss4/6

24

Stark: Deconstructing the Framers' Right to Property: Liberty's Daughter
2000]

DECONSTRUCTING THE FRAMERS' RIGHT TO PROPERTY

have-nots?'2 By examining the rights set out in the Economic Covenant,
we expose what the Bill of Rights takes for granted and we discover that
economic rights are iterations of the Framers' right to property from the
perspectives of those who had no property, including those who were
property themselves.' 23
B. A DangerousSupplement
Even as the Framers sought to protect the propertied minority,
nothing-not even subsistence-could be taken for granted by white
women and black slaves.' While some of them lived quite well, and a
few even enjoyed the accoutrements of wealth and privilege, in general
they had no right to property. From the Framers' perspectives, white
women and black slaves were so obviously inferior that rights discourse
simply did not apply to them.'2'
122. The have-nots, of course, include a wide range of often-divergent interests. In
ARUNDHATI Roy, THE GOD OF SMALL THINGS (1997), for example, the author describes a dam
project which enables rice farmers in India to harvest two crops a year, but costs the surrounding
community a river. See id. at 118-19.
123. At the same time, economic rights may be in tension with the right to property. See, e.g.,
HuNT, supra note 40, at 45 ("The protection of property rights may, in fact, conflict with an obligation to provide housing, employment or food for all."') (quoting J.B. ELKIND & A. SHAW, A
STANDARD OFJUSTIcE 7-8 (1986)).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54.
125. For example, Madison referred to slaves as "an unhappy species of population ... sunk
below the level of men." THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 277 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (indicating Madison's views on slaves as "debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants"). As social historian Stephanie Wolf explains:
A free, married man was the "head of the family" and master of all its members, no
matter how marginal his own position in society. Black slaves were thoroughly dehumanized, appearing in inventories of property along with the cattle, horses, and other
livestock if they were field hands, and among the pots, pans, and "dough troughs" if
they were house servants. Servants, apprentices, wives, and children were not "chattels"
in the same literal sense, but they were generally not regarded as being "people" ....
Only the [white man] was recognized as a fully empowered responsible member of society... only he was, in fact, truly a human being. This legal fact of life impinged far
more on eighteenth-century Americans than any lack of political rights like speaking in
public, voting, or election to office.
WoLF, supranote 6, at 246-47. Many legal commentators have noted the consequences for women
of the Framers' misogyny and racism. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 92, at 9 (noting the ramifications
for black women emanating from "the psychologically disabling [condition] that contemporary
black men, ... like their slave forbears" suffer from); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's
Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453, 454-56
(1992) (discussing the shortcoming in the Bill of Rights with respect to "guaranteeing women the
exercise of governmental power"); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.J. 447,
486 (1984) (stating that "[t]he men who wrote the Constitution in 1787 designed a framework for
governing society as it was perceived by men and run by men"); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex
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From a human rights' perspective, the "inferiority" of white

women and black slaves was socially" 6 and politically 27 constructed by
the denial of basic human rights, including economic rights. 8 The Economic Covenant is a "dangerous supplement" because it adds to our understanding, exposing the Framers' perspective as incomplete. 29 It subverts our confidence in that perspective. 3 The fact that our confidence
has long been subverted, that the terrible flaws in the Framers' perspective are now widely recognized, 3 ' simply shows the extent to which
some of the basic precepts of the Economic Covenant have already
seeped into our consciousness and our law. 32 It also suggests the ongo-

ing costs of ignoring those precepts that have not.
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 955 (1984) (opining that "[t]he constitutional ideal
alienates people from their own experience"); Catherine A. MacKinnon, "Freedomfrom Unreal
Loyalties": On Fidelity in ConstitutionalInterpretation,65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1773, 1777 (1997)
("The Constitution does not prohibit the bad and the wrong. It does prohibit the unequal.");
MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 1282 (exposing the inequality present in the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights). But see RAKovE, supra note 40, at 337 ("[A]t the Convention Madison had described racial slavery as 'the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man,'
grounded on 'the mere distinction of colour."').
126. See infra Parts V.B.7, V.B.9 (discussing the denial of the rights to an adequate standard
of living and to an education).
127. See infra Part V.B.I.a (discussing the denial of the right to self-determination).
128. There are some surprising similarities between subsistence agrarian societies two hundred years apart. See generally Penelope Andrews, Spectatorsat the Revolution? GenderEquality
and Customary Law in a Post-Apartheid South Africa, in 7 LAW & ANTHROPOLOGY:
INTERNATIONAL YEARKBOOK FOR LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 261, 261 (Ren6 Kuppe & Richard Potz
eds., 1994) (describing the social and political construction of women's inferiority with respect to
the promise of equality for South African women of color).
129. Cf.Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of OriginalMeaning, 86 GEO.
LJ.569, 570-71 (1998) (arguing that "original meaning, properly understood, must contemplate
the possibility that a traditional practice is unconstitutional, and more broadly that requiring fidelity to original practices is inconsistent with interpreting constitutional provisions to stand for principles").
130. Many constitutional scholars, analogously, have rejected originalism because of a similar subversion of confidence. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Questfor the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205 (1980) (opining that "[s]ome central doctrines of American
constitutional law cannot be derived even by moderate originalist interpretation, but depend, instead, on ... 'nonoriginalism'"); James E. Fleming, OriginalMeaning W*thout Originalism, 85
GEO. L. 1849, 1849 (1997) (noting that several prominent originalists have asserted the notion
that it is not "possible for a constitutional theorist to give due regard to original meaning in constitutional interpretation without being an originalist"); Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 381, 382 (1997) (discussing whether the Constitution warrants a showing of fidelity).
131. A popular children's history text, the title of which is taken from a poem written by
Langston Hugues, for example, matter-of-factly refers to the Framers' failure to take blacks and
white women into account. See BEVERLY J.ARMENTO Er AL., AMERICA WILL BE 264 (1997).
132. The Economic Covenant's norms against race and sex discrimination, set out in Articles
2 and 3, for example, are glaringly absent from the Bill of Rights. See International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993 U.N.T.S. at 5. As Stephen Marks has
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C. Liberatingthe Text of the Economic Covenant
The conventional story is that Americans do not need economic
rights; they are irrelevant to our experience.' Most of the accounts of
the founding of the United States confirm this view." Economic rights
only emerge in these accounts as "trace.""13 By shifting our attention
from the historical experience of the Framers to the experience of a
group which did not enjoy economic rights, however, we "displace the
question, leading one to consider what are the processes of legitimation,
validation, or authorization that produce differences among readings
and enable one reading to expose another as a misreading. 136 By liberating the text of the Economic Covenant, we discover that economic
rights were extremely relevant to the historical experience of eighteenth
century women. For those who did not enjoy economic rights, who
could not take them for granted, they may well have been even more
crucial, even more vivid, than the civil and political rights to which we
unthinkingly subordinate them.

pointed out, our Bill of Rights addresses the first in the French triumverate of rights, "libert,
dgalitd, fraternitd." Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generationfor the
1980s?, 33 RuTGERS L. REv. 435, 441 (1981). The Economic Covenant, in contrast, addresses
"second generation" rights of "egalit6." See Jennifer A. Downs, Note, A Healthy and Ecologically
BalancedEnvironment: An Argument for a Third GenerationRight, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
351, 364 (1993). See generally Joan C. Williams, Culture and Certainty: Legal History and the
Reconstructive Project,76 VA. L. REV. 713, 725 (1990) (describing "the shift to humanitarianism
in the eighteenth century").
133. See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Postmodern Rhetoric, Economic Rights and an International
Text: "A Miracle for Breakfast," 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 439 (1993) (positing that the dream of
opportunity "made economic rights superfluous"). See also discussion infra Part V.A (discussing
how economic rights were not valued as much as civil and political rights on the United States).
134. See, e.g., BERNARD BAiLYN, THE OmGINS OF AimRiCAN PoLmcs 100 (1968) ("[T]here
was not sufficient stability in the economic groupings more loosely defined to re-create in America
the kind of stable interest politics that found in England so effective an expression in 'virtual' representation."); REiD, supra note 46, at 96-97 (examining different theories of property and stating
that "during ... seventeenth century, 'property' referred to rights of all kinds"); WARREN, supra
note 49, at 73-74 ("[A]n alignment of men as for or against a new Constitution, on the basis of
property or non-property ... is an attempted simplification of the political situation in 1787, which
facts and human nature do not support."); GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 404-05 (1969); Levy, supra note 69, at 260-62 (stating that while no one
opposed the principle of a bill of rights, the framers "had... confidence [in] their constituents and
the state legislatures that elected them" to uphold the principles contained therein); But see
NEDELSKY, supra note 48, at 96-97 (discussing James Wilson's alternative perspective that "property was not the main object of government."); ZINN, supra note 7, at 56-75.
135. See supra Part II.C (explaining the dominant concept of "trace"); supra text accompanying notes 89-95 (describing that which is taken for granted in the text and Amendments of the
Constitution).
136. CtULLER, supra note 2, at 179.
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By liberating the text of the Economic Covenant, in short, we may
achieve a transformation of sensibility. We may come to see that our
original conception of civil and political rights is incomplete, and come
to lose confidence in that reading. We may come to see, like the cakeloving protagonist of In The Night Kitchen,'37 that that which we value
most is dependent on the work of those who have hitherto been missing
from the story.
1. Economic Rights in Context
Economic rights must be understood in context, concretely, from
the bottom up. Like civil and political rights, economic rights are not
abstractions, but acquire meaning and substance from the real physical
contexts in which they are enjoyed, or from which they are absent. But
how can we grasp the physical contexts of another time? In The Holder
of the World,' Bharati Mukherjee's novel about two twentieth century
Americans trying to grasp the physical contexts of seventeenth century
colonial experience, she undertakes this task through two very different,
but complementary, approaches.'39 Venn is a virtual reality specialist,
meticulously collecting minute pieces of hard data, organizing them and
putting them in digital form.' ° The first-person narrator, in sharp contrast, follows clues serendipitously happened upon in museums and antique stores, linked together by some unspecified connection to a distant
ancestor.'4 ' Mukherjee suggests that the historian's project requires both
the painstaking accretion of detail and a discriminating surrender to visceral impressions. 14 Thus, while Venn methodically enters data on
weather conditions, economics, exchange rates, imports, and exports,
the narrator loses herself in a small
painting, seeking understanding
14
1
art.
to
response
subjective
a
through
Here, similarly, this dialogue with the past requires both meticulous research and a discriminating surrender to the stories that bring re-

137. See generally SENDAK, supranote 29.
138. BHARATi MUKHERiEE, THEHOLDER OFTHE WORLD (1993).
139. See id. at 5-21.
140. See id. at 5-6.
141. See id. at 7-20. A.S. Byatt tackles a very similar theme, more effectively but less pertinently. See generally A.S. BYATr, POSSESSION: A ROMANCE (1990) (illustrating that by doggedly
tracking a text, a scholar discovers her great-grandmother and her great love, who finds his vocation).
142. See MUKHERJEE, supra note 138, at 17-19 (describing what the narrator does and feels
when looking at a small painting).
143. Seeid. at5-6, 17-18.
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search to life." 4 Deconstruction can be used to give voice to both, making their respective claims and challenges explicit, allowing neither to
become the privileged, unquestioned perspective.'45 Deconstruction has
been used, for example, to question the authority of human rights law to
impose purportedly "universal" standards on people living in very different cultures.'" Several commentators have argued that such standards
incorporate Western values and they have urged those espousing them

to seek more constructive alternatives.'

7

Tracy Higgins, for example,

has proposed that human rights advocates engage in a "consciousness-

raising" dialogue with those in other cultures, through which both
groups may be changed.141 What is proposed here, however, is not a

consciousness-raising dialogue with women from another place, but a
dialogue with women from another time. 49 The risks are different, but
the objective-to displace our cultural solipsism-is the same."'

144. See infra notes 191-98 and accompanying text (describing the assumptions underlying
this "discriminating surrender" and the criteria used).
145. As Culler puts it, "[elach perspective shows the error of the other in an irresolvable alternation or aporia." CULLER, supra note 2, at 96.
146. See, e.g., Isabelle R. Gunning, ArrogantPerception,World-Travelling and Multicultural
Feminism: The Case of Female GenitalSurgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 189, 189 (1992)
(positing the author's right "as a western feminist... to criticize as right or wrong the practices of
an entirely different culture ... and ... [whether] law, with its attribution of right and wrong, exoneration and punishment, [should and can] be used to eradicate a cultural practice"); Hope Lewis,
Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation":Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARv. HUmi. RTs. J. 1, 3 (1995) (exploring "the ambivalence and tension in feminist discourse about the involvement of Western feminists in a human rights-based, cross-cultural
effort to eradicate" female genital surgery).
147. See, e.g., Karen Engle, Female Subjects of PublicInternationalLaw: Human Rights and
the Exotic Other Female, in AFrER IDENrrY: A READER INLAW AND CULTURE 210,210-12 (Dan
Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995) (discussing different cultural perspectives on the practice of
female genital mutilation).
148. See Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 119 (1996).
149. See BELL, supra note 92, at 28. In Professor Bell's compelling account, Geneva Crenshaw is "enabled by extraordinary forces to address the Framers of the Constitution just as they
were about to sign it." Id. at 24-25. Startled by the sudden appearance of a black woman surrounded by a "transparent light shield" one of the delegates demands, "[h]ow dare you insert yourself in these deliberations?" Id. at 27, 28. She responds by quoting Thomas Jefferson's observation
that slavery "brutalizes slave owner as well as slave and, worst of all, tends to undermine the 'only
firm basis' of liberty, the conviction in the minds of the people that liberty is 'the gift of God."' Id.
at 28 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
150. But see Feldman, supra note 27, at 156 (criticizing the use of deconstruction by modernists who use it "to criticize the normative positions of other modernists. But then, once the values and goals of others have been neatly deconstructed and swept away, the modernist writer typically begins to articulate his or her own normative position").
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this is a complex and often am-

biguous project. The impact on eighteenth century women of the lack of
some economic rights, such as the capacity to own property, seems

relatively straightforward. The impact of the lack of other economic
rights, however, such as "the right to health," at a time when medical
attention was often fatal, is considerably more problematic. At the very
least, however, this dialogue with the past illustrates the void in our jurisprudence, the absence of economic rights from the very beginning,
and the overwhelmingly negative impact of that absence on women
even then.
2. Reclaiming the Past
American women 5 2 are all "Liberty's Daughters" in that they all
live with the legacy of the women of the Republic, whether consciously
or unconsciously, whether their ancestors were kidnapped and brought
here centuries ago,' whether they arrived twenty-five years ago from
Puerto Rico," 4 or whether they arrived yesterday from Southeast Asia. 5

That legacy permeates our laws, especially the laws that continue to
marginalize economic rights, from the patched-over lacunae in the Constitution to the family laws that still insulate the private sphere from the
151. See infra Part V (describing a thought experiment in which the Economic Covenant is
transported to the eighteenth century).
152. This includes all women subject to American law, aliens as well as citizens. As Deseriee
Kennedy points out, many women throughout the world are "subject" to American law, whether
American nationals or non-nationals. The focus here is on women living within United States territory, but the point is well-taken and one I address at length in Barbara Stark, Women and Globalization: The Failure and Postmodern Possibilities of International Law, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 503 (2000).
153. See, e.g., CROSSING THE DANGER VATER: THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF AFRICANAMERICAN WRITING 39-47 (Deirdre Mullane ed., 1993) [hereinafter CROSSING THE DANGER
'WATER] (discussing an account of Phillis Wheatley's kidnapping in 1761 and how she became the
first African American author to be published in book form).
154. For a rich and sharply observed account of one woman's arrival, see Berta Esperanza
Hernndez-Truyol, Borders (En)Gendered:Normativities, Latinas, and a LatCrit Paradigm,72
N.Y.U. L. REv. 882, 892-97 (1997); Berta Esperanza Hemdndez-Tmyol, Natives, Newcomers and
Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century, 23 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 1075,
1075-78 (1996).
155. Many young women from Southeast Asia are lured here by international "mail-order
bride" businesses. See, e.g., Christine S.Y. Chun, Comment, The Mail-OrderBride Industry: The
Perpetuationof TransnationalEconomic Inequalitiesand Stereotypes, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
1155, 1157 (1996) (examining the mail-order bride industry by focusing on transactions between
the United States and the two major suppliers of mail-order brides, the Philippines and Russia);
Eddy Meng, Note, Mail-OrderBrides: Gilded Prostitutionand the Legal Response, 28 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 197, 197 (1994) ("explor[ing] the international mail-order bride industry where
women from Asia and other developing countries are trafficked to men in Western industrialized
countries").
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public sphere.156 We cannot understand the erasure of economic rights in
this country without understanding their legacy, and we cannot understand that legacy without understanding their experience." If we are to
reclaim economic rights, accordingly, we must reclaim our past.'

This has psychological, as well as, legal implications.'" That is, the
historical erasure of economic rights has shaped the way our culture
thinks and feels about the distribution of wealth and property,''6 from

our notions of what kind of work, done by whom, deserves what kind of
compensation, to our notions of what kind of work should be done for
"love," and not for money at all 61 Thus, the dialogue attempted here is
analogous to the psychoanalytic process. As Peter Brooks explains it,

through the "talking cure," the patient eventually imposes order and
meaning on the events of her life. 62 By shaping the past into a coherent

story, the patient in analysis creates a coherent self and thus frees her-

156. See, e.g., Davis, Antebellum Perspective, supra note 5, at 288 ("[T]he ideological messages and distributional consequences of private law are at least as important-if not more important-than the public law criminalization of a particular kind of relationship.").
157. Native American women are not included in this study because they were subject to the
laws of another sovereign, and another culture. Useful introductions to eighteenth century social
histories of Native American women may be found in MARION E. GRIDLEY, AMERICAN INDIAN
WOMAN (1974); FRANCIS JENNINGS, THE INVASION OF AMERICA: INDIANS, COLONIAUSM, AND
THE CANT OF CONQUEST (1975); HENRY THOMPSON MALONE, CHEROKEES OF THE OLD SOUTH
(1956).
158. This Author has discussed the need for such reclamation elsewhere. See, e.g., Stark,
Turning the Wheel, supra note 108, at 181-86 (discussing "Nietzsche's 'Eternal Return' and the
struggle that women face in attempting to overcome their history); Barbara Stark, Urban Despair
and Nietzsche's "EternalReturn:" From the MunicipalRhetoric of Economic Justice to the InternationalLaw of Economic Rights, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 185, 194-95 (1995) (showing that
irrespective of the perception that economic rights in United States culture are too marginal, in
fact, the United States has already adopted economic rights law and the urban poor can claim this
law as their own).
159. Gerda Lerner "persuasively argued that women's struggle to comprehend their own history lies at the heart of their ability to envision a world in which they are full participants." Kerber
et al., supra note 7, at 4. This has become a major feminist project. See generally ScoTT, supra
note 6, at 15-27 (describing the recent work of historians who are explicitly taking women's experiences into account).
160. The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLTJ"), for example, has taken the position that
while the government has no affirmative obligation to assure the rights set out in the Economic
Covenant, it cannot "cause or perpetuate poverty." Nadine Strossen, What Constitutes Full Protection of FundamentalFreedoms?, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 48-49 (1992).
161. See Annamay Sheppard, The UnfinishedBusiness of American Family Law, in GENDER
BIAS AND FAMILY LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 1, 1 (Barbara Stark ed., 1992).
162. See PETER BROOKS, READING FOR THE PLOT: DESIGN AND INTENTION IN NARRATIVE 90112 (1984) (comparing the process of structuring experience into a coherent narrative, or story,
with the psychoanalytic process).
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self from the internalized constraints of the past."6 This is experienced
as both liberating and empowering. As Richard Rorty explains, by
finding "a way to describe [the] past which the past never knew... [we
find selves] to be which [our] precursors never knew [were] possible."'"
Because of our reverence for the Framers, we remain ambivalent,
even now, about recognizing their wrongs. '6 Their ideas about rights
were inspired by, we say, the bedrock upon which to build a great
66
country. The Framers simply did not extend those ideas far enough.1
But this ignores the economic, social, and cultural assumptions
built into those rights and thus, ironically, reinforces and perpetuates
those wrongs. 67 By imagining how the Economic Covenant might have

163. "The first act of a feminist critic is 'to become a resisting rather than an assenting reader
and, by this refusal to assent, to begin the process of exorcizing the male mind that has been implanted in us."' CULLER, supra note 2, at 53 (quoting Judith Fetterly).
164. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 29 (1989); cf.Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1690 (1997) ("For many feminists, the
self that lies at the heart of liberal constitutional theory ... does not comport with women's selves
under patriarchy.").
165. As Jennifer Nedelsky explains:
Their sense of the vulnerability of property in a republic became the focus for the
broader task of securing individual rights against the tyranny of the majority. This focus, in turn, led to the greatest weakness of our system: its failure to realize its democratic potential. The Framers' preoccupation with property generated a shallow conception of democracy and a system of institutions that allocates political power
unequally and falls to foster political participation.
NEDELSKY, supra note 48, at 1. See generally JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN SPHINX: THE
CHARACTER OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (1997) (exploring contemporary ambivalence toward Thomas
Jefferson); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CH. L. REV. 453 (1992) (discussing the structural problems with the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights).
166. See, e.g., Ackerman & Katya, supra note 63, at 573 (explaining that the founding of the
United States stands for the promise of the future).
So long as the Republic lives, the Founding will serve as a caution for the future: The
Glorious Revolution has no end, but only new beginnings; we cannot sustain our constitutional tradition without unconventional innovation and democratic renewal; we
cannot sustain our tradition without leaving a large space for the People, and their ongoing effort to take control of their government.
Id. See generally MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION INAMERICAN CULTURE xi (1986) ("attempt[ing] to describe the place of the Constitution in the public consciousness and symbolic life of the American people").
167. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 54, at 1285 (describing that "laws developed when
women were not allowed to learn to read and write, far less vote, enunciated by a state built on the
silence of women, predicated on a society in which women were chattel, literally or virtually").
See generally Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 4 (1987) (analyzing the eight "topics" he deems necessary for studying the Constitution
through economics). But see McKenna, supra note 13, at 79-80 ("The Framers knew that both
laws and men were indeterminate and evolving.... They designed a form of government that
forced debate on every major decision and new law.").
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transformed the lives of those for whom civil and political rightswithout more-would have made little difference, we can begin to
appreciate the extent of those wrongs, and what might be required to

remedy them."
"Economic rights" are an anachronism, inconceivable at the time.
This is precisely the point, however. Because economic rights were inconceivable to the Framers, except as enjoyed by the already-propertied,
the universalizing trends that eventually extended civil and political
rights to those originally denied them, never applied to economic
rights. 6 9 Nor can economic rights ever be "found" in the Constitution, as
the Supreme Court has consistently held. 70 While the interdependence
of economic rights and civil and political rights is globally recog-

nized, 7' accordingly, economic rights still play a very minor role in our

national jurisprudence. 72 Their marginalization reflects and reinforces
the marginalization of those who still have the least property-a group,
not coincidentally, disproportionately comprised of women'73 and black

men.

174

168. "When we understand the distortions rooted in the original focus on property, we can
more clearly see the real problems Madison so brilliantly and imperfectly grappled with, and we
can begin to envision alternatives to the concepts and institutions he bequeathed us." NEDELSKY,
supra note 48, at 15. As Professor Kramer concludes:
[W]hile investigating the reception of Madison's theory is only a start, it suggests a
possible need to reexamine the Founding more broadly and to consider whether-in our
understandable desire to make the creation of the Constitution seem as important, familiar, or just plain interesting as possible-we have mischaracterized what it actually
meant in context.
Kramer, supra note 106, at 673.
169. But see, e.g., Cogan, supra note 50, at 478 (describing the demise of property requirements for voting that occurred in the 1800s).
170. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 288 (1984)
(holding that demonstrators and protestors had no right to sleep in public places); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 297 (1980) (holding that there was no right to Medicaid funding for abortion);
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (holding that there was no right to housing). See
also Lynn A. Baker, The Myth of the American Welfare State, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 110
(1991) (reviewing THEODORE R. MAIMOR ET AL., AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE:

PERSISTENT MYTHS, ENDURING REAL-mS (1990)). Many scholars have argued that economic
rights should be "found" in the Constitution. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE
MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 17 (1996) (finding "the defining aim of democracy to be ... collective decisions [that] treat all members of the community as individuals
with equal concern and respect"). For a number of sources supporting this premise as well, see
supra note 10.
171. See supranote 12 and accompanying text.
172. "US jurisprudence reveals an approach to rights which is less amenable to second generation rights than any other Western jurisdiction." HUNT, supranote 40, at 52.
173. In 1995, 13.3% of women between the ages of 18 and 64 were at or below the "poverty
threshold" as computed by the Bureau of the Census, compared to 9.5% of men. See HACKER, supra note 9, at 62-63. Among older people, poor women outnumber poor men three to one. See id.
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V. A CASE STUDY: LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
This Part is a thought experiment in which the text of the Eco-

nomic Covenant is "liberated" from its twentieth century moorings and
transposed intact to the eighteenth century." 5 Imagine that "Madison's
nightmare" became reality, 7 6 that Shays's Rebellion and similar rebellions' 77 were not squelched, but succeeded and sparked still more rebellions, and that the Constitutional Convention was forced to take another

faction into account.'

Imagine that this faction, drawing perhaps on

at 64. The link between women's subordination and private property was first theorized in
FREDERICK ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE STATE 43 (1884)

For a critique of Engels's "thesis that women's subordination developed through the private ownership of property together with monogamous marriage," see WOMEN AND PROPERTY, supra note
46, at 1. For an analysis of "how women might do systematically worse than men with respect to
property, if one [assumes] either... that women have a greater 'taste for cooperation' than men
.... [or] that women am merely perceived to have a greater taste for cooperation than men, even
though that perception may be erroneous," see CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION:
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OwNERSHIP 234 (1994).
174. In 1995, 29.3% of blacks were poor. See HACKER, supra note 9, at 63. Although official
statistics fail to capture the poverty rate for single men, Hacker notes the pertinence of the United
State's incarceration rate. See id. at 65. The total number of inmates, it is predicted, will well surpass two million by the end of year 2000. See Gaylord Shaw, TougherLaws Result in Increased
Number of Prisoners,LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Jan. 1, 2000, at lIB. For a black American
born in 1999, the chances of incarceration are 1 in 4. See Timothy Egan, Hard Time: Less Crime,
More Criminals,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, (Week in Review), at 1.
175. See supraPart H.D (discussing "liberating the text").
176. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Madison'sNightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 342
passim (1990) (discussing events subsequent to Madison's vision (i.e. "the new bureaucratic system... [that] constitute Madison's Nightmare")).
177. Ackerman and Katyal point out:
Shays's Rebellion was only the most dramatic example of agrarian uprisings that swept
through Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, as well as Massachusetts, in the
mid-1780s. Throughout western New England, farmers were not only closing down
courts and refusing to pay debts. They were engaging in more constructive forms of
politics, meeting in illegal county conventions, and making extraordinary demands for
fundamental change.
Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 63, at 498. See also DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION:
THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECrION 120 (1980) ("[I]t is clear that Shays' Rebellion
played an integral part in the genesis and formation of the United States Constitution .... "); ZINN,
supranote 7, at 93-94.
178. The extent to which Shays' Rebellion affected the Constitutional Convention is a matter
of considerable debate. See Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 63, at 498 n.66. Compare WARREN,
supra note 49, at 79 (stating that historians have overemphasized the role of Shays' Rebellion in
bringing about the call for the Constitutional Convention) with ZINN, supra note 7, at 94 (positing
that such rebellions played a critical role in motivating the effectuation of the Convention). In fact,
after the Massachusetts General Court declared a state of rebellion, the Governor raised 2600 new
troops and the legislature "passed an act disqualifying Shaysites from voting, serving as jurors, or
holding public office." Ackerman & Katyal, supra note 63, at 504 n.81.
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Thomas Paine's plan for economic, social, and cultural rights,' although unable to persuade the Convention to incorporate these rights
into the Constitution, produced a separate legal instrument, the Eco-

nomic Covenant, which was duly ratified by the Congress. What difference would it have made? To whom?80
A.

An Overview of Economic Rights

The Preamble to the Covenant explicitly "[r]ecogniz[es] that ...
the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can
only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy
his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political
rights.. ." Economic rights refer to a State's obligation, inter alia, to
assure its people's basic needs, including an "adequate standard of living"; i.e., food, housing, healthcare, and shelter. In addition, the Covenant requires States to assure education, employment, support for the
family, and similar rights conducive to the "inherent dignity of the human person."'' 2
As a practical matter, the drafters of the Economic Covenant understood that these rights could not be implemented in precisely the
same way as civil and political rights.'83 Rather, economic rights are to
be "progressively ...realiz[ed]."'" This does not mean that economic
rights are merely "aspirational." Rather, the State is expected to make
179. See Eric Foner, Introduction to THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 1, 9 (1984).
The crucial social chapter of Part Two envisages a graduated income tax to finance
a benefit for newly-wedded couples; a maternity allowance; a benefit for poor families
enabling them to raise and educate their children; public employment for those in need
of work; a system of social security permitting workers to retire on a pension at age
sixty; and a benefit for the decent burial for those who die in poverty.
HUNT, supra note 40, at 6. Paine's arguments were "extraordinary for [their] time." MARK E.
BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND CONsTTUmoNAL FAiLuRE 1216
(1998).
180. See supra text accompanying note 132.
181. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5.
182. Id.As Craven notes:
Of those rights that might be clearly defined as "economic", "social", or "cultural"
rights, the only obvious absence from the Covenant is the right to property. A draft article based upon article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had been put
forward for inclusion in the Covenant [by the United States] but disagreement over the
issues of expropriation and compensation meant that agreement upon a text was never
possible.
CRAVEN, supranote 117, at 25.
183. See CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 106 passim.
184. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5.
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steady progress towards its realization. 5 According to the Committee
charged with implementing the Economic Covenant, at the very least
"progressive realization" means that a State cannot fall below previously assured levels of rights. 6 In addition, some progress, some dis-

cernable improvement in the enjoyment of rights, must be shown over
time.
Scholars have argued that civil and political rights are "negative"
rights, which basically require that the State refrain from certain acts.' 88
Economic rights, in contrast, have been characterized as "positive"
rights, imposing affirmative obligations on the State, which are necessarily more difficult to implement. 9 This dichotomy, however, has been
criticized for overstating the distinction between the two types of
rights. 19
Rather, both kinds of rights require extensive and often complex
interactions between State and private actors, and public and private
law.'9' Civil and political rights, for example, require courthouses, lawyers, and an independent judiciary (beyond the reach of bribes or corruption), if they are to function effectively.'9 The United States has be-

185. See Philip Alston, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
in MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTING UNDER SIX MAJOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS 39,46-47, U.N. Doec. HR/PUB/91/1 (1991).
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. See, e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 88106 (1989) (discussing theories of civil and political ideas and property, including Locke's theories).
189. The relationship between negative and positive rights involves what deconstructionists
call:
[A] notion of presence ...the superior term belongs to the logos and is a higher presence; the inferior term marks a fall. Logocentrism thus assumes the priority of the first
term and conceives the second in relation to it, as a complication, a negation, a manifestation, or a disruption of the first.
CULLER, supranote 2, at 93.
190. See HUNT,supra note 40, at 55-56 ("It is misleading to suggest that civil and political
rights require only non-interference by the state. The prohibition against torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, for example, obliges the state to provide places of detention which conform to
international standards and to establish training programmes for prison and police officers."); see
also CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 111 n.22 ("The obligation to protect in the field of civil and political rights would seem to require as a minimum the provision of an effective police force and
justice system.").
191. For a brilliant account of the role of private laws in preserving property rights and sustaining racism, see Davis, supra note 5, at 221-88.
192. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (E.D. Ark. 1971) ("Inadequate
resources can never be an adequate justification for the state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights. If the state cannot obtain the resources to detain persons awaiting trial in accor-
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come oblivious to some of these costs'93 because we take them for

granted; we have always invested in them. From the earliest public
buildings in Philadelphia and Washington to the student loans which
weigh down recent graduates, we have invested, publicly and privately,
in the civil and political rights which are so valued as a part of American law.
We have treated economic rights very differently. In the case of
property-owning men, the complex interrelationship between legal supports on the part of the state and responsible stewardship on the part of
the rightsholder was well understood in the eighteenth century.'" Eight-

eenth century women, like contemporary women, were primarily responsible for assuring "lesser" included economic rights, such as adequate food, clothing, and shelter.'95 The male head of the household was
expected to provide them with the means with which to do so, and he, in
turn, could rely on certain supports from the government.'96 But it was
the women's responsibility to make sure that each member of the
household was fed, clothed, and sheltered. If her husband, father, or

owner failed to provide her with a household allowance sufficient for
doing so, a woman generally had no recourse.' 9 She was nevertheless

dance with minimum constitutional standards, then the state simply will not be permitted to detain
such persons.").
193. See id. Others have given rise to protracted litigation. Forty-five states, for example,
have been subjected to court order for unacceptable prison conditions. See RICHARD B. LILLICH &
HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEaS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE
314-17 (3d ed. 1995). The courts have consistently rejected "insufficient resources" as a justifica,
tion. See Hamilton, 328 F. Supp. at 1194; accordHUNT, supra note 40, at 56-57.
194. See infra text accompanying notes 448-50. Negative rights may be more meaningful, in
general, for men than for women. "Thus, for feminists, the assumption that the self is adequately
protected by negative liberties so as to enable her full participation in both public and private life
is problematic ... because it implies a level of agency that, under patriarchy, may be more accurate for men than for women." Higgins, supra note 164, at 1696. As Carol Rose explains:
[I]f ... [women] acquire fewer assets than ...[men], they are not likely to have the
political influence that ...[men] have, because they cannot make the same investment
in politics that ...[men] can.... [T]hey cannot make the same investment in influencing culture either, even when the culture is about "what women are like" or "what
women think...."
ROSE, supra note 173, at 252 (discussing the differences between men and women in terms of acquiring wealth and power) (citations omitted).
195. See infra Part V.B.7 (discussing women's culturally imposed duties with respect to the
Article 11 "right to an adequate standard of living"). Paul Hunt observes that "[plut crudely, traditionally-speaking, first-generation rights are men's rights and social rights the responsibility of
women." HUNT, supra note 40, at 87.
196. As Ely points out, for example, the colonial governments typically subsidized mills to
assure that citizens could afford bread. See ELY, supra note 3, at 19-20.
197. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 328-34.
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expected to "make do." Women were blamed, then as now, for their inability to care for their families, even under circumstances making it
impossible for them to do so.'98
This is consistent with John Locke's blueprint, which separated the
public sphere of politics and civil society from the domestic sphere of
the family.' 99 The laws and customs which encouraged women's subordination to their husbands, unlike the laws and customs which encouraged their husbands' subordination to the King, were maintained under
Locke's liberal theory. As Carole Pateman trenchantly notes, "[t]he
dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two
centuries of feminist writing and political struggle; it is, ultimately,
what the feminist movement is about." '

Greater power attaches to the public, male world. Assigned to the domestic sphere,
women are regarded as dependent on men for subsistence. Further, the law more
closely regulates the public sphere. Shielded by the privacy of domestic life, the private
world is less visible and less regulated, tending to preserve the status quo. In short, the
dichotomy is gendered: it "operates both to obscure and legitimate men's domination of
women.
HUNT, supranote 40, at 86 (citation omitted).
198. See Catherine McBride-Chang et al., Mother-Blaming: Psychology and the Law, 1 S.
CAL. REv. L. & WoMEN's STUD. 69, 69 (1992) (discussing the historical scape-goating of mothers); cf Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REV. 871, 873-75
(1994) (arguing that the work of black mothers is devalued and unappreciated). The extent to
which this norm was internalized varied, of course, among cultural groups as well as among individuals. See id. at 873.
199. This public/private dichotomy can be traced to Aristotle. See GERDA LERNER, THE
CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 208-11 (1986) (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICA (Benjamin Jowett trans.),
in, THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (W.D. Ross ed., 1921)); see also infra text accompanying notes
278-79 (discussing how Locke separated the public sphere of politics and civil society from the
domestic sphere of the family).
[Locke], in company with other Enlightenment thinkers, severed the connection between family and state; he in particular contended forcefully that the state originated
not in the family but in a contractual agreement among men, and that the alms and
functions of the resulting polity were very different from those of the family.
NORTON, supra note 6, at 5. See also infra Part V.B.2 (noting that Locke stated that authority was
grounded in the social context).
200. See infra notes 276-79 (explaining this assertion in greater detail).
201. Carole Pateman, Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281, 281 (S.L Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983); see also Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to InternationalLaw, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613, 635 (1991)
("The major forms of oppression of women operate within the economic, social and cultural
realms.").
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B. Economic Rights on the Ground
This Part focuses on the decades between 1750 and 1800.m The
experience of women during this period varies tremendously, of course,
as a function of class,2 geography,' race,2°5 and the specific circumstances of their lives.' It is not the purpose of this Part to provide a
comprehensive overview, but rather to provide some concrete examples

202. This includes part of the "colonial period," which is much broader, generally referring to
the period beginning in the early seventeenth century until the Revolution. Some of the source
material relied upon falls outside of this range. Several studies, for example, covered the period
between 1750 and 1830. See, e.g., SALMON, supra note 6, at xii (discussing "the three concerns of
women's legal history in a study of property law between 1750 and 1830"). As Gerda Lerner has
observed, "[s]ource material concerning black women is much more difficult to find than that pertaining to slaves in general." BLACK wOMEN IN W-hTE AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 14
(Gerda Lerner ed., 1972) [hereinafter BLACK WOMEN IN WHrITE AMERICA]. Accordingly, when
such material is unavailable, I have relied on material which falls outside this time period, indicating the actual dates whenever possible. As Lerner observes, however, challenges to slavery in
the 1820s through the 1830s produced a backlash of increasingly stringent laws and repressive
practices. See id. at 26. For a rich and detailed account of the daily lives of slaves in South Carolina in the mid-nineteenth century, for example, see CHARLES JOYNER, DOWN BY THE RIVERSIDE:
A SouTH CAROLINA SLAVE COMMUNITY (1984).
203. See, e.g., Many Revolutions, in PORTRAITS OF AMERICAN WOMEN FROM SEirLEMENTTO
THE PRESENT 65, 65-135 (G.F. Barker-Benfield & Catherine Clinton eds., 1998) [hereinafter
PORTRAITS OF AMERICAN WOMEN] (containing biographical essays on American women of the
late eighteenth century, including the wealthy Eliza Lucas Pinckney, middle class Mercy Otis
Warren, and black poet Phillis Wheatley, whose life ended in poverty). See generally Kerber et al.,
supra note 7, at 2 (describing Gerda Lerner's determination to study "even the poorest" women).
204. "New Englanders," for example, "gave male heads of household more control over family property... than was common elsewhere." SALMON, supranote 6, at 6; accordNORTON, supra
note 6, at 12 (describing the differences between the Chesapeake and New England communities).
Salmon also notes the "remarkable diversity in colonial laws." SALMON, supra note 6, at 3; accord
COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE SOCIETY 1-2 (Lois Green Carr et al. eds., 1988) (noting the differences in
colonial life among the North and South).
205. See, e.g., IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST Two CENTURiES OF
SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 101 (1998); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 53, at 46-47; MASTERS
AND SLAVES IN THE HOUSE OF THE LORD: RACE AND RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 17401870, at 103 (John B. Boles ed., 1988); SLAVERY AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 32, 178-80 (Ira Berlin & Ronald Hoffman eds., 1983). In Virginia, "the number of
Africans rose in the colony from a mere twenty three in 1625 to three hundred by 1640 ... No
African man or woman who set foot in Virginia after 1640 had the benefit of indenture's or the
hope that their 'service' would be anything but lifelong." GIDDINGS, supranote 6, at 36.
206. "Social historians have documented black, women's, and working-class subcultures,
each of which harbors ways of being and understanding fundamentally at variance with the 'consensus' heretofore assumed." Williams, supra note 132, at 729. This is not to say, of course, that
there were not important overlaps. "Submission and obedience, the core values of slavery, weie
also the key words of patriarchy and piety." Nell Irvin Painter, Soul Murder and Slavery: Toward
a Fully Loaded Cost Accounting, in NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 125, 129. See generally CHUSED, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining the religious, cultural, commercial, and political diversity present in Maryland in the eighteenth century).
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of the lack of economic rights in women's lives.2 It then draws on deconstruction to explore and illuminate the consequences.
This Part focuses, to the extent possible with respect to a particular
right, on the perceptions of eighteenth century women themselves. The
absence of economic rights, as such, was rarely an issue for most of
them. This is not to say, of course, that they were unaware of their own
hunger, poverty, or dependence; rather, they did not view their various
deprivations as the absence of an entitlement. But the eighteenth century
was neither homogenous nor hermetic."' In different contexts, different
women noted and protested the absence of particular economic rights in
their lives. Two very different groups of eighteenth century women
were perhaps especially likely to question the cultural "givens": African
American women, particularly those who had been kidnapped from Africa; and those white female heads of households whose privileges were
a constant reminder that limitations were not inherent in gender."'
1. Article 1-The Right to Self-Determination
Article 1 of the Economic Covenant provides that: "All peoples
have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development." 210 The Guidelines explain that, "[t]he right of
self-determination is of particular importance because its realization is
an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of these
rights. ' 21' That is, while the right to "freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-

207. For a very different, but not inconsistent, approach, see ROSE, supra note 173, at 233.
208. See, e.g., MARC W. KRUMAN, BETmEEN AuTHoRrrY & LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION
MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 103-06 (1997) (noting that a few even asked why widows
and unmarried women with property could not vote); WOLF,supranote 6, at 249 (concluding that
"[the revolutionary century did ... little to change the status of women and, like that of blacks, it
got better in some places, worse in others").
209. As Norton explains, there were "three problematic elements" in the late seventeenth
century and early eighteenth century social hierarchy. See NORTON, supra note 6, at 10. First,
women, as mothers, had some authority within the family. See id. Second, widows were no longer
subordinate to their husbands. See id. "[TJhird, high-status women took precedence over lowstatus men ....When the three elements were united-that is, in the persons of high-status widowed mothers-the combination posed particularly knotty problems for state and society." Id.
210. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993

U.N.T.S. at 5.
211. Alston, supra note 185, at 82. In the Guidelines to the Covenant, Philip Alston, Chair of
the Committee, notes that the Civil Covenant uses the same language. See id.
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ment" belonged to groups like the American colonists, a major
212 purpose

is to assure the rights of individuals within the larger group.
The drafters of the Economic Covenant, like the American Framers, recognized the primary importance of self-determination; that is,
the right of individuals to participate politically in their government.213
Indeed, the Revolution was fought so that Americans could "freely de"freely pursue their ecotermine their political status and[,]" implicitly,
' 21 4
nomic, social and cultural development.
But women were universally denied this right. Thus, the concept of
self-determination contained an oppositional hierarchy: "selfdetermination" was the privileged conception, and determination by
others was the subordinated opposition, which was, in fact, the experi-

ence of eighteenth century women. 25" No women could vote. 26 Almost

all black women were slaves and property themselves, protected only by

212. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5; ROSE, supra note 173, at 253 (explaining how a woman in a relationship with a
"sufficiently domineering" man can find herself "in a situation comparable to slavery"); c Patrick
Thomberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLAssIc AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 135, 140 (Charlotte Ku
& Paul F. Diehl eds, 1998) (describing State resistance to minorities' claims of "selfdetermination").
213. The idea of self-determination is often considered the first principle of the American
Revolution. See BAILYN, supra note 134, at 19-20. The idea took root and became pervasive:
"Authority had been challenged in 1776 by appeals to the people that now seemed limitless. The
right to rule, the Whigs had said, existed only so long as the people's good was promoted. But
who could judge the people's good better than the people themselves?" WOOD, supra note 134, at
398.
214. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5.
215. See generally BRANDON, supra note 179, at 28 (discussing the contradictions between
the Constitution's simultaneous protection of freedom and slavery).
216. See KERBER, supra note 6, at 120.
A married pair might express only one will to the outside world-the husband's; therefore a married woman had no independent control of her property. Since republican
theory emphasized that the right to participate in the management of a political unit
stemmed from ownership of property, the denial of political rights to women seemed
quite natural.
Id. "Women who were not slaves were counted as persons, without being mentioned, for purposes
of apportionment; slaves of both sexes were explicitly counted as three-fifths of a person. The only
MacKinnon, supurpose of counting either of them was to divide power among white men ....
pra note 54, at 1282. New Jersey was a brief exception to this rule, allowing property-owning
women to vote until 1807. See EDWARD R. TURNER, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE IN NEW JERSEY: 17901807 SMiTH COLLEGE STUDIES IN HISTORY 1 (1916); accordAnn D. Gordon & Man Jo Buhle, Sex
and Class in Colonial and Nineteenth-Century America, in LIBERATING WOMEN'S HISTORY:
THEORETICAL AND CRITICAL ESSAYS 278, 296 n.24 (Berenice A. Carroll ed., 1976).
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the economic self-interest of their masters,1 7 which conspicuously failed
to assure any minimal level of rights. ls White women were subject to
their fathers' governance as daughters 19 and to their husbands' governance as wives.m

a. Political Status
Unlike the Framers, the drafters of the Covenant explicitly made

the right to self-determination applicable to women as well as to men.2"
While most eighteenth century women may well have been baffled by
the "right to self-determination," the contemporaneous acts and state-

ments of two specific groups-African slaves from the Igbo tribe in

217. See, e.g., PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES 175-76 (1997) (describing "slaveholder's unnatural powers ... over the sexual functions
of slaves," including "breeding").
218. "Slaves had little protection ... from a master's excessive cruelty." NORTON, supra note
6, at 103. Indeed, killing a slave was not a felony because "'it cannot be presumed that prepensed
malice (which alone makes [murder a felony]) should induce any man to destroy his own[] estate."' Id. (quoting the reasoning of the legislators). By definition slavery precludes enjoyment of
the threshold right of self-determination:
The essence of slavery was that the slave was legally a chattel, a piece of property
to be bought and sold and disposed of at the master's will. He had no legal rights, could
not testify in his own behalf nor bear witness against a white person. As a result of this
feature of the slave system, which was peculiar to North American slavery, the slave
was subject to the arbitrary will of his master in all matters.
BLACK WOMEN INWHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 5. For an earnest, if now well-discredited,
effort to perpetuate that myth, see ULRICH BONNELL PHILLiPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY: A
SURVEY OF THE SUPPLY, EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL OF NEGRO LABOR AS DETERMINED BY THE
PLANTATION REGIME 261 (Louisiana State University Press 1969) (1918).
"The care of negroes is the first thing to be recommended, that you give me timely notice of their wants that they may be provided with all necessarys [sic]. The breeding
wenches more particularly you must instruct the overseers to be kind and indulgent to
... and the children to be well looked after,... and that none of them suffer in time of
sickness for want of proper care."
L. (quoting Richard Corbin, writing for the guidance of his steward in 1759) (second alteration in
original).
219. After the Revolution, daughters were allowed to inherit as well as sons in most states.
See SALMON, supra note 6, at 142.
220. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 54, at 430; see also SALMON, supra note 6, at 188 (describing reforms to simplify the law, which further disadvantaged women by strengthening the
concept of "[u]nity of person"); infra Part V.B.2 (discussing nondiscrimination); cf. KERBER, suipra note 6, at 140 (describing St. George Tucker, who published Blackstone's commentaries in the
United States and was dismayed by the treatment of women under American law).
221. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5; infra Part V.B.2.
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West Africa and a small group of well-to-do educated white womenshowed that they would have put it to good use.'
These two groups were probably closer to the right of selfdetermination than any other women in the colonies. For affluent, educated white women, the right was expounded upon and enjoyed by the
men in their own homes. For the Igbo women, the right was a recent
memory.' Despite spatial and temporal proximity, however, the right to

self-determination remained out of reach for both groups.
In Africa, the Igbo were highly democratic.22 Although "women
did not participate in government to the same degree as men,", they
were accustomed to political autonomy. Before their enslavement, Igbo
women "distinguished themselves in multiple arenas.... [by] controll[ing] local exchange.... [and] regularly defend[ing]the village."
The Igbo women in America soon realized they had no hopes for a decent life among those who had kidnapped and enslaved them. While
some sought to regain their right of self-determination by running

away, others, along with Igbo men, took more drastic measures.
There are innumerable stories and songs in African American
folklore about slaves who "[rose] up in [to the] sky an[d] ...[flew]

222. See DAVIS, supra note 217, at 109 ("As early as 1774, enslaved people petitioning the
government of Massachusetts grounded their claim to freedom in an argument of a natural right to
family integrity and autonomy.").
During the Revolutionary War [,.... slaves like Jenny Slew and Elizabeth Freeman
...of Massachusetts successfully sued for their freedom on the grounds that the Bill of
Rights applied to them as "persons." Freeman's case, heard in 1781, established the legal fact that "a Bill of Rights, in Massachusetts at least, had indeed abolished slavery."
GIDDINGS, supra note 6, at 40 (quoting HOWELL RANES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS
INTHE DEEP SouTH RErMEERED 280 (1977)).
223. See, e.g., L. Amede Obiora, Bridges and Barricades:Rethinking Polemics and Intransigence in the CampaignAgainst Female Circumcision,47 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 275, 305 (1997)

("The epoch-making political demonstrations of Igbo women at the turn of the century offer a
clear example of how the 'public sphere' is not conceptualized as masculine.").
224. See, e.g., JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNrrY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 15 (1972) (describing Tbo culture by drawing on the account of Olaudah
Equiano, the son of an Tbo tribal leader).
225. MICHAEL A. GoMEz, EXCHANGING OUR COUNTRY MARKS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AFRICAN IDENTiTES IN THE COLONIAL AND ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 128 (1998).
226. Id. at 126-27.
227. See id.at 121; see also id at 126-27 (describing the disproportionate number of Igbo
female runaways in America); GERALD W. MLLN, FLIGHT AND REBELLION: SLAVE RESISTANCE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY VIRGINIA 36 (1972) (noting that "rebelliousness ...focuses on the psychological implications of a pattern of resistance for the slave an individual"); PETR H. WOOD,
BLACK MAJORrrY: NEGROES IN COLONIAL SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1670 THROUGH THE STONO
REBELLION 239 (1974) (capturing this resistance in the chapter "Runaways: Slaves Who Stole
Themselves").
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Michael A. Gomez traces these stories to an actual

event at Ebo Landing on St. Simon's Island, where a group of Igbo
slaves marched into the river and committed collective suicide. 9 As
Gomez explains, the Igbos believed that at death their spirits would fly
back to their native land.2 Thus, "the slaves in the account, presumably
Igbo, were experiencing suffering unusual even for a slave.... such that
they were unproductive, and rather than accept punishment, they chose
to fly back to Africa.""' The Igbo women would have known exactly
what to do with the right to self-determination-they would have returned home. 2
The second group of eighteenth century women who would have
known what to do With the right to self-determination were those educated American women who saw an obvious parallel between the colonists' situation with respect to the British and their situation with respect to the new American government. In 1781, for example, Mary
Byrd "claimed the right to redress of grievances 'as a female, as the
parent of eight children, as a virtuous citizen, as a friend to [her] Coun-

228. The Flying Africans, in 2 THE HEATH ANTHOLOGY OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 204,205
(1990); see also HERBERT G. GUTMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 17501925, at 332 (1976) (describing prevalence of the belief held by Africans that they would return to
their own country after death); Wishbone (PBS children's television show) (devoting an episode to
this theme in which Anansi, a "trickster" spider, showed the slaves how to make magical golden
dust which caused them to rise up in the air and fly toward Africa when tossed at each other while
working in the fields).
229. See GOMEZ, supra note 225, at 119; see also DAVIS, supra note 217, at 63 ("By its radical deprivations of civil rights, slavery imposed a civil death, such that the enslaved person was
unable to go about the characteristically human projects of applying energy to chosen ends, establishing and honoring affiliations, and making moral choices.").
230. See GOMEZ, supra note 225, at 117-19.
231. Id.at 119.
Some of these stories are probably references to absconding, but the fact that the
American-born never similarly vanish suggests that many of these flights were suicides,
and that the Igbo were disproportionately represented in these tragedies. In any event, a
close link between the Igbo and suicide was clearly established in the minds of many
planters, and a self-ternminating labor force was clearly out of the question.
Id. at 120.
232. See, e.g., id. at 71-72 (noting that in 1733, a Royal African company Officer had Ayuba
b. Sulayman freed and returned to Wvest Africa after the officer was "moved by his plea (penned in
Arabic) for liberty"). The right to return now is well established in international human rights law.
See, e.g., Universal Declarationof Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 13, 2, at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) ("Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country."); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
176 ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.").
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try, and as a person, who never violated the laws of her Country.'"23" As
Norton observes:
Byrd's recital of her qualifications was peculiarly feminine in its attention to her sex and her role as a parent (no man would have included such items on a list describing himself), but it was also sexless
in its references to her patriotism and her character as a "virtuous citizen." In developing the implications of the latter term, Byrd arrived at
her most important point. "I have paid my taxes and have not been
Personally, or Virtually represented," she observed. "My property is
taken from me and I have no redress."'
As Abigail Adams more famously warned her husband John, "'[i]f
p[a]rticular care and attention is not paid to the Laidies,' [sic] ... 'we
are determined to foment a Rebel[1]ion, and will not hold ourselves
bound by any Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation." '
But, the liberal principle of "consent of the governed" only applied to
men.S In the "Ladies" context, it could only be a joke. Thus, Abigail
Adams used iterability, the repetition of the same in a different context,2 7 to expose the dangerous supplement, the hidden subordinated
conception on which the privileged conception depended."S Here, the
privileged conception, the "consent of the governed," in fact depended
on the continuing governance of women without their consent. The subordinated conception, the refusal to extend the principle of consent to
women, was its dangerous supplement, exposing the original conception

233. MARY BETH NORTON, LIBERTY'S DAUGHTERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE OF
AMERICAN WOMEN, 1750-1800, at 226 (quoting Mary Byrd); see also KERBER, supra note 6, at
140 (citing St. George Tucker, who complained that women were subject to taxation without representation, since they were taxed but could not vote).
234. NORTON, supranote 233, at 226.
235. Id.; see also THE BOOK OF ABIGAIL AND JOHN: SELECTED LETTERs OF THE ADAMS
FAItLY 1762-1784 (L. H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1975) (restoring the spelling mistakes and the
sections of Adams' letters deleted in an earlier edition by her grandson, Charles Frances Adams,
regarding matters he considered "unseemly," such as her pregnancies and child rearing); see generally EDITH B. GELLES, PORTIA: THE WORLD OF ABIGAIL ADAMS (1992) (discussing the life and
times of Abigail Adams through her letters).
236. See Linda K. Kerber, A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like American Ladies:
Women and the Obligations of Citizenship, in NEw FEMINIST ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 17, 21
("Even though coverture, which transferred a woman's civic identity to her husband at marriage,
giving him the use and direction of her property throughout the marriage, was theoretically incompatible with revolutionary ideology ...patriot men carefully sustained it.").
237. See Balkin, supra note 2, at 749-50.
238. See CULLER, supra note 2, at 104-05; Balkin, supra note 2, at 751.
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as incomplete.29 What did it mean for a woman to be a "citizen," as Ad-

ams and Byrd argued, if in fact women did not have access to the law? 20
b. Economic, Social, and Cultural Development

Their inability to freely determine their political status kept eighteenth century women from changing the law, and the law kept them
from enjoying the second element of the right to self-determination: i.e.,
the right to "'freely pursue their [economic,] social and cultural development."'2' Female slaves could not own or transfer property; they did
not even "own" themselves. 2 Rather, they were property and could be
sold and transferred. Their sexuality and reproductive capacity, simi-

larly, were subject to their owners' control.

3

Even wealthy white women were generally denied the right to economic self-determination? 4 First, "[u]nder the common law the colonists inherited from England, married women legally became one with
their husbands, and so they could not sue or be sued, draft wills, make
contracts, or buy and sell property. '' 45 Even if women earned money, it
belonged to their husbands.? Laws under which slave owners owned
slaves' wages and property and husbands owned their wives' wages and

239. See supra text accompanying notes 6-17.
240. See NORTON, supra note 233, at 227 (noting that Byrd and Adams "thus demonstrated an
unusual sensitivity to the possible egalitarian resonances of revolutionary ideology and showed an
awareness of implications that seem[ed] to have escaped the notice of American men").
241. CRAVEN, supranote 117, at 120; see also id. at 120-21 ("Not only is the individual posited as the primary subject of development, but ... emphasis is placed upon 'empowerment' or
'self-reliance' as an objective.").
242. See Kimani Paul-Emile, The CharlestonPolicy: Substance or Abuse?, 4 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 325, 336 (1999).
243. See discussion infra Part V.B.6.a.
244. See, e.g., Twila L. Perry, Alimony: Race, Privilege,and Dependency in the Searchfor
Theory, 82 GEO. L.. 2481, 2484 (1994) (noting that there is a hierarchy among white women, in
which their value is determined by their ties to affluence).
245. NORTON, supra note 233, at 45-46; see also Rende Hirschon, Introduction:Property,
Power and GenderRelations, in WOMEN AND PROPERTY-WOMEN AS PROPERTY, supra note 46, at
1, 20 n.2 ("J.S. Mill, an early feminist,... assert[ed] 'the wife's position under the common law of
England is worse than that of slaves in the laws of many countries."') (quoting J.S. Mill).
246. See NORTON, supra note 233, at 45-46. "[I]f they owned property prior to marriage, any
personal estate went fully into their husbands' hands and any real estate came under their spouses'
sole supervision." ld. at 46. Prenuptial agreements were available in the United States, although
they were generally constiued quite narrowly. See KERBER, supra note 6, at 141 (citing Wilson v.
Wilson, 1 S.C. Eq. 219 (1 Des. 219) (1791)); cf. BROWNE, supra note 41, at 15 (noting that in
England, "a wife's property, including her earnings, became her husband's, although there were
restrictions on his right to dispose of land belonging to her[;] .... rich families normally settled
their daughters' money [under the management of a trustee] ... rather than allowing it to pass into
their husbands' control").
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property would have directly contravened Article 1(2), which provides,

"[i]n no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence." 47 In many cases, the "self-determination" enjoyed by propertied
white men was thus predicated on the denial of women's selfdetermination.
The slave codes, and the customs they supportedUS imposed brutal

constraints on black women's social and cultural development. From the
earliest practices of the slave traders, who made every effort to separate

slaves who spoke the same language,29 to laws prohibiting slaves from

congregating for worship,20 social life was rigidly restricted."' Notwithstanding these restrictions-and to some extent, paradoxically, because
of these restrictions-over time and incrementally,
slaves developed a
2
rich and diverse African American culture
247. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 232, 999 U.N.T.S. at
173. "'[E]very man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself.
The labourof his body and the works of his hands... are properly his."' Reva B. Siegel, Home as
Work: The First Woman's Rights Claims Concerning Wives' Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103
YALE LJ.1073, 1103 n.104 (1994) (quoting John Locke, An Essay Concerningthe True Original,
Extent and End of Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND
ROUSSEAU 17 (1947). Professor Siegel has described how nineteenth century feminists cited John
Locke and Adam Smith when they "invoked the discourse of self-ownership to protest the expropriation of wives' labor ..."Id. As Fran Ansley points out, whether a gender constitutes a "people" within the meaning of Article 1.2 is problematic. This interpretation is supported, however,
by the redundant assurances of nondiscrimination on the grounds of sex in the Covenant. See, e.g.,
discussion infra Part V.B.2 (describing the nondiscrimination norms of Articles 2 and 3).
248. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 53, at 252 (discussing the Georgian slave codes which
"created numerous new crimes for which slaves could be executed and placed strict limitations on
slaves' everyday activities and movements").
249. This practice developed after several shipboard uprisings. See WOLF, supra note 6, at
24-25; see generally RICHARD NEWMAN & MARCIA SAWYER, EVERYBODY SAY FREEDOM:
EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT AFICAN-AMERICAN HISTORY 31 (1996) (noting how
African slaves "welded themselves ...into a single people" despite their different languages and
cultures).
250. See NEWMAN & SAWYER, supra note 249, at 32. By law, for example, slaves could not
gather for worship in several southern states unless a white person was present. See id. See generally ALBERT J. RABOTEAU, SLAVE RELIGION: THE 'INVISIBLE INSTITUTION" IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH 214-15 (1978) (discussing, among other things, religion in the slave communities and noting that despite the fact that "[s]laves faced severe punishment if caught attending secret prayer
meetings[,]" slaves nevertheless "devised several techniques to avoid detection of [those] meetings").
251. Prohibitions against the most intimate relationships between husbands and wives, and
parents and their children are discussed in connection with Article 10. See infra Part V.B.6. The
ways in which African culture was suppressed, similarly, are discussed in connection with Article
15. See infra Part V.B.10.
252. See, e.g., EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THEWORLD THE SLAVES MADE
xvi (1976) (concluding that "slaves made an indispensable contribution to the development of
black culture and black national consciousness as well as to American nationality as a whole");
MORGAN, supranote 96, at 379 (noting that the use of firearms by ordinary men against the estab-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

47

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 6
HOFSTRA L4W REVIEW

[Vol. 28:963

Although white women, even those who were indentured, had considerably more scope for social development in that they were not legally prohibited from meeting with friends, or traveling to do so, as a
practical matter white women were also subject to restrictions." 3 First,
few had the means to travel independently.2 Second, even fewer had
the time. As described elsewhere,' 5 their families depended on them on

a daily basis .2 6 Thus, women's social activity had to be justified by providing some greater benefit to the family or, less commonly, to the
community."7 In the early part of the century, for example, women were
expected to call on a large number of acquaintances in order to barter." 8
Women also participated in quilting and sewing "'bee[s.]' ' 59 For the
most part, however, white women's social lives revolved around the

church, which reinforced norms of female subordination.O Unlike black
women, whose social lives were rooted in a counterculture in which the
norms of white society were often irrelevant,26' white women were a

lishment "was in itself enough to generate leveling thoughts"); see also discussion infra Part V.B.1
(discussing the denial of the right to self-determination with respect to women); discussion infra
Part V.B.10.a (examining how black women were denied their African heritage).
253. See COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE SOCIETY, supranote 204, at 225. Women had limited social
lives in the Chesapeake in the early eighteenth century. See id. (stating that visits were generally
limited to those with neighbor women living only a few miles away).
254. See discussion infra Part V.B.4.b (noting married women's inability to own property).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99; infra text accompanying notes 448-53.
256. See AMERICA'S WOMEN AT WORK,supra note 6,at 6. As Groneman and Norton explain,
women's first responsibility was to "the culturally shaped 'needs' of their families. A woman's
own interests have long been subordinated to those of her husband and children; she and they have
traditionally perceived their demands on her time as superior to other possible claims." Id. This
often applied to blacks as well as to whites, although "[t]he sexual division of labor ...among
slave families on antebellum plantations ... had no explicit economic base." Id. at 7.
257. See id. at 7, 25-26.
258. See Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, Housewife and Gadder: Themes of Self-Sufficiency and
Community in Eighteenth-CenturyNew England, in AMERICA'S WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 6,
at 23-24 (noting that historians have documented social "gadding" as an accepted mechanism for
the distribution of goods).
259. See id. at 30.
260. See 1 THOMAS WOODY, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES
177-79 (1966). The Calvinists, for example, "held to the supremacy of the male as indicated ...
[in the instructions to the wife that] 'you are to love your lawful husband, to honor and fear him, as
also to be obedient unto him."' Id. at 179 (quoting THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REFORIED DUTCH
CHURCH OF N.A. 124 (1840)). Women were treated more equitably in the Middle Colonies, which
Woody traces in part "to different religious conceptions" from those of New England. See id. at
177. He notes, for example, that in Quaker "marriage[s] there was no promise of obedience." Id. at
178.
261. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 217, at 92 (describing the importance of "fictive kin" and
other ties relied on by black women to assure the care of children). But see discussion infra Part
V.B.10.a (describing the suppression of African culture).
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part of the dominant white culture and for the most part, they accepted
and internalized its norms.
2. Articles 2 and 3-Nondiscrimination72
The universality of economic, social, and cultural rights is confirmed by the explicit provisions of Article 2: "The States Parties to the
present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in
the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any
kind as to race, colour, sex, ... or other status."' 3 Equality under the
law26' is essential to the Covenant scheme. Equality, similarly, comprised the "'life and soul"' of eighteenth century republican thinking,
according to historian Carl Wood.2ss But equality was still a relatively
new idea, and its parameters were uncertain. While it was clear that
there would be no nobility, 266 some still dreamed of a New World meritocracy: "[N]one would be too rich or too poor, and yet at the same time
...men would readily accede to such distinctions as emerged as long as
they were fairly earned." 267

262. See CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 22. As Craven points out, Articles 2 through 5, in Part II
of the Covenant, set out the principles that apply to all of the substantive provisions in Part m11,
including clauses regarding nondiscrimination. See id. As he further notes, however, Article 2 only
appears to apply to rights "recognized" in the Covenant. See id. at 26. Article 3, in contrast, requires the state to "ensure" rights. See id.
263. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5.
264. See CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 184-92. Affmnative action necessary to compensate for
historical discrimination is a notable exception. See id.; see also infra note 288 (noting that the
Covenant recognized the need for affirmative action to further women's economic independence).
265. See WOOD, supra note 134, at 70 (quoting David Ramsay, Oration on Advantages of
American Independence, Niles, ed., Principles,375).
266. See The FEDERALIST No. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
As Hamilton explained:
Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the cornerstone of republican government; for so
long as they are excluded there can never be serious danger that the government will be
any other than that of the people.
Id.
267. WOOD, supra note 134, at 73; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not
less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property
immediately results ....
Id.; see also Kramer, supra note 106, at 631 n.85 (explaining the contemporary belief in a natural
aristocracy).
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Equality was grounded in the social contract theory of John

Locke.m According to Locke, authority was grounded not in some natural, divinely ordained hierarchy, but in the social contract, i.e., the
agreement between the governed and the governing.29 Locke's theory

challenged a profoundly hierarchical society, in which the notion of female subordination was firmly embedded. This was encapsulated in the

philosophy of Sir Robert Filmer.20 Each household was a little monarchy, with each male head of household serving as a benevolent despot. 2"
Hierarchies of subordination and responsibility were replicated within
the family structure; that is, just as the wife was subordinate to the husband, the children and servants were subordinate to the wife.2 2 Among
servants, as among children, gendered hierarchies were replicated. This
was redundantly reinforced-and internalized-through culture (including religion), 3 social relations (formalized in family law), and economic institutions. 27 4
Norms most deeply embedded, such as those regarding race and
gender, were considered natural and not subject to analysis."' Although
268. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 94 (Peter Laslett 2d ed., 1967).
269. See id. at 92-93.
270. See ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS xv (Johann P. Sommerville
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1648). As Norton concisely explains:
[The Filmerian] outlook saw family and state as analogous institutions, linked symbiotically through their similar historical origins, aims, and functions .... [This] worldview assumed the necessity of hierarchy in family, polity, and society at large. Authority in all aspects of life theoretically emanated from the top, not the bottom, of those
essential hierarchal structures.
NORTON, supra note 6, at 4; see also Note, Organic and Mechanical Metaphors in Late Eighteenth-Century American Political Thought, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1832, 1832 (1997) (describing
other metaphors, besides the family relations metaphor, for political structures in the eighteenth

century).
271. See, e.g., JOHN DEMos, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH
COLONY 282-84 (1970) (discussing the reinforcement of hierarchies in the Puritan household).
272. See id.
273. See supra note 260. Some religions insisted upon a stronger version of this than others
did. See SALMON, supra note 6, at 8. The Puritans, for instance, considered the wife's submission
to her husband's will a central tenet. See id. This was in tension with English common law rules
regarding conveyance, dower, and marriage settlements. See id.
274. See CATHERINE CLINTON, THE PLANTATION MISTRESS: WOMAN'S WORLD INTHE OLD
SOUTH 60 (1982). Female subordination was reinforced in the South, for example, by the difference in ages between husbands and wives. See id. In the South, the median age of marriage for
women was 20, while the median age for men was 28 (taken from a sample of planters born from
1765 to 1815). See id. In the North, in contrast, the median age of marriage for women was 24,
while the median age for men was 26. See id.
275. See CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 191-92. This resonates with late twentieth century rhetoric of "individual choice." See, e.g., id. (noting the conflict between the exercise of individual
choice and the control of discriminatory behavior). Private clubs, for example, have sought to bar
women on the grounds of their members' First Amendment freedom of association rights. See,
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many opposed slavery, especially in the North, their objections were not
grounded in any presumed equality between the races, but rather in the
notion of liberty.2 6 Rather, distinctions grounded in gender were accepted as necessary and inevitable.' 7 Thus, even as Locke challenged
the political order (the public sphere), he left the private domestic
sphere to the laws and customs of the old regime.27 8 While Locke's theory was the basis for the political challenges asserted by the white men
at the top of the domestic hierarchy against a foreign authority, the implications of that theory did not immediately reverberate in the domestic
sphere. 279
While most eighteenth century women might have considered the
Covenant's prohibitions against discrimination unintelligible,20 they

e.g., New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1988) (rejecting a challenge to a New York City law prohibiting discrimination in private clubs deemed to be sufficiently
"public" in nature). The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such arguments. See id. at 18
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537, 545-46 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984).
276. See generally MORGAN, supra note 96, at 379-82 (noting that many Northerners opposed
slavery not for equality of the races but because slavery was not consistent with a Republican ideology).
277. See NORTON, supra note 233, at xiv. Norton notes:
Eighteenth-century Americans proved to have very clear ideas ...of what behavior
was appropriate for females, especially white females; and of what functions "the sex"
was expected to perform. Moreover, both men and women continually indicated in
subtle ways that they believed women to be inferior to men ....[M]ost of the white
women who lived in pre-revolutionary America turned out to display low self-esteem,
to have very limited conceptions of themselves and their roles, and to habitually denigrate their sex in general.
Id.
278. See NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 21. "If ever there were a site to examine the
simultaneity of the personal as the political, it is here. The legal treatises of the early republic describe households as hierarchical as if Locke had never written." Id. As Professor Comett points
out in her analysis of eighteenth century English law, "women's legal subordination and their concomitant exclusion from the public sphere were not theorized." Judy M. Cornett, Hoodwink'd by
Custom: The Exclusion of Women from Juries in Eighteenth-CenturyEnglish Law and Literature,
4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 14 (1997); cf.Mark E. Brandon, Family at the Birth of American ConstitutionalOrder, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (1999) (arguing that "conceptions of the
family played an important role in imagining and establishing political authority in England and in
her colonies in North America").
279. See SALMON, supra note 6, at xvii. "Most important, although the ideal of equality espoused in the Declaration of Independence did not work immediately to allow women greater
autonomy, it represented a powerful weapon for future use ....In this sense, the influence of the
American Revolution is still being felt today." Id.; c. BROWNE, supra note 41, at 20 (noting that
Locke "argues that women and men should receive similar educations, and that the extent of a
wife's subordination to her husband is a matter of contract; [and] can be varied, or even abolished
altogether ....He does not deny women's natural inferiority, but consistently plays it down").
280. See DE PAUW & HuNT, supranote 6, at 153 (explaining that no "woman of her time perceived these [lofty] principles [of the Revolution] as promising full equality to the female sex").
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would have resonated profoundly for some. Numerous examples have

survived of women who questioned the constraints of the time. Elizabeth Freeman and Jenny Slew, for example, sued for their freedom in
Massachusetts, asserting that slavery could not be reconciled with the
principles of the Revolution.2 ' Mercy Otis Warren claimed a place for
herself in the world of work, becoming a prolific political writer and
historian.22 Others, like Mary Byrd, sought to challenge property regimes. 283 Eighteenth century laws and customs limiting ownership, management, and transfer of property to men plainly would have violated
the Covenant. In such cases, moreover, the norms of the Covenant
would have been justiciable84

More generally, over time, the Covenant probably would have
supported the progressive realization" of nondiscrimination. As a dangerous supplement, it may well have exposed the original understanding
as incomplete.26 It would have subverted confidence in the privileged
concept and undermined the myriad economic and social arrangements
that reinforced and perpetuated the eighteenth century social structure."'
Successful reliance on the Covenant in some areas would have encour-

281. See id.; GIDDINGS, supra note 6, at 40; see also HAROLD W. FELTON, MuMBET: THE
STORY OF ELIZABETH FREEMAN 7 (1970) (discussing the action brought by Elizabeth Freeman,
"Mumbet," in 1781 to obtain freedom under the constitution of Massachusetts). Equality as a social norm, as opposed to a legal right, was more often found between partners in a slave family
than in a white one. See GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 501 ("The slave family ... rested on a
much greater equality between men and women than... the white family.").
282. See Marianne B. Geiger, Mercy Otis Warren, in PORTRAITS OF AMERICAN WOMEN:
FROM SETTLEMENT TO THE PRESENT 121, 121 (G. J. Barker-Benfield & Catherine Clinton eds.,
1998); see also KERBER, supra note 6, at 227 ("Warren was virtually the only prominent American
example who could be trotted out against the complaint that intellect necessarily meant rejection
of domesticity and domestic work.").
283. See supra text accompanying notes 233-40.
284. See CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 181 ("It would seem quite apparent that States are capable of eliminating most dejure discrimination immediately.").
285. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supranote 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5-6; see also Alston, supra note 185, at 39 (noting that the progressive realization obligation of Article 2.1 of the Covenant is made subject to the availability of resources). "The provisions of this Article are probably the most complex in the entire Covenant. They are of major
importance since they spell out the nature of the general obligation incumbent upon all States parties with respect to each and every one of the substantive obligations recognized in the Covenant."
Id. at 46.
286. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
287. See SALMON, supra note 6, at 191 (noting that this would have accelerated a process
already underway because "[b]y 1800 ... families were becoming increasingly egalitarian. Male
dominance in the family circle was yielding to an emphasis on spouses' equality, albeit an equality
based on the idea of separate spheres").
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aged women to rely on it in others.5 Norton points out, for example,
that women voluntarily remained ignorant of family finances:
Married women rarely appear to have sought economic information
from their husbands, whether in anticipation of eventual widowhood or
simply out of a desire to understand the family's financial circumstances. On the contrary, women's statements reveal a complete acceptance of the division of their world into two separate, sexually defined spheres.289
This "complete acceptance" reflected a very real recognition of
their lack of options. Once married women had a right to manage their
own property, surely some, at least, would "have sought economic information" from their husbands, and would have begun-however tentatively-to question the "division of their world into two separate,
sexually defined spheres." 2 °
3. Articles 4 and 5-Non-Derogation
Articles 4 and 5 address the non-derogation of economic, social,
and cultural rights. Article 4 provides in pertinent part that "the State
may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by
law only in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these
rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a
democratic society." 29' As Professor Alston notes, this imposes a rigorous standard: "[L]imitations must, in the first place, be 'determined by
law' in accordance with the appropriate national procedures and must

288. The Covenant scheme also supports women's economic independence by recognizing
the need for affirmative action. See CRAvEN, supra note 117, at 184-86 (noting an insightful
analysis of affirmative action in the Covenant, which concludes that while the travaux confirm the
legitimacy of affirmative action, there is little indication beyond Article 3 that it is required, although the focus throughout on vulnerable and disadvantaged groups is certainly consistent with
an endorsement of affirmative action); cf.Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Human Rights Comm., 37th Sess.,
General Comment 18, Non-discrimination, at 26, U.N. Doe. HRIIGEN/l/Rev.1 (1989) ("Mhe
principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the
Covenant."); HUNT, supra note 40, at 64 (noting the General Comment on non-discrimination and
equality).
289. NORTON, supra note 233, at 7 (footnote omitted).
290. As Reva Siegel notes, Antoinette "Blackwell may have been one of the first feminists to
note that the law reduces women to 'pecuniary dependence' on men." Siegel, supra note 247, at
1075 n.3.
291. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5.
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not be arbitrary or unreasonable or retroactive. The
29 limitations must also
'be compatible with the nature' of these rights." 2
Article 5 extends the prohibition against derogation in three important ways. First, it extends this prohibition to non-State third parties. 293 Second, it extends the prohibition to activities indirectly aimed at
derogation, such as indenture.2' Third, it prohibits derogation from any
other fights on the "pretext" that the Covenant requires such derogation.29
Articles 4 and 5 require the State to address the inevitable tensions
between and among civil/political and economic, and social and cultural
rights. 2" Thus, the supplement becomes dangerous here in a political
sense because it exposes competing interests. The practice of allocating
one-seventh of the food allowance for slaves as for white indentured
servants, 2'7 for example, could have been challenged under Article 11.
Those private individuals responsible for setting this allowance might
have argued that the food allowance was their own property, to do with
as they liked. Articles 4 and 5, however, would have provided an important counter-argument. For the State to have supported those private
individuals would have been to support non-State third parties in the effective derogation of Article 11 rights. This is precisely the example
used by Alston to illustrate a violation of these provisions: "[A] limitation which purported to prevent access to food by a part of the population would be unlikely to be considered ... to be compatible with the
basic concept of human dignity on which the Covenant is grounded." 293
Similarly, arguments that it would be impractical or unnatural to
educate girls would have generally been rejected under the Covenant,
even if supported by evidence that girls themselves were uninterested in
education.2'9 Rather, the State would have been expected to address the

292. Alston, supra note 185, at 48.
293. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supranote 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6 (extending protection to a "group or person"). As Craven notes, "[it must be assumed that where the State is not in a position to ensure the rights itself, it must regulate private
interaction to ensure that individuals are not arbitrarily deprived of the enjoyment of their rights by
other individuals." CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 112.
294. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supranote 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 5-6.
297. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 166.
298. Alston, supra note 185, at 48. Nor could such a limitation be justified by appeal to "the
general welfare in a democratic society," he continues, since it "simply discriminated against one
segment of society in favour of another." Id.
299. See discussion infra Part V.B.9 (discussing the right to education).
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social and cultural factors underlying girls' lack of interest and to affirmatively educate the public about the importance of educating girls."
Tensions between competing rights would have been subject to the
same kind of rigorous, contextual inquiry.
l 3 '
4. Articles 6, 7, and 8-The Right to Work
The right to work is broken down in the Covenant into three major
guarantees. First, under Article 6, the State "recognize[s] ... the right of
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely
chooses or accepts." 3 Article 7 goes on to assure "just and favourable
conditions of work," explicitly including:

[Flair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without
distinction of any kind, in particularwomen being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equalpay for

equal work; a decent living for themselves and their families...; rest,
leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours. .. 2'
Article 8 focuses on the right to form and join trade unions.' As
the commentary to the Guidelines notes, "Itihe right to work is of fun300. See, e.g., Report on the Eighth and Ninth Sessions, Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. ESCOR, 8th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 33, U.N. Doc. E/1994/23/E/C.12/1993/19
(1994) (noting that the Committee has explicitly rejected religion as a justification for derogation
and Iran had interpreted the nondiscrimination norms of Article 3 "with due regard to Islamic
standards"). In response, the Committee noted that it was apparent "that the authorities in Iran are
using the religion as a pretext in order to abuse these [women's] rights." Id.
301. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S at 6 (noting the right to work); see also CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 22-23 (setting out the
substantive rights protected).
302. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6; see also CRAVEN, supranote 117, at 194.
Article 6 ... is not so much concerned with what is provided by work (in terms of remuneration), or the conditions of work, but rather with the value of employment itself.
It thus gives recognition to the idea that work is an element integral to the maintenance
of the dignity and self-respect of the individual.
Id. The socialist States argued for the inclusion of Article 6 in 1950. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm.,
5th Sess., C.3, 289th-91st, 297th-99th mtgs. at 176, U.N. Does A/C.3/SR.289-91, 297-9, 5 (1950).
303. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6 (emphasis added). As Paul Hunt has pointed out, however, "international human
rights law formulates some second-generation rights in a discriminatory fashion. Article 7 ... for
example, is confined to work in the public sphere. Since most women's economic activity is
treated as falling within the private realm, Article 7's guarantees offer no protection to most
women." HUNT, supra note 40, at 105.
304. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6-7. For a history of women's exclusion from the guilds, see DIANE BALSER,
SISTERHOOD & SoLDARrry: FENmISM AND LABOR INMODERN TIEs (1987); WoMEN's WORK,
MEN'S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB (Barbara F. Reskin & Heidi I. Hartmann eds., 1986).
For a fascinating account of the ways in which women's organizing efforts were undermined by
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damental importance, not only for its own sake but because it can be the
key to the enjoyment of many other rights." 3

Eighteenth century women were systematically denied the rights
set out in Articles 6 through 8, and this denial was key to the perpetuation of their subordination and dependence.0 6 The meaning of work was
radically transformed during the eighteenth century, however, and the
ways in which these rights were denied changed as well."' At the beginning of the century, the colonies were basically a subsistence agrarian
economy." When production was centered in the home, women could
meet its demands while also meeting the demands of home and family? °w By the end of the eighteenth century, the North was becoming industrialized1 0 and the plantation system had been institutionalized in the
South.3" ' In the North, production shifted from the home to the factory
and a preference emerged for manufactured, rather than home-produced,
family loyalties, see Mary H. Blewett, the Sexual Division of Labor and the Artisan Tradition in
Early Industrial Capitalism: The Case of New England Shoemaking 1780-1860, in AmERICAN
WoMEN AT WORK, supranote 257.
305. Alston, supra note 185, at 117. The comments "provide authoritative 'jurisprudential
insights' into the Covenant's provisions." HUNT, supra note 40, at 61.
306. See, e.g., Alice Kessler-Harris, Women, Work and the Social Order, in LIBERATING
WOMEN'S HISTORY, supra note 216, at 330-43 (providing a provocative exploration of the interaction between ideas about women and their labor force participation).
307. See generally JACQUELNE JONES, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE LABORING CLASSES: FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 34-88 (1999) (describing workers in the eighteenth century and
instances of slavery and freedom in the Antebellum South); WORK AND LABOR IN EARLY
AMERICA (Stephen Innes ed., 1988) (examining the nature of work and labor in America from
1614 to 1820 through a collection of essays).
308. See KERBER, supra note 6, at 7.
309. See DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 61.
310. See CLINTON, supra note 274, at5.
While the political center in New England remained the town, plantation society revolved around the county unit. Urbanization and industrialization, which made such inroads into northern society, had little impact upon the plantation South. European immigrants avoided the region; the planters discouraged any influx of foreigners, from a
xenophobic impulse to preserve their own homogeneity; and the recent arrivals
shunned competition with slave labor.
Id. See, e.g., BILLY G. SMITH, THE "LOWER SORT": PHILADELPHIA'S LAEORING PEOPLE, 17501800, at 63-91 (describing the effect of industrialization on the working class of eighteenth century Philadelphia).
311. See CLINTON, supra note 274, at 5. This is obviously a simplified schema. See Nell lrvin
Painter, Soul Murder and Slavery: Toward a Fully Loaded Cost Accounting, in NEw FEMINIST
ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 126 ("In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, slavery was a national
phenomenon, and its effects were by no means limited to the South."). By 1710 the plantation had
emerged "as the basic unit of capitalist agriculture" in the South. STANLEY M. ELKINS, SLAVERY:
A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 47 (3d ed. 1976); see generally Davis, supra note 5, at 224 n.6 (explaining that "many historians of the South... use the term
plantocracy to describe the southern political economy in which the mode of production, slavery,
structured social and economic relationships").
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goods.312 In the South, the large plantations that sustained the economy
depended on a large number of slaves."3
Thus, at the beginning of the century, white women participated in
all of the occupations:
[S]ince all occupations centered in the home or a nearby office or
workshop ... women and children as well as men worked to make a
success of the family enterprise. There was no formal licensing required for the practice of law and medicine until the end of the eighteenth century, so that women might draft wills and other legal documents. Some appeared in court arguing on their own behalf or as
attorney for an absent husband. As we have seen, women monopolized
they
obstetrical practice until the last part of the century, and 31
4 were prepopulation.
the
of
most
by
practitioners
medical
as
ferred
By the end of the century, however, white women were limited to a
few marginalized professions, such as midwifery.3"5 At the beginning of

the century, black women's work was similarly diverse.3"6 By its end,
black women, for the most part, were consigned to fieldwork.3 17 The

question here is whether the Economic Covenant would have made any
difference. If so, to whom? How would it have come into play?

Four major factors combined to deny women the right to work by
the end of the eighteenth century. First, and most obviously, slavery
precluded enjoyment of this right.318 Second, women were for the most
part incapable of owning property, which meant that most women could

312. See DE PAUW & HUNT, supranote 6, at 65.
313. See generally JULIA C. SPRUILL, WOMEN's LIFE AND WORK INTHE SOUTHERN COLONIES
(1972).
314. DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 61. "The years between 1750 and 1815 witnessed
the passing of a remarkable generation of women who were strong, self-reliant, employed in all
occupations entered by men, although not in equal numbers, and active in political and military
affairs." Id. at 9; see also WOMEN AND PROPERTY, supra note 46, at 8 ("Everywhere wage labour
is generally more accessible for men."); ZNN, supra note 7, at 109 ("Women also were shopkeepers and innkeepers ... bakers, tinworkers, brewers, tanners, ropemakers, lumberjacks, printers,
morticians, woodworkers, staymakers, and more."); cf. Marsha Freeman & Arvonne S. Fraser,
Women's Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 108 (Louis
Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994) ("Even men who belong to traditionally oppressed
groups.., have more choices in their lives than their female counterparts and companions.").
315. See DEPAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 61.
316. See id. at 68.
317. See id. But see GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 328 (noting that approximately a quarter
of the southern slaves, including slaves owned by small farmers and townspeople, worked in or
around the house rather than in the fields).
318. See DAVIS, supra note 217, at 13 ("[The most basic and obvious of slavery's deprivations [was] the right to choose one's work and to pursue it in the marketplace.").
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not own their own labor. '19 Third, most occupations and professions
were closed to them.'2 Fourth, women were responsible for women's
work; that is, the childcare, food preparation, cleaning, laundry, sewing,
weaving, and other work that women did for their families."' This was
not considered part of the market economy.
Each of these factors had an impact on each right as shown in the
following chart:
Art. 6: "to gain his

Art. 7: "fair wages

Art. 8: "right of eve-

living by work that he

and equal remunera-

ryone to form trade

freely chooses or ac-

tion for work of equal

unions and join the

cepts"

value"

trade union of his

"Subsistence" more

No wages

choice"
Under slavery

Attempts at organ-

common than "liv-

izing brutally sup-

ing"; no choice about

pressed

work
Legal incapacity to

"Living" goes to hus-

Earnings to man of

'Women could not

own property

band

the house

pay dues

Exclusion form

Limited work open

Work of "equal

Guilds served as

most occupations

from which to "freely

value" foreclosed for

gatekeepers to ex-

choose"

most women

clude women

Unpaid women's

"Men's work" was

Guild members pre-

work first priority for

work minus the work

sumed to have wives

white women, black

done for them by

women often denied

women; "women's

opportunity to care

work" was work plus

for their own families

the work they did for

"Women's work"

their families

While all of these factors affected all women, they obviously did
not affect all women in the same way or with the same impact.
Women's work and slavery, for example, had dramatically different im-

319. See KERBER, supranote 6, at 120. See generally CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF 'WOMEN:
SEX AND CLASS IN NEw YORK, 1789-1860, at 106-19 (1986) (describing a practice known as
"outwork," in which factory owners paid women for piece work; for example, weaving and sewing
done in their homes).
320. See DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 65.
321. See id. at 45.
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plications for black and white women, as discussed below.3 2 Two
groups of women are missing from the following chart: free black
women and unmarried (or widowed) white women. Although both
groups were for the most part free to own property, 23 married free black
women were subject to coverture and unmarried white women usually
found themselves doing women's work in someone else's home.24 Both

groups, moreover, remained excluded from most professions.
a. Black Women Under Slavery
Slavery barred most black women from any enjoyment of the Article 6 right "to gain ...[their] living by work which ...[they] freely
cho[se] or accept[ed]." 3'2 First, they were rarely able to gain a "living."
While the living conditions for a single slave might be very different

from those of a slave on a large plantation, both were likely to be sup-

ported at subsistence levels, or below.3 6 Although the following account
refers to male slaves, women rarely received preferential treatment 3 2
In Georgia, for example, during the 1740s, it was reckoned that it
cost 9E per year to keep a male white servant, compared to only 3.46f
322. This is not to suggest, of course, that black women were unaffected by women's work, or
that white women were unaffected by slavery. Rather, slavery and women's work were linked in a
complex and problematic system of "mutual conceptual dependence." See text accompanying supra note 54; see also infra text accompanying notes 358-66 (describing the inability of slave
women to perform the women's work of taking care of their children due to their other duties on
the plantation). See generally CLINTON, supra note 274, at 3-16 (discussing the lives of women on
cotton plantations in the South from 1780-1835).
323. But see infranote 339 and accompanying text (describing Maryland law, which required
property-owning women to marry). In fact, "[f]ew antebellum single women ever acquired financial security, a place of their own, or higher education.... [F]or the spinsters of this study, liberty
remained largely the subject of fantasy." CHAMBERS-ScII.LE, supra note 54, at 82.
324. See CHAMBERS-SCHILLER, supra note 54, at 107 (noting that even if a woman had no
husband or children, "the single woman's parents expected that she could be recalled at need");
infra note 350 and accompanying text (describing the need for a "hired girl" in New England
households).
325. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S at 6. The specific measures necessary for implementation of Article 6 had been set out in
ILO instruments by the mid 1950s. See CRAVEN, supra 117, at 200.
326. See discussion infra Part V.B.7 (discussing the right to an adequate standard of living).
327. See discussion infra Part V.B.8. Indeed, even nursing mothers were often denied an adequate allotment. See discussion infra Part V.B.8 (discussing the right to health). But see BLACK
WoMN iNWHTE A EmICA, supra note 202, at 47-48 ("[S]he was er breeder woman en' brought
in chillum ev'y twelve mont's jes lak a cow bringin' in a calf... He orders she can't be put to no
strain 'casen uv dat.") (quoting Martha Jackson, b. 1850, Alabama Narratives, Federal Works
Project, WPA for the State of Alabama, 1939) (alteration in original); JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR
OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW 17 (1985) ("Pregnant and nursing women usually ranked as half
hands and were required to pick an amount less than the average 150 or so pounds [of cotton] per
day.").
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for a black slave. The difference was accounted for in both clothes and
food. Servants were clothed after the style of their masters in character
of garments, if not in quality, while slaves, at least in warm weather,
merely wore loose, untailored garments of linsey-woolsey and wore no
shoes. The real difference came in food allowances: Servants received
seven times as much food as slaves, on average, and their alcohol ration,
in the form of beer, was valued in cash at almost as much as the entire
food and clothing ration of their black coworkers.
Nor did slaves have any choice about their work. The plantation
system was well entrenched in the southern economy, and although
black women engaged in a wide range of tasks, including highly skilled
work such as smithing, they "were usually put to [the] hard labor in the
fields [.],,329Furthermore:
[B]y the end of the eighteenth century black women were almost never
trained in a craft by which they might hope to support themselves if
they ran away. Spinning was virtually the only alternative to labor in
the fields except for a few privileged house servants, and generally
only the old and sick were allowed to spin.330
Slavery similarly precluded enjoyment of the Article 7 right to
"just and favourable conditions of work." 33' In an account published in
1839, Angela Grimk6 Weld shows how even relatively privileged house
slaves suffered. 32 In the winter, for example:
[Sieamstresses were kept in cold entries to work by the staircase lamps
for one or two hours, every evening in winter-they could not see
without standing up all the time, though the work was often too large
and heavy for them to sew upon it in that position without great inconvenience, and yet they were expected to do their work as well with
their cold fingers, and standing up, as if they had been sitting by a
comfortable fire and provided with the necessary light.333
Conditions were generally worse for women who worked in the fields.
Even after Chesapeake farmers began to use plows and carts, for example: "[B]lack women continued their old familiar routines of hand hoe-

328. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 166; see also discussion infra Part V.B.7 (discussing the
right to an adequate standard of living); discussion infra Part V.B.8 (discussing the right to health).
329. DE PAUw & HUNT, supra note 6, at 68.
330. Id.
331. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6.
332. See BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supranote 202, at 19-22.
333. Id. at 20.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol28/iss4/6

60

Stark: Deconstructing the Framers' Right to Property: Liberty's Daughter
20001

DECONSTRUCTING THE FRAMERS' RIGHT TO PROPERTY

ing and weeding, as well as grubbing stumps from the swamps in the
wintertime, breaking new ground which could not be handled with the
plow, cleaning stables, and spreading manure."3 4

Article 8 rights, assuring workers the right to organize, 335 were
ruthlessly and violently suppressed. As Lerner notes, "[t]he terror system against open rebellion was too cruel and overwhelming, the slave's
isolation from supporting allies too complete to make rebellions anything but rare, sporadic outbursts, doomed to certain defeat." 336 The per-

sistent resistance of women under slavery, however, shows that many
would have known what to do with the right to organize, had it been
recognized at the time. "The real story of slave resistance must be
sought in the buried record of daily sabotage, passive resistance and deliberate deceit. In a system such as slavery, survival for the oppressed
' In short, slavery effecgroup was the greatest form of resistance."337
tively denied rights provided under Articles 6, 7, and 8; that is, every
aspect of the right to work. Thus, by the end of the eighteenth century,
the southern 3economy was predicated on the denial of the most basic
human rights. 11
b. Women's Legal Incapacity to Own Property
Laws prohibiting married women from owning property339 meant
that women were precluded from gaining their living, or assuring a "decent living for themselves and their families."' Despite the visibility of
334. WOLF, supra note 6, at 167.
335. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6-7.
336. BLACK WOMEN INWHrrE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 26-27.
337. Id. at 27. See also ELY, supra note 3, at 15 ("The slave codes ... minutely governed the
slaves' activities, prohibiting them from assembling ....). See generally discussion infra Part
V.B.10 (describing the separation of groups by language so as to prevent rebellions).
338. See, e.g., WOLF, supra note 6, at 167 (noting that in the lower south, "the majority of the
inhabitants were black-as many as 90% in some areas where the climate was regarded as particularly dangerous for white residents"). The climate posed a serious threat to the health of slaves,
particularly in conjunction with the "diseases brought on by standing water in the man-made irrigation ditches." Id. See generallydiscussion infra Part V.B.8 (discussing the right to health).
339. See text accompanying supra note 173. See generally WOMEN AND PROPERTY, supra
note 46 (discussing the significance of property in relation to women). Even when women did own
property, they might not own it for long. "The Maryland Assembly, for example, passed a 'seven
year' provision for women: females were required to marry or remarry within seven years of landholding." CLINTON, supranote 274, at 4.
340. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6. As Professor Rose notes:
It has often been noted that the slave's status is that of a person who is also an object of property. Perhaps less remarked is the slave's status as a person who owns no
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"wives' economic contribution to the household ... in the more subsistence-oriented agrarian economies of the colonial and Revolutionary

eras[,]J "' they had no legal right to that contribution. While "[w]idows

and spinsters could hold property of their own ...it was difficult to
make a living outside of a family business in the eighteenth century, and
unmarried women were often impoverished. ' 42 As Wolf remarks,
"[w]omen who were heads of their households and supported themselves and their families by sewing, washing, cooking, or spinning faced
still worse hardships. Many relied solely on prostitution and others
augmented insufficient incomes in this way as well."' 4 Unmarried

women, who were not virgins, whether voluntarily or because of rape,
"would feel obliged to leave home to save their parents from disgrace.
And as job opportunities for women narrowed, prostitution was viewed

as an alternative to starvation." 34
c. Exclusion from Most Occupations
Before the Revolution, white women joined their husbands and
fathers in household businesses and farms.35 They also practiced law
and medicine.3 During the Revolution, many women managed these
businesses and farms while the men were away.37 When the men reproperty and can have no assets. As John Locke noted, however, this person is one and
the same.
ROSE, supra note 173, at 253 (footnotes omitted).
341. Siegel, supra note 247, at 1092.
342. DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 66. Even when women had a right to specific property, many eighteenth century women "enjoyed a right to property only when their communities
believed that supporting it would help keep the women off relief roles." SALMON, supra note 6, at
xiv.
343. WOLF, supra note 6, at 185-86.
344. DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 14. But see id.
at 89 (noting that enlisted men could
not afford the "camp wives" abjured by the American officers during the Revolution).
345. See Gordon & Buhle, supra note 216, at 281 (explaining how this practice was not
unique to America).
In England, women had belonged to craft guilds, as widows worked in their late husband's jobs, had professional standings as midwives, and acted with power of attorney
in lieu of their husbands. But by the end of the seventeenth century women lost these
positions.... The colonies reverted to a form of work disappearing from England; but
as the American economy capitalized its productivity, and as individual wage earners
replaced families as the basic production units, women found themselves excluded
from their earlier work experience.
Id.
346. See ELSAiET- ANTHONY DEXTER, COLONIAL WOMEN OF AFFAIRS: WOMEN IN
BUSINESS AND THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICA BEFORE 1776, at 184-85 (2d ed. 1931).
347. See CLINTON, supra note 274, at 29; DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 90. The poorest
women went to war with their husbands, "cooking, mending uniforms and stockings, foraging,
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turned from the war, however, the women returned to their accustomed
duties. 4' By the end of the century, women were systematically ex-

cluded from most occupations.
paid women's work,

°

49

Rather, they were relegated to poorly

which was increasingly circumscribed. Mid-

wifery, for example, had traditionally been women's work. 5' But after
1780, "schools of law and medicine were established [and] women
'
[were] driven from the practice of these professions."352

d. Women's Work
Women's work, such as unpaid work done for their families, was
literally "never done. 35 3 Professor Norton's summaries of the work records of white farm wives in the eighteenth century are records of end-

less, hard, unpaid labor:
[Sarah Snell] Bryant devoted one day to washing, another to ironing,
and a third at least partly to baking. On the other days she sewed, spun,
nursing and doing laundry." Id. at 90. For accounts of 84 women's lives during the Revolution, see
REVOLUTIONARY WOMEN IN THE WAR FOR AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE: A ONE-VOLUME REVISED
EDITION OF ELIZABETH ELLET'S 1848 LANDMARK SERIES (Lincoln Diamant ed., 1998). See generally WOmEN IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 6 (discussing the changing
role of women over time).
348. See DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 95 (noting that "women's participation was far
more restricted than it had been during the Revolution").
349. See CoTr, supranote 6, at 6. By the early nineteenth century, "[tihere was only a limited
number of paid occupations generally open to women, in housework, handicrafts and industry, and
school teaching. Their wages were one-fourth to one-half what men earned in comparable work."
Id.
350. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 36.
The unmarried female "retainer" was an ...ubiquitous and integral part of the
New England family circle, since every farm household needed at least one woman to
do jobs outside the male domain such as laundry, cleaning, and needlework. In general,
the women received less than half the wages of the men.
Id. Hannah Hickok Smith, for example, "commented anxiously on the presence or absence of a
'hired girl' in her family in every letter she wrote to her mother." CoTr, supra note 6, at 29.
351. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 201. Wolf notes that:
The position of the midwife was secure and respected: she was regarded as a professional to be paid for her ministrations, consulted during pregnancy, totally in charge in
the delivery room and usually able to overrule husbands who tried to interfere. Moreover, she was a credible witness in court when some dispute arose over the nature of the
birth or the death of a fetus or an infant.
Id. at 200-01. For an illuminating account of the role and status of midwives in eighteenth century
England, see Cornett, supra note 278, at 18-24.
352. DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 61; see generally JEAN DONNISON, MIDWIVES AND
MEDICAL MEN: A HISTORY OF INTER-PRoFESSIONAL RIVALRIES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1977)
(discussing the tradition of requiring midwives to have home children themselves).
353. See AMERICA'S WOMEN AT WORK, supra note 6, at 9; DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6,
at 45.
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and wove. In the spring she planted her garden; in the early summer
she hived her bees; in the fall she made cider and dried apples; and in
mid-December came hog-killing time. Mary Cooper recorded the same

seasonal round of work, adding to it spring housecleaning, a midsummer cherry harvest, and a long stretch of soap-making, boiling
"souse," rendering fat, and making candles that followed the hog
butchering in December.

Women's work was more repetitive than men's work, involving
more tasks, such as laundry, that had to be done over and over. 5 5 As
Norton explains: "[W]omen's expressed dissatisfaction with their
household role derived from its basic nature, and from the way it contrasted with their husbands' work.... Against the backdrop of their
husbands' diverse experiences, the invariable daily and weekly routines
of housewifery seemed dull and uninteresting to eighteenth century
[white] women[.] '3 56 Against the backdrop of slavery, in contrast,
women's work was a source of satisfaction and strength for black
women, affirming their most intimate ties. 7 Under slavery, black
women were often prevented from taking care of their children and husbands. Even if they were not sold to different owners,' 58 the demands of
field work combined with work for the slaveowner's family often made

354. NORTON, supranote 233, at 11; see generally JOAN M. JENSEN, LOOSENING THE BONDS:
MID-ATLANIc FARM WoMEN, 1750-1850 (1986) (discussing women in the Philadelphia hither-

land and how they became an integral part of the area's rise to agricultural prominence). women
in the South "managed the dairy, the garden, and the smokehouse." CLINTON, supra note 274, at 7.
355. See CoTr, supra note 6, at 26 ("During the late eighteenth century both unmarried and
married women did their primary work in households, in families."). But see DE PAUW & HUNT,
supra note 6, at 61 ("White women did not usually labor in the fields, but those desperate to survive could not be fussy about the work they did, and when necessary poor farm women would
plow and harvest.").
356. NORTON, supra note 233, at 34-35.
357. See GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 495 (noting that although some slave owners arranged
for communal breakfasts, some slave women "had to cook for their families, put the children to
bed, and often spin, weave, and sew well into the night"). I am not suggesting, of course, that this
additional work was not often onerous.
358. See DAVIS, supra note 217, at 99 (describing "[tihe oft-told story of parent-child separation resulting from sale or other reallocations of slave resources [as] a subtext of panic in every
parental script"). For example, when slave traders moved slaves,
often ... young children [in the slave coffle] grew very noisy, being too young or unsophisticated to understand the gravity of the situation. The driver would complain of a
child's crying and warn the mother to stop the noise. If the crying persisted, the driver
would take the child away from its mother and give it away to the first home the gang
came across.
Id. at 99 (alterations in original) (quoting STANLEY FELDSTEIN, ONCE A SLAVE: THE SLAVES'
VIEW OF SLAVERY 92 (1971)).
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it impossible for slave women to take care of their own families. A former slave described her dilemma:
Did you have any more children? Yes; but they all died. Why could
you not rear any of them? La, me, child! they died for want of attention. I used to leave them alone half of the time. Sometimes old mistress would have some one to mind them till they got so they could
walk, but after that they would have to paddle for themselves. I was
glad the Lord took them, for I knowed they were better off with my
blessed Jesus than with me.359

Another former slave "thought the number of slave children raised on
[his] plantation low because '[t]he mothers had no time to take care of
them-and they ...[were] often found dead in the field and in the
quarter for want of care of their mothers." 3 "
Similarly, slave women were rarely able to provide their families
with even a modicum of amenities. "Chambermaids and seamstresses
often sle[pt] in their mistresses' apartments, but with no bedding at
all., 31' Even when they were allowed to live with their families, housing
was usually inadequate. As Stephanie Grauman Wolf describes it:
Even on the wealthiest showplace plantations in the South, slave
housing (at least that of field hands far from the main house, where it
did not show) continued to be built in impermanent ways: wooden
houses directly laid on the ground, with dirt floors and mud-covered
wooden chimneys connected to the house only by supports that could
be knocked away in the event of fire. 62
Thus, for eighteenth century slave women, the women's work they were
able to do for their families, as opposed to the women's work they were
forced to do for their owners, was a source of pride and satisfaction.3"
While the social meaning of women's work may have varied, its
economic consequences were the same.3 6 Women's work freed white
359. Id. at 93 (quoting OcrAvIo ALBERT, THE HOUSE OF BONDAGE OR CHARLOTTE BROOKS
AND OTHER STORIES 14-15 (1890)).

360. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting STANLEY FELDSTEN, ONCE A SLAVE: THE
SLAVES' VIEWV
OF SLAVERY 49 (1971)). But cf. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 97-98 (1978) (providing a separate opinion by Judge Zekia explaining that the separation of
a mother from her suckling baby for hours, during which the baby cries from hunger, would be an
example of "inhuman treatment" violative of the human rights of mother and child).
361. BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 21 (providing the testimony of
Angela Grimk weld).
362. WOLF, supranote 6, at 54.
363. See JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK,
AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 29(1985).
364. See generally BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at xxiv-xxv.
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men, whether husbands, fathers, or owners, to tend to their businesses or
professions. They were not expected to prepare meals, mend clothes,
clean houses, take care of children, or do laundry.36 This was all

women's work.
e. Consequences of the Denial of the Right to Work
The right to work is linked to other economic rights. Most obvi-

ously, it is often requisite to the right to an adequate standard of living.
Because they were denied this right white women's standard of living
usually depended on their relationships with men. While a few black
women were able to improve their standard of living through relation-

ships with white men,367 most endured abysmal conditions, even on the
wealthiest plantations.3 The right to work is also related to the right to
education, since many jobs require some kind of preparation or training.

Thus, limitations on women's right to work were used to justify limitations on girls' right to education. 69

In addition, as described above,3 70 the right to work, and thus to acquire property, was related to certain civil and political rights, such as
the right to vote.371 White women were of course denied the right to vote
even after the demise of property requirements. However, as Gerda
Lerner has explained, the feminist consciousness, which ultimately en-

abled women to mobilize for suffrage, required a critical mass of eco-

Because the lowest-status, lowest paid jobs in white society are reserved for black
women, they often can find work even when black men cannot.... For black women,
this has meant that they are trained from childhood to become workers, and expect to
be financially self-supporting for most of their lives. They know they will have to work,
whether they are married or single; work to them, unlike to white women, is not a liberating goal, but rather an imposed lifelong necessity.
Id.
365. See JoNEs, supra note 363, at 14 ("Tasks performed within the family context-child
care, cooking, and washing clothes, for example-were distinct from labor carried out under the
lash in the field .... Still, these forms of nurture contributed to the health and welfare of the slave
population .... ").
366. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 140-41.
367. See BLACK WOMEN INWHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 46. Relationships with white
male owners "were for slave women the one and only avenue toward some precarious improvement in their lot and that of their offspring. Promises of future emancipation for themselves and
their children convinced some women when punishment did not." Id.
368. See discussion infra Part V.B.7 (discussing the right to an adequate standard of living).
369. See discussion infra Part V.B.9 (discussing the right to education).
370. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
371. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51.
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nomically independent women. 72 The requisite mass did not materialize
in the United States until women had more, rather than less, of the right
to work and to keep and manage their own earnings.

5. Article 9-Social Security
Article 9 of the Covenant provides that: "The States Parties to the
present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social insurance."373 This is not work-linked, but a fundamental
entitlement to be afforded each member of society. It includes, but is
not limited to, medical care, maternity, and old-age benefits.374 As the
Guidelines note, "[p]articularly in the case of developing countries,
many of these categories might be of very limited relevance. But in such
cases, reports should provide information as to informal arrangements
which might provide defacto coverage."375
In eighteenth century America, 6 such de facto coverage was provided first and most importantly by families.3" Under the family dy-

nasty model, it was the duty of the male head of household to support its
infirm or aged members. As the family dynasty model eroded throughout the eighteenth century, however, this duty became increasingly attenuated and finally forgotten.378 Local governments were ambivalent
about their scope of responsibility and uncertain how to cope with even
the responsibility they conceded:

372. See GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF FEMINIST CONSCIOUSNESS: FROM THE MIDDLE
AGES TO EIGHTEEN-SEVENTY 276 passim (1993).
373. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 7.
374. See Alston, supra note 185, at 55.
375. Id. at 56.
376. However, at least in the North, there is ample anecdotal evidence of an elderly population. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 51, at 149 ("The relatively healthy population of the northern
colonies created a whole group of elderly men and women at risk of poverty, a demographic category that did not exist in the disease-ridden South.").
377. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 18. "In return for their labor and submission, all the members
of the dynastic family... in theory at least, were protected at the most basic level by an economic
and social safety net of the master's devising." Id.; cf. COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE SocIETY, supra
note 204, at 173 (noting that in seventeenth century Maryland, poor relief and the care of orphans
were matters dealt with at the county level).
378. See, e.g., WOLF, supra note 6, at46.
During the 1790s, several women who had worked for the [Drinker] family ... applied
to Mrs. Drinker for help when they or their husbands became disabled, or fell on hard
times and were unable to support their families. It is clear that these former servants
evidently felt something of the old entitlement to membership in the Drinkers' family,
but it is equally clear that the Drinkers felt no such reciprocal responsibility.
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They fell back on the old British model of the almshouse ... in addi-

tion to the custom of outdoor relief whereby a cash-short family might
be tided over with a judicious handout of flour or firewood. In the Old
World, these institutions had been intended only for the benefit of local, worthy indigents, but in the larger, more anonymous world of the

young Republic, it was necessary to provide social services, in the
name of humanity, even to those who seem clearly unworthy.

Some local and state governments operated almshouses t ° and orphan" ' The Guardians
ages. Churches and charities also provided some relief.38
of the Poor, an eighteenth century version of a public welfare agency,
arranged for the children of the working poor to be indentured. 2
At the very least, the Covenant would have encouraged local governments to recognize their obligations and address them more systematically. Under the Guidelines, States are required to describe the forms
of social security available in their country3 and, more specifically,
"whether in your country there are any groups which... enjoy the right
to social security ... to a significantly lesser degree than the majority of
the population. In particular, what is the situation of women in that respect? ' I'3 4 Such data was obviously not collected in eighteenth century
America.385 It is likely that women were disproportionately represented
among the neediest, however, because of their legal incapacity to own
property,38 6 their lack of access to remunerative employment,8 and their
childbearing and child-rearing responsibilities.388 As Wolf explains, elderly widows or spinsters were more likely to require aid than men were
379. WOLF, supra note 6, at 47-48.
380. See, e.g., THE DAILY OCCURRENCE DOCKET OF THE PHILADELPHIA ALMSHOUSE:
SELECTED ENTRIEs, 1800-1804 (Billy G. Smith & Cynthia Shelton eds., 1985); WOLF, supra note
6, at 48 (describing indigents seeking aid at the Philadelphia Almshouse in 1789: "Ruth and Henry
Kendall ... came here ... in such wretched plight & swarming with Vermin so as immediately to
extort clothing").
381. Cf. BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 42-43 (providing a May 2,
1838 letter from Elizabeth Grimk, which explained that in South Carolina there is "no hospital,
no lunatic asylum where [blacks] ... are received and owners are made to take care of them").
382. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 46. In early eighteenth century, colonial Chesapeake, the
county court performed a similar service. See COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE SOCIETY, supra note 204, at
415 ("Orphans, bastards, children abandoned by runaway parents, and those whose parents were
too poor to support them all came before the county court to be placed in households where they
could be both nurtured and trained to support themselves as adults.").
383. See Alston, supra note 185, at 55, 56. These may include medical care, cash sickness
benefits, maternity benefits, old age benefits, unemployment benefits, or family benefits. See id.
384. ld. at 56.
385. But see supranote 378 (discussing anecdotal evidence of the "Drinker" family).
386. See discussion supra Part V.B.4.b.
387. See discussion supra Part V.B.4.c.
388. See discussion supra Part V.B.4.d.
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because "the facts of the ownership of property in colonial America
'
made [men who were ill and old] ... far less vulnerable."389
6. Article 10-Recognition of the Assistance Due the Family3"
Article 10 requires the State to recognize that the "widest possible
protection and assistance should be accorded to the family ... particu-

larly for its establishment and while it is responsible for the care and
education of dependent children." 391 "Family" is not defined under the
Covenant. Instead, the Guidelines require the State to "indicate what
meaning is given in your society to the term 'family. ' ' 392 Feminists have
criticized such open-endedness for condoning, and thereby legitimizing

and perpetuating, local patriarchal norms.93 This criticism surely would
have been justified as applied to eighteenth century norms.3"
389. WOLF, supra note 6, at 244.
390. See CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 135 (noting that there is no reference to "rights" in Article 10).
391. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S at 7.
392. Alston, supra note 185, at 57. In fact, social organization in the eighteenth century is
better understood in terms of "households" than "families," since unrelated individuals, including
indentured servants and slaves, were often included in a single social/economic unit. See XvOLF,
supra note 6, at 17-20. But see NORTON, supra note 6, at 17 ("In seventeenth-century English
America... [t]wo major connections linked members of a family to one another: co-residence and
subjection to the same person.") (emphasis added). This is precisely the kind of arrangement,
leaving children who were not family members particularly vulnerable, that Article 10 seeks to
discourage. See id. (noting that families may be found within a household consisting of a male
head of household, a wife, children, and sometimes other children); see also CRAVEN, supra note
117, at 135 (noting that Article 10 refers to rights that "should" be in place for the family, mothers,
and children).
393. See ECONOMIC, SOCtAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 279 (noting that in
many countries, "a married woman has to prove that she is a breadwinner before she can claim
entitlements," while it is assumed that married men are breadwinners); see also Helen Bequaert
Holmes, A Feminist Analysis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in BEYOND
DOMINATION: NEw PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY 250, 251-55 (Carol C. Gould ed.,
1984) (criticizing Article 16(3) of the Universal Declaration as repressive to women); Marilyn
Waring, Gender and InternationalLaw: Women and the Right to Development, 12 AUSTL. Y.B,
INT'L L. 177, 187 (1992) (arguing that "non-definition in international law is clarified by the use
of the 'norm' that is, the insertion of the word 'patriarchal' before the word 'family').
394. See, e.g., GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 239 (1986) (explaining that
patriarchy is "the manifestation and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society in general").
Lemer's definition of patriarchy is very close to Sir Robert Filmer's model for family relations.
See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text. But see Gordon & Buhle, supra note 216, at 280.
Throughout most of the seventeenth century, colonial society was relatively unfragmented, either by sex or age.... Cultural expressions of the time indicate lack of consciousness about the possible differences which later characterized all discussion of all
women and children. Such silence about sex- and age-roles is a feature of pre-industrial
societies.
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During that time period, a white woman's marriage determined her
Upon marriage, she became afeme covert with no legal rights of
her own. 316 Since divorce was generally unavailable 3 9 the wife was ba398 Moreover, if she left
sically at the mercy of her husband.
him, she
399
children.
knew she would lose her
life.395

This predicament was sanctioned both by the early eighteenth
century Filmerian system and by the liberal theory which was to supplant it.4°° Both assumed a hierarchical family structure, with a white
male acting as the head of the household, who controlled the family finances and represented the family insofar as the family had any dealings
with the State."° The hierarchical opposition was well-established and

Id.
395. See, e.g., CLINTON, supra note 274, at 59-86 (describing how marriage determined white
women's lives in the South). This often applied to black slave families on antebellum plantations
as well as to whites, although the "sexual division of labor [in black slave families] ... had no
explicit economic base." AMERICA'S WOMEN AT WVORK, supra note 6, at 7.
396. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text. For contemporary explications of
women's rights in this context, see BARON AND FEME, A TREATISE OF THE COMMON LAW
CONCERNING HUSBANDS AND WIVES 3-4 (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1700) (discussing "[t]he
Nature of a Feme Covert"); A TREATISE OF FEME COVERTS: OR THE LADY'S LAw 78 (Garland
Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1732) ("Of the Privileges of Feme Coverts, and their Power, in Respect of
their Husbands, and all others: Of Husband and Wife, in what Actions they are to join, and how far
they are chargeable."). There was a scarcity of women throughout the colonies, however, allowing
a woman some choice of a husband. See Gordon & Buhle, supra note 216, at 279.
397. See CHUSED, supra note 6, at 1; DE PAuw & HUNT, supra note 6, at 16; see also
KERBER, supra note 6, at 183 (describing Nancy Shippen's discovery in 1789 "that Revolutionary
freedom did not clearly extend to the right to be free of an unhappy marriage").
398. See NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 22 ("Under coverture, a woman's only
freely chosen obligation was to her husband. Once she made that choice, he controlled her body
and her property; there were relatively few constraints on what he could do with either .... 1;
SALMON, supra note 6, at xv (describing the "enforced dependence" of American women).
399. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 250.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 268-74.
Locke... described a state of nature predating the creation of what he termed "Political Society," even in that natural state women were not (indeed, could not be) free of
men's control.... Locke thereby refused to admit.., that a woman could be a mother
(that is, a powerful figure) without first being a wife (that is, under the control of the
man). For Locke, only wives could be mothers, even in a state of nature, in the absence
of all civil law, the relationship of husband wife necessarily preceded and gave rise to
that of mother and child.
NORTON, supra note 6, at 142.
401. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text; see also KERBER, supra note 6, at 119
("'Baron and Feme' was the law of domestic relations. The very wording implies a political relationship: lord and woman, not husband and wife. One party had status as well as gender; the other
had only gender. As 'Baron,' husband stood to wife as king did to baron.").
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generally unquestioned:' The male head of household was legally, socially, and economically privileged, while the women and children
within the household were legally, socially, and economically subordinated.4°3
In view of its textual ambiguity, 4 Article 10 would probably not
have had a radical impact on hierarchical relationships in the eighteenth
century family. However, it might have had some impact,4 5 particularly

in conjunction with certain other articles, such as those assuring nondiscrimination,4 the right to work,' an adequate standard of living,41 and
education.4 For example, Article 10 would have provided a legal ba-

402. But see NORTON, supra note 233, at 10 (discussing the high status widowed mothers as
the exception, who commanded respect equal to that of low ranking men, without being subject to
the control of a man by virtue of their widowed status).
403. See NEv FEMIST ESSAYS, supra note 7, at 23.
American revolutionaries did not change the law of domestic relations at the same
time that they radically changed other civic relations; they did not even debate the possibility [that] all free married men-whatever their class position, whether they were
white or black-benefited from a system of law in which husbands controlled the bodies and property of their wives. They felt no need to renegotiate it.
Id.
404. See supra notes 392-93 and accompanying text. The Article's alleged ambiguity is evidenced by its limited impact in those States which have in fact ratified the Covenant. See Barbara
Stark, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as a Resource for
Women, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAw 223 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorean
Koenig eds., 2000).
405. Slavery, of course, often rendered such relationships incoherent:
"By our deplorable situation we are rendered incapable of shewing our obedience to
Almighty God how can a slave perform the duties of a husband to a wife or parent to
his child How can a husband leave master to work and cleave to his wife How can the
wife submit themselves to there husbands in all things ......
DAvIS, supranote 217, at 136 (quoting Petition to the Governor and Legislature of Massachusetts,
dated May 25, 1774).
406. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 5; see also discussion supra Part V.B.2 (noting that the covenant may have encouraged a closer examination of the role of women in the family and in society and may have encouraged more people to question the social structure of the day).
407. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supranote 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6-7; see also discussion infra Part V.B.4 (noting that the absence of any meaningful
opportunity to work deprived women of an opportunity to reduce their subordination and dependence).
408. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Righst, supranote 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 7; see also discussion infra Part V.B.7 (noting that the lack of a right to an adequate
standard of living resulted in women spending much of their time and energy trying to secure one
for themselves and their families).
409. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 8; see also discussion infra Part V.B.9 (noting that the absence of education is perhaps
the most profound, as participation in all aspects of democratic society are impaired by the absence of an education).
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sis4 '° for contesting at least two broad forms of women's subordina-

tion.41' First, the violence4 2 to which black women were subject under
slavery would be barred by Article 10.413 Second, the social approbrium
suffered by unwed white mothers and their children would be inconsis-

tent with Article 10, which provides for "[s]pecial protection" for children,41 4 regardless of the circumstance of their birth. While contemporaneous accounts suggest that many black women would have availed
themselves of the protections of Article 10, white women probably
would have been more ambivalent.
a. Violence Toward Black Women
The importance of Article 10 protections are perhaps best revealed

in the lives of black women denied them under slavery.1 5 Article 10.1,
for example, provides that: "Marriage must be entered into with the free
4 6 While some historians claim
consent of the intending spouses.""
that
410. Although, as Craven notes, Article 10 does not refer to any "rights" but only requires
States to recognize the protection due the family, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
has consistently treated this obligation on a par with the rights of other articles. See CRAVEN, supra note 117, at 135.
411. See generally NORTON, supra note 6, at 119 (describing "two spouse-abuse incidents
[that) began when mothers attempted to protect children from beatings by their fathers[, where] the
courts in Salem and New Haven assessed penalties for striking the spouses but not for beating the
children"). A discussion of domestic violence is beyond the scope of this Article.
412. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986)
(noting that when "[legal interpreters have finished their work, they frequently leave behind victims whose lives have been torn apart by these organized, social practices of violence"). Cover's
well-known observations on the law's violence are brutally apt in this context. Indeed, this is precisely the kind of violence that precipitated human rights law, which invalidates those laws that
seek to legitimize violence, such as the slave codes.
413. See generally THE DEVIL'S LANE: SEX AND RACE INTHE EARLY SOUTH xlii-xiv (Catherine Clinton & Michele Gillespie eds., 1997) (discussing essays on slavery and gender in the colonial South).
414. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S at 7.
415. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 217, at 4 (noting that "the stories of enslaved families" are
"Motivating Stories" since "they inspired th[e] constitutional commitment" to make "family freedom a constitutional right").
416. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 7. While white women were legally free to choose their husbands, as a matter of social
custom it was often more of a collective family decision. See NORTON, supra note 233, at 43, 58.
[However,] [a]s Eliza Southgate noted in 1800, "The inequality of privilege between
the sexes is very sensibly felt by us females, and in no instance is it greater than in the
liberty of choosing a partner in marriage; true we have the liberty of refusing those we
don't like, but not of selecting those we do."
CHAMBERS-SHILLER, supranote 54, at 36 (quoting ELIZA BowNE, A GIRL'S LIFE EIGHTY YEARS
AGO: SELECrIONS FROM THELErERS OF ELIZA SOUTHGATE BowNE 38 (1887)). At the same time,
the stigma borne by unmarried women, as well as the lack of employment opportunities, made
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slave
marriages were not recognized by the state and offered none of the protections of legal marriage. 4"s Black women's marriages could be arranged at the whim of a slave owner. They could be dissolved by the
sale of one of the partners.419 Married or not, moreover, black women
were routinely exploited sexually by white men. 20
In addition, black women had virtually no control over their own
reproduction. 41 Black unwed mothers did not suffer the same stigma as
white unwed mothers, in part because slave owners viewed black chil"black girls were almost always allowed to marry for love[,]'

marriage an economic necessity. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 98-99. The economic system of
eighteenth century America was based on households, and individuals who did not marry would
generally have to live out their lives as subordinates in someone else's household. See id. at 36.
417. DE PAUW & HuNT, supra note 6, at 16. "Slave parents did not have the authority to forbid a child's marriage, and the master was usually content to have his slaves choose their own
partners." Id. See generally HERBERT G. GutMAN, THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND
FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at xvii (1976) (discussing the Afro-American family between 1750 and
1925 as well as the origins and early development of Afro-American culture).
418. See DAVIS, supra note 217, at 30; STANLEY M. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN
AMERICAN INSTITUTONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LInE 53-54 (3d ed. 1976).
419. See ELKINS, supra note 418, at 53-54 ("Any restrictions on the separate sale of slaves
would have been reflected immediately in the market; their price would have dropped considerably."). See generally DAVIS, supra note 217, at 32-33 (providing a first person account of a family
that was tom apart).
420. But see infra text accompanying note 504 (noting that black women knew how to avoid
pregnancy). In order that the resultant offspring would be the white owner's property rather than
his legal obligations, the "universal understanding of Southern jurists" was that "'the father of a
slave is unknown to our law."' ELKINS, supra note 418, at 55 (quoting Frazier v. Spear, 1 Ky. (2
Bibb) 385). As Professor Davis notes: "The private law doctrine of intestate succession ... contributed to the cultural ideology regarding enslaved women's sexual availability. In refusing to
grant standard economic rights that inure to sexual families, civil law, like criminal law, denied
legal recognition of enslaved women's sexual relationships." Davis, supra note 5, at 247; see also
HARRIET JACOBS AND INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL 3, 21-22 (Deborah M. Garfield &
Rafla Zafar eds., 1996) (describing sexual exploitation of Harriet Jacobs by her master); cf. BLACK
WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 149-50 (describing the sometimes complex relationships between black women and white men); Davis, supra note 5, at 227 (explaining how the
courts had to consider "the possibility of affection between the races" in probate cases involving
interracial relationships). See generally CLINTON, supra note 274, at 199-222 (discussing oppression based upon and perpetuated by white sexual control); Karen A. Getman, Sexual Controlin the
Slaveholding South: The Implementation and Maintenance of a Racial Caste System, 7 HARv.
WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 115 (1984) (discussing sexual characterizations of black female slaves in the
South).
421. See discussion infra Part V.B.8. But see infra text accompanying notes 492-515 (discussing contraception, abortion, and infanticide). While protection from rape is not explicitly assured by Article 10, rape is itself increasingly recognized as a violation of human rights. See, e.g.,
Report of the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,
at 37, U.N. Doc. AICONF.157/24 (Part 1) (1993) (citing systematic rape and forced pregnancy as
violations of the human rights of women).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2000

73

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:963

dren as additional property. Even so, pregnant women, as well as
those who had recently given birth, were frequently forced to work notwithstanding the threat to their health and their fetuses. 4 3 As Francis
Kemble, a British woman married to an American slaveholder, noted in
her journal in 1838:
Fanny has had six children; all dead but one. She came to beg to have
her work in the field lightened. Nanny has had three children. Two of
them are dead ....Leah has had six children; three are dead. So-

phy... came to beg for some old linen. She is suffering fearfully; she
had had ten children; five of them are dead. Sally ... has had two miscarriages and three children born, one of whom is dead. She came
complaining of incessant pain and weakness in her back.... There

was hardly one of these women ... who might not have been a candidate for a bed in a hospital, and they had come to me after working all
day in the fields.
4
Rather than petitioning a woman who had no ability to help them, 21
these women could have demanded that the State assure the "[s]pecial
protection" to which they were entitled under Article 10.2.426
Whatever the circumstance of their birth, black infants could be
sold or "given away 'like puppies" 27 and their mothers were powerless

422. See DEPAuw & HUNT,supra note 6, at 24; Davis, supra note 5, at 285. In 1662 Virginia
passed the following law: "'Children got by an Englishman upon a Negro woman shall be bond or
free according to the condition of the mother, and if any Christian shall commit fornication with a
Negro man or woman, he shall pay double the fines of the former act."' GIDIoS, supra note 6, at
37 (quoting DoROTHY STERING, BLACK FOREMOTHERS: THREE Ltvus 79 (1979)). As Higginbotham noted, this overturned the normal doctrine of English law, "that the status of a child would
be dependent upon the status of the child's father." HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 53, at 44. For an
insightful analysis of some of the consequences of this legacy, see Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CH. L. REV.209, 211-12 (1995) (analyzing the consequences of the genetic tie of
racial identity).
423. See, e.g., BLACK WOMEN INWHITE AMERICA, supranote 202, at 49.
424. Id. (alterations in original).
425. Frances Kemble's journal entry concludes: "And to all this I listen-I an Englishwoman,
the wife of the man who owns these wretches, and I cannot say: 'That thing shall not be done
again...' I remained choking with indignation and grief long after they had all left me to my most
bitter thoughts." Id. at 50 (alteration in original).
426. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 7; supra text accompanying notes 410-14; see also supra text accompanying notes
358-60 (describing how slave women were often forced to neglect their children). As Genovese
notes, slave women "complained especially about the inadequate conditions for nursing."
GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 498. But see JONES, supra note 327, at 17 (describing some accommodations made for pregnant or nursing women).
427. WOLF, supra note 6, at 38; see also DAvis, supra note 217, at 91 (noting that black infants were often "'sold along the roadside"').
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to protect them.' 2 In addition to violating the self-determination rights
of parents and their children, this obviously contravenes Article 10.1429
and Article 10.3, which requires the State to assure "[s]pecial measures
of protection and assistance... on behalf of all children." 3
b. Separation from Their Children and Other Consequences

of Unwed Motherhood for White Women
Adultery was understood as a crime against the husband of a married white woman. 43' Eve Sewell, wife of John, for example, was con-

victed of adultery in 1790 for bearing a mulatto child.432 Mrs. Sewell and
the "child were condemned to servitude. ' t433 Accordingly, intercourse
between unmarried men and women was not necessarily a crime, because no husband was injured. However, sexual relations were strongly
condemned if the parties did not subsequently marry. 4' The children of
such unions were "bastards," and unless the mother had some independ-

428. See, e.g., TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 430-32 (1987) (describing how the circumstances
led more than one slave mother to kill her child, rather than have her grow up as a slave); see also
Two CENTURIES OF LETrERS, SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND
SLAVE TESTmiONY:
AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 7-8 (John W. Blassingame ed. 1977) (providing a March 8, 1795 letter from
Judith Cocks, a slave mother, to James Hillhouse, her son's owner). But see GENOVESE, supra note
252, at 499 (describing "slave mothers who forcibly defended their children against white abuse").
For the story of Margaret Gardner, the model for Morrison's protagonist, see DAVIS, supra note
217, at 191.
429. See supra text accompanying notes 390-414.
430. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 7. Devices were employed in the slave community "for absorbing the shocks of sale
and separation," including "adoption and 'fictive kin."' ELKINS, supra note 418, at 284; see also
JONES, supra note 327, at 31 (explaining how slaves "defined patterns of mutual obligations
among themselves").
431. See RICHARD B. MORRIS, STUDIES INTHE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 38 (1964) (noting that in the seventeenth century, adultery was a capital crime).
432. See CHUSED, supra note 6, at 1. Relationships between white women and black men outraged the community. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and
Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO. L.J. 1967, 1997-98
(1989).
433. CHUSED, supra note 6, at 1. Her husband John was granted the first divorce passed after
the Revolutionary War. See id.
434. See WoMEN'S WRITING, supra note 15, at 950. It was not until 1782 that New England
discontinued its use of the scarlet letter for adulterers. Id. See generally LAUREL THATCHER
ULRICH, GOOD WIVES: IMAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN NEW
ENGLAND 1650-1750, at 10 (1982) (studying role definition of women in relation to others, and
providing a description of neglected aspects of daily life in particular places and times).
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ent means of support, 435 the child was often indentured, that is, placed
with a family as a servant until majority.4 6
Unwed white women and their children were not considered families in the eighteenth century. 437 Article 10.3, however, explicitly forbids
"discrimination for reasons of parentage." 43 As set out in Article 10.2,
moreover, "special measures of protection" are to be accorded mothers,
without distinguishing between married or unmarried mothers.439
The impact of Article 10 has been slight in States, like eighteenth
century America, with strong religious, moral, and social norms against
illegitimacy."0 Harsh eighteenth century laws and practices directed
against unwed mothers" ! were intended to encourage marriage, and they
were often quite effective. Indeed, as Norton notes, "in some
New England towns ... one-third of the [women] were pregnant at the
time of their marriage." 2 Most eighteenth century white women wanted
to be married because of the stigma and hardship associated with "spinsterhood. ' 443 Some eighteenth century women, moreover, surely loved
the fathers of their unborn children-or at least wanted their compan-

435. See, e.g., NORTON, supra note 233, at 55 (describing a young woman supported by her
wealthy widowed aunt).
436. See, e.g., MARY LEE SETTLE, 0 BEULAH LAND 41-43 (1956). Settle provides a vivid
fictional account of indentured children in describing a pair of brothers sold to a Virginia planter
in the mid-eighteenth century. See id. at 42. The older brother, about 12-years-old, kills himself,
unable to bear the brutal treatment and harsh conditions. See id. The planter, thus cheated, adds his
remaining term to that of his younger brother, who runs away. See id. at 42-43.
437. See supra notes 392-93 (describing "families").
438. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 7.
439. See id.; see also Philip D. Morgan, Slave Life in Piedmont Virginia, 1720-1800, in
COLONIAL CHESAPEAKE SOcIETY 433, 471 n.68 (Lois Green Carr et al.
eds., 1988) (providing an
account of the white women cited by grand juries in Piedmont Virginia for having "mulatto hastard[s]").
440. See Stark, supra note 404, at 223-35 (discussing Afghanistan in the context of Article
10); see also Rebecca J. Cook, Reservationsto the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
DiscriminationAgainst Women, 30 VA. J.INT'L L. 643, 702-06 (1990) (describing State reservations to the Women's Convention, particularly those provisions dealing with the family).
441. See CLINTON, supra note 274, at 122 (providing an account of the ways in which a
"woman's fall plummeted her to a position of irremedial dishonor and unmitigated regret" in the
South); cf GIDDINGS, supra note 6, at 37 (noting that in 1662, Virginia passed a law that "any servant woman who had a child by her master was subject to two additional years of service. The
guilty servant was to be 'sold' to the church-wardens, who would employ her in the tobacco
fields").
442. NORTON, supra note 233, at 55.
443. See id. at 15 (noting that the term itself refers to the endless hours of spinning in store for
the unmarried woman). As Norton notes, "women had no real alternative to an irrevocable marriage." Id. at 57. See also discussion supra Part V.B.4 (describing limits on women's right to
work).
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ionship and support. Thus, Article 10 probably would have had little appeal for many white women, at least where marriage was an alternative.
For those who were deserted, however, such as the unfortunate young
Virginian woman abandoned by her French lover,444 the protections of
Article 10, especially if they translated into food and shelter for herself
and her baby, would have been invaluable.
7. Article 1 1-Right to an Adequate Standard of Living
Under Article 11, "[t]he States ... recognize the right of everyone
to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including
adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions." 5 As Professor Ely points out, colonial governments in fact assumed significant responsibility for assuring an adequate standard of living:
[C]olonial governments regulate[d] economic activity for the general
welfare of the community.... [C]ounty courts fixed the rates to be
charged for food, drink, and accommodations. Similarly, the colonists
treated gristmills as public institutions subject to control. Most colonies regulated the operation of mills and set the toll for grinding
grain.... [L]awmakers established supervised public markets in colonial cities.... [M]any colonies and localities [regulated by law] the
weight, quality, and price of bread .... The purposes of such legisla46
tion were to curb alleged abuses by bakers and to make bread cheap.
Thus, rights recognized under the Economic Covenant were also recognized by colonial governments. In some respects, moreover, these rights
were better supported than they are today. 7 However, these rights could
only be claimed by the head of the household, almost always a white
man.
Although most women could not make claims against the State,
they generally had the day-to-day responsibility of assuring an adequate
standard of living for their families. 44 Women were responsible for pre444. See NORTON, supra note 233, at 55. Rachel, the young woman, was "lost to every thing
that is dear to Woman[.]" Id. She bore an illegitimate son and lived with her elderly aunt. See id.
445. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 7. For an ambitious attempt to find a philosophical justification for the right to an adequate standard of living, see David Copp, The Right to An Adequate Standard of Living: Justice,
Autonomy and the Basic Needs, in ECONOMIc RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 231.
446. ELY, supranote 3, at 19-20.
447. See DE PAuwv & HUNT, supranote 6, at 12.
448. See Col, supra note 6, at 40-41 ("Wife-and-motherhood in a rural household of the
eighteenth century implied responsibility for the well-being of all the family. Upon marriage a
woman took on 'the Cares of the world,' Elizabeth Bowen admitted as she recounted her past life,
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paring and growing much of the food the family consumed. 9 Slave
women often had their own garden plots. 40 Even city women "in the
autumn ... preserved fruit and stored vegetables, and early in the winter... salted beef and pork and made sausage. ' 451' Eighteenth century
women were also responsible for providing their families with clothing,
often spinning the wool and weaving the cloth which they used. "Farm
wives, and especially their daughters, spent a large proportion of their

time, particularly in the winter months, bending over a flax wheel or
loom, or walking beside a great wheel, spinning wool." 452 This was especially true after 1765 and the boycotts of British goods.453 In short, the
eighteenth century household depended on women to provide meals,
clothes, bedding, and a comfortable home.
Article 11 rights may be usefully understood as inverted descriptions of eighteenth century women's duties. 4 4 They are the dangerous

at mid-century."); see also WOLF,supra note 6, at 17 (noting that "the family was charged with
responsibility for the basic necessities of everyday life"); cf.Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright,
The HungerTrap: Women, Food, and Self-Determination, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 262, 276 (1993).
The introduction of free market systems in formerly socialist states:
[HIas meant the end of basic social services such as subsidized rent, price controls on
basic food products, guaranteed employment, health services, universal child care, and
even reproductive freedom, such as abortions. Women have suffered first and foremost
from the removal of provisions which ensured these basic social and economic rights.
Id.
449. See, e.g., DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 45 ("Fresh vegetables, fruit, and a few
flowers might be provided by a woman's kitchen garden."); cf Hilary Charlesworth & Christine
Chinkin, The GenderofJus Cogens, 15 HuM. RTs. Q. 63, 75 (1993) (arguing that the right to food
should be ajus cogens norm for women throughout the world).
450. See BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 17 (noting that these plots,
"patches," were usually in the woods or some other undesirable location) (citing Charles Ball,
SLAVERY N THE UNITED STATES: A NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF CHARLES

BALL, A BLACK MAN 166 (1836)).
451. NORTON, supra note 233, at 21-22. To the extent that "adequate" food refers to nutritional value as well as quantity, however, women's work was sometimes counterproductive:
mhe monotonous diet of corn mush, salt meat, and grog, cider, or molasses
beer[] ... made scurvy a constant threat throughout the colonial period.... [E]ven
when fresh vegetables were served, they were boiled for hours beforehand and so lost
their vitamin content. The slaves ...also overcooked their vegetables; but they prized
the "pot likker" and so did not lose all nutritional benefits.
DE PAuw & HuNT, supra note 6, at 45.
452. NORTON, supranote 233, at 15. 'This was a time-consuming, never-ending task. Since it
took nearly a year and a half to create linen from flax, a man's shirt often wore out by the time a
woman could complete a new one." DEPAUw & HUNT, supranote 6, at 48.
453. See NORTON, supra note 233, at 15. Women were similarly responsible for producing
the "bedcoverings [which] were as essential as clothing." DE PAUW & HUNT, supranote 6, at 51.
454. Much of this remains women's work even today. See Stark, supra note 108, at 178, 179;
see, e.g., ROSE, supra note 173, at 244-45 (discussing perceived differences between men and
women in employment and domestic situations and the pattern which reinforced these beliefs).
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supplement of women's work, the subordinated opposition, situating re-

sponsibility for the assurance of those rights in the public sphere.455
While eighteenth century women had the most direct, concrete responsibility for assuring Article 11 rights,456 they had no direct access to
the mechanisms put in place by the states to assure an adequate standard
of living. Instead, they were dependent on the man of the house to secure the family's share of State resources, and to provide them with a
share sufficient, along with what they were able to produce themselves,
to meet the needs of the household. 57
But eighteenth century men sometimes had other priorities and

women could only beseech them to remember their responsibilities. A
wife who demanded support was guilty of "'[s]colding,' the contempo-

rary term for nagging... a serious fault in a wife, probably as deserving
of a beating as any other form of insubordination." '5 Women's attempts
to improve their standard of living inspired "frequent, bitter references

to female extravagance as the cause of everything from domestic discomfort to financial ruin and the corruption of the moral virtue of the
new Republic., 459 Rebecca McElwee, for example, sued for divorce in
Pennsylvania because her husband John "had flown into a 'great passion' and pushed and threatened" her when she had asked for a new carpet and a shawl.4 Even if a woman could obtain a divorce, she was not
necessarily assured support, 46' and as noted above, divorce was for the
most part unavailable.6 2 Women whose husbands would not support
455. See Stark, supranote 119, at 19.
456. See KERBER, supra note 6, at 167.
Women were undeniably important to the family economy, and on rare occasions when
they refused their services, their husbands were shocked and distressed. David Frisbie,
begging for a divorce from his wife in 1783, asserted that he had "never ... received
from her any kind of aid or assistance in Supporting the Family of Children which he
had by her." Ezra Belding, petitioning for a divorce in 1788, complained that his wife
had "wholly neglected all care of domestic affairs, and by every method in her Power
endeavoured to waste & embezzle his Estate."
Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Divorce petition of David Frisbie (1783) and
Ezra Belding (1788) respectively).
457. See, e.g., SALMON, supra note 6, at xv (noting that a recent study of the property rights
of eighteenth century women "revealed above all else a picture of their enforced dependence, both
before and after the Revolution").
458. WOLF, supra note 6, at 78.
459. Id. at 79.
460. Id. at 80.
461. See KERBER, supra note 6, at 168. "A husband's failure to support his wife economically.., was introduced into petitions filed during and after the war." Id.
462. See SALM ON, supra note 6, at xvi. Divorce became more available after the Revolution,
especially for deserted or abused wives. See id. For a comparison of the differences in divorce
between Massachusetts and Maryland after the Revolution, see CHUSED, supra note 6, at 18-38.
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them were often forced to turn to charity. Mary Wright, for example,
applied for assistance from the Philadelphia Almshouse in 1800 because
her husband had gone to sea and sent her not "one farthing of his
Monthly pay_
Slaves rarely enjoyed an adequate standard of living. 464 On a South

Carolina plantation, for example, Grimk6 describes the swarms of mosquitoes that required not only white family members, but their horses, to
be provided with nets, a necessity denied their slaves. Slaves were allowed "only two meals a day... thefirst at twelve o'clock.... They are
often kept from their meals by way of punishment.... As the general
rule, no lights of any kind, no firewood-no towels, basins, or soap, no
tables, chairs or other furniture, are provided."'14 On a Louisiana planta-

tion each slave received a weekly allotment of "three and a half pounds
of bacon, and corn enough to make a peck of meal. That is all.' 67 Even
those "slave[s] who worked alongside a poor master and his family... shar[ing] the cooked hominy, vegetables, and meat that made up
the usual one-pot meal [were frequently] allotted the less-nourishing
'Hoppin' John,' composed only of grits and peas. 468

The extent to which Article 11 imposes an affirmative obligation
on the State to assure its people an adequate standard of living is not
altogether clear. It is clear, however, that laws which effectively deny

one segment of the population access to Article 11 rights are prohibited
under the Covenant. 469 Thus, women like Rebecca McElwee 70 or Mary

WrightC47' could have challenged laws which gave their husbands sole

463. WOLF, supra note 6, at 100 (quoting The Philadelphia Almshouse records for October 7,
1800).
464. See, e.g., IGGINBOTHAM, supra note 53, at 263 (noting that in Georgia, the modest
protections afforded slaves in the earlier part of the century were dropped in the 1765 laws, which
no longer required that a slave "be provided with 'sufficient' food and clothing").
465. See BLACK WOMEN INWHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 19.
466. Id. at 19-20 (second alteration in original) (quoting AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS:
TESTIMONY OF A THOUSAND WITNESSES (1839)).
467. Id. at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting NARRAIVE OF SOLOMON NORTHup, T wELvE
YEARS A SLAVE ...165-69 (1853)). But see GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 331 (explaining that
house servants generally "had more and better food and clothing, more comfortable quarters, and
more personal consideration from the whites"). Professor Jones suggests that, "the advantages of
domestic service over field work for women have been exaggerated in accounts written by whites.
Fetching wood and water, preparing three full meals a day over a smoky fireplace, or pressing
damp clothes with a hot iron rivaled cotton picking as back-breaking labor." JONES, supra note
327, at 27.
468. WOLF, supranote 6, at 166.
469. See Alston, supra note 185, at 48.
470. See supra text accompanying note 460.
471. See supra text accompanying note 463.
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access to State resources.4" In conjunction with Article 5, which prohibits derogation from any right,473 even by a non-State third party,474
Article 11 could also have been relied upon to challenge laws under
which white men controlled their wives' earnings and property 75 Finally, insofar as the institution of chattel slavery enabled third parties
(slaveowners) to deny slaves their Article 11 rights, it, too, would have
been subject to challenge under Article 11 in conjunction with Article 5.
Women's demands for an adequate standard of living in the eighteenth
century, albeit discouraged and usually futile,47 6 suggest that many
would have been eager to avail themselves of the protections of Article 11.
8. Article 12-The Right to Health
As Virginia Leary has pointed out, "'right to health' is ...shorthand, referring to the more detailed language contained in international
treaties and to fundamental human rights principles."4"
This complex and wide-ranging right may be broken down into
two major components: one, medical services; 47 and two, the prevention

of health problems through adequate nutrition, safe drinking water,
public education, and similar measures.479 In the eighteenth century,
however, this right would have been unintelligible because of the embryonic state of medical science.s
In fact, medical services were often deadly. Doctors were dangerous:
472. This assumes, of course, that they would have access to the courts under Articles 2 and 3. See discussion supra Part V.B.2.
473. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supranote 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6.
474. See supra notes 293-98 and accompanying text.
475. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
476. See, e.g., supra notes 423-30 and accompanying text (discussing black women seeking
protection after giving birth); supranotes 458-63 and accompanying text (discussing white women
seeking support).
477. Virginia A. Leary, The Right to Health in InternationalHuman Rights Law, 1 HEALTH &
HuM. RTs. 25, 28 (1994); see also HUNT, supra note 40, at 62 (describing the overlap between this
right and the first generation "right to life" found in Article 6 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), as set out in general comment on Article 6 of the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, which opined that this right requires that States "adopt positive
measures [including] all possible measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics").
478. See HUNT, supranote 40, at 116.
479. See Leary, supranote 477, at 47-49.
480. See generally Greenberg & Litman, supra note 129, at 605 (arguing that "scientific beliefs and other beliefs more susceptible of public demonstration affect the application of political
and ethical terms").
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[T]he more highly educated the doctor, the faster and more painfully
was the patient likely to die ... whatever the patient's complaint, the
aim of the physician was to get out the "vile humours" that were
causing illness ...bleeding, with a blade and bowl or with live
leeches, was no doubt often the immediate cause of a patient's death,

since it was common to take forty ounces of blood or even more."'
Nor would preventive measures have furthered the right to health, given
the eighteenth century understanding of such measures. "[T]he rate of
child mortality was appallingly high in the eighteenth century, and its
marked decline in the early nineteenth century suggests that certain
features of colonial child-rearing practices indirectly caused many of the
483 for example,
deaths. 482 In Some Thoughts Concerning Education,
John Locke urged mothers to bathe infants and young children in icy
water and to provide them with thin-soled shoes. 484 Locke also advised
mothers to refrain from feeding their children most varieties of fruit,
and until they were older, meat.4 He suggested warm beer as the most
appropriate drink for young children."" The more diligently the public
was educated about such measures, accordingly, the worse it would
have been. The text of Article 12, in short, becomes incoherent if it is
liberated entirely from its twentieth century moorings.
While this apparent paradox itself offers rich material for deconstruction,"' that is not the purpose here. Rather, this Article focuses on

481. WOLF, supra note 6, at 20.
482. DE PAUW & HuNT,supra note 6, at 27. Unlike the Children's Convention or the Protocol of San Salvador, Article 12 does not refer to primary health care and health education. See
HUNT, supra note 40, at 118-19.
483. JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION 86 (John W. Yolton & Jean S.
Yolton eds., 1989) (1690).
484. See id.
at 86.
485. See id. at 93-97.
486. See DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 28; see also Kerber, supra note 236, at 17-19, 25
(providing a sharp analysis of the ways in which Lockean child-rearing linked women to the political community).
487. We might investigate, for example, the relationship between economic, social, and cultural rights and the development of science. Does the realization of the former depend on the latter? Since the conventional wisdom of a particular time and place may simply be wrong, extending
its influence can be disastrous. This is not unique to the eighteenth century. In the twentieth century, for example, Third World women were urged by medical professionals to avoid breastfeeding and use formula instead. Mixed with impure water, this resulted in skyrocketing infant
mortality before women were instructed to resume breast-feeding. In a recent twist, the United
Nations has recommended that women with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS")
refrain from breast-feeding. See Lawrence K. Altman, AIDS Brings a Shift on Breast-Feeding,
U.N. DiscouragingPracticefor Women Infected with H.LV., N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1998, at 1. See
generally BARBARA EHRENREICH & DEIRDRE ENGLISH, FOR HER OWN GOOD: 150 YEARs OF THE
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the eighteenth century American experience as an iteration of the postcolonial, pre-industrial experience!"u What is the impact on women in
such cultures of Article 12, understood not merely as the actual text of
the Article, 49 but rather, as Leary suggests, including the more detailed
"language employed in international treaties" 490 and at least some of the
scientific knowledge that underlies it?49'
For example, the right to health could have been promoted in the
eighteenth century by supporting women's control over their own reproduction.49 There are at least three good reasons for focusing on this
aspect of Article 12. First, reproductive health was in fact a major health

issue for eighteenth century women. 49 Second, reproductive health
could have been substantially improved through low technology methods, many of which were well known at the time. Third, the example of
reproductive health vividly illustrates the underlying thesis of this Article: that economic rights are inextricably tied to civil and political
494
rights, and that both kinds of rights are crucial, especially for women.

EXPERTS' ADviE TO WOMEN (1978) (discussing the medical profession's inaccurate view on
women's health from a historic perspective through the present day).

488.

Cf. ROBERT J.C. YOUNG, COLONIAL DESIRE: HYBRIDY IN THEORY, CULTURE AND

RACE 29-54 (1995) (arguing that contemporary cultural theory unconsciously replicates nineteenth
century patterns of thought on culture and race).
489. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 8.
490. Leary, supranote 477, at 28.
491. By "some," I mean to exclude the antibiotics and vaccines that would have radically
transformed eighteenth century life:
For eighteenth-century Americans, the primary threat to health and life was infectious disease.... Yellow fever and pernicious malaria, for instance, were new to the
European colonists, and they had no immunity.... [BIlacks seemed particularly susceptible to pulmonary diseases-influenza, tuberculosis, and pleurisy...
... [S]mallpox was probably the most dreaded disease ... in the white population
... [and] one victim in every seven or eight died. Among the blacks, the proportion
was slightly lower, since the disease had been endemic in Africa even longer than in
Europe.
DE PAuW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 35. In the early South, for example, "[flew couples reached old
age together, and in many families the death of one spouse occurred within a decade of the marriage." SALMON, supra note 6, at 10-11. This created special problems for widows. See discussion
supraPart V.B.5 (discussing Social Security).
492. See Audrey R. Chapman, Monitoring Women's Right to Health Under the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1157, 1170, 1171-73
(1995) (explaining that the right to control reproduction is necessarily implicated in the right to
health).
493. See DE PAUw & HUNT, supranote 6, at 24.
494. See, e.g., WOMEN AND PROPERTY, supra note 46, at 5 (providing an argument that "production and reproduction [must be treated] as a 'single process' [and how] property as a conceptual focus helps us to do so") (citation omitted); Davis, supra note 5, at 225 (describing "the dis-
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Indeed, to show a more egalitarian approach to marriage after the
Revolutionary War, Norton relies on evidence of significantly reduced

marital fertility, assuming that this demonstrated a real increase in
women's power within marriage.9
Eighteenth century women were well aware of the "debilitation
' Complications
women suffered as a result of repeated pregnancies."496
from pregnancy and childbirth ruined the health of many mothers and
were a frequent cause of death.497 Children were an important source of
labor, however, and women were expected to produce them.49 As historians Gordon and Buhle observe, women were valued for their reproductive as well as productive capacities.
Black women under slavery were often forced to reproduce.5"
Sometimes they were paired with another slave.5"' In addition, as Lerner
explains: "The sexual exploitation of black women by white men was so
widespread as to be general.... [It] was always possible and could in
no way be fought or avoided-it was yet another way in which the total

helplessness of the slave against arbitrary authority was institutionalized."5" The value of children as labor was brutally explicit in this context, unrelieved by any rhetoric of family sentiment. Indeed, it was less
trouble if the mother was not attached to her children, since they were
legally the property of the slaveholder. 5°3

tinction drawn between those sexual or biological relationships that yield legal obligations and
entitlements and those that do not").
495. See NORTON, supra note 233, at 234.
496. Id. at 232. See generally JUDITH WALZER LEAvrIT, BROUGHT TO BED: CHILDBEARING IN
AMERICA 1750 TO 1950, at 13-35 (1986) (discussing the biological and social impacts of pregnancy on the mother).
497. See DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 24; see also GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 497
(noting the impact of maternal mortality statistics among slaves between 1845-1860); cf.Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, Black Mothers' Mortality Rate Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, at I
(citing a recent study indicating that black women are four times as likely to die from childbirth
and related causes as white women, a disparity which remains constant even for middle class black
women with health insurance).
498. See Gordon & Buhle, supranote 216, at 279.
499. See id. at278-81.
500. See BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 47-48 (describing the
"Breeder Woman"). "'[S]he was er breeder woman en' brought in chillum ev'y twelve mont's jes
lak a cow bringin' in a calf... He orders she can't be put to no strain 'casen uv dat."' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Martha Jackson); see also DAVIS, supra note 217, at 178 (describing a
"breeder" male slave).
501. See DAVIS, supra note 217, at 179 (discussing how two slaves managed to "subvert the
breeding system" by secretly agreeing to sleep separately).
502. BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 46.
503. See GIDDINGS, supra note 6, at 37 passim.
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Eighteenth century women knew how to avoid pregnancy. Prolonged nursing of a child was a known way of preventing future pregnancies. ° Abortion was known and not illegal at the time. 5 Even under
slavery, notwithstanding the pressures and inducements of their owners,
"[s]ome slave women, perhaps a significant number, did not bear offspring for the system at all. They used contraceptives and abortives in
an attempt to resist the system, and to gain control over their bodies.... When contraception failed, slave women took more extreme
measures." ' Some women even killed their own infants, rather than
have them grow up to be slaves.5
Under the Covenant, as noted elsewhere, slavery would have been
prohibited 5" and children would not have been property.5 O Moreover,
the State would arguably have had an affirmative obligation to educate
women about the benefits of spacing pregnancies to their own health, as

504. See DE PAuW & HUNT, supranote 6, at 21. Indeed, this was the practice of most Indians
and many free Africans at the time. See id. at 31.
505. See MARY BECKER E AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE:
TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 364-65 (1994) (citing Amicus Brief of 250 Historians, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 & 91-902)).
Abortion was not a pressing social issue in colonial America, but as a social practice, it was far from unknown. Herbal abortifacients were widely known, and cookbooks and women's diaries of the era contained recipes for such medicines. Recent
studies of the work of midwives in the 1700s report cases in which the midwives appeared to have provided women abortifacient compounds. Such treatments do not appear to have been regarded as extraordinary or illicit by those administering them.
Id. at 365; see also WoLF, supra note 6, at 83 (describing "abstinence, prolonged breast-feeding,
and folk medicines that produced abortions," and noting that "[a]lthough no special strictureseither religious or moral-were attached to abortion, particularly before 'quickening' of the fetus,
most women preferred to think of these 'decoctions' as ways to safeguard health by 'regulating
menstruation') See generally DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 31 (noting that slaves nursed
children until the age of three or four).
506. GIDDINGS, supra note 6, at 46.
507. See DAVIS, supranote 217, at 191.
508. See discussion supra Part V.B.1 (discussing the right to self-determination); discussion
supra Part V.B.4.a (discussing the right to work); discussion supra Part V.B.6.a (discussing violence toward black women); discussion supra Part V.B.7 (discussing the right to an adequate standard of living). It could be argued, of course, that much of our own law, including much of our
federal and state constitutional law, similarly prohibits slavery-at least in hindsight. The crucial
distinction is that the Covenant is firmly grounded, historically and textually, in anti-slavery, while
the Constitution is grounded in ambivalence. See generally MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW
OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST 11-156 (1981) (discussing the development of southern slave law).
509. See discussion supra Part V.B.6 (discussing the special protection of children and their
subordination to their fathers). As Thomas Jefferson noted: "'I consider a woman who brings a
child every two years as more profitable than the best man of the farm' ....'What she produces is
an addition to the capital, while his labors disappear in mere consumption."' NORTON, supra note
233, at 73.
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well as that of their children.1 0 Since women were primarily responsible
for medical services in generl, and services in connection with childbirth in particular, they probably would have been the educators!"

For eighteenth century women, control over reproduction was
available, at best, only to the extent individuals were able to negotiate it
within their own relationships, through subterfuge, or through the desperate measures described above. 12 Thus, this right remained culturally

and socially privatized, beyond the reach of most women. Yet their own
contemporaneous statements and acts show that many would have

availed themselves of this right. Surely most slave women, like those
who petitioned Francis Kemble, 5"3 as well as those who repeatedly

aborted and even killed their own infants, would have welcomed relief
from their exploitation as breeders.

4

These women showed by their

acts, as well as their words, that they fully understood the importance of
control over their own reproduction.5 15
9. Articles 13 and 14-The Right to Education
Article 13 requires States to "recognize the right of everyone to
education... directed to the full development of the human personality
and the sense of its dignity, and... [to] enable all persons to participate

510. See Chapman, supra note 492, at 1171-73 (providing an excellent outline of this argument).
Demographic studies of colonial fertility reveal the stark statistics of childbearing in
eighteenth-century America... [M]ost mature women experienced five to ten pregnancies and had between three and eight surviving children.... The general pattern of
a birth every two or three years to each fertile married woman was accepted as a rhythmic part of colonial Americans' everyday existence.
NORTON, supra note 233, at 72-73.
511. See, e.g., WOLF, supra note 6, at 201 ("On southern plantations and northern farms alike,
wives were the primary providers of medical services."); WooDY, supra note 260, at 263 ('[I]n
Colonial days, in North and South, women advertised themselves freely as proficient in ... [the
medical] profession."). It was well known that "[c]olonial women were more willing than male
physicians to borrow treatments from the Indians and black slaves." DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note
6, at 36. "Usually ... their treatments would do no further harm and might make the patient more
comfortable." Id.
512. See supra text accompanying notes 503-07.
513. See supra text accompanying notes 421-24 (describing slaves who had miscarried and
lost infants because of their owners' refusal to allow them any respite from grueling fieldwork).
514. See, e.g., BLACK WOMEN IN WrTE AMERICA, supra note 202, at 47-48 (discussing the
exploitation of the "Breeder Woman").
515. Cf. BECKER Er AL., supra note 505, at 353 ("The ability to plan whether to have children, how many, and when, is critical to equality in the workplace, educational plans, political
participation-indeed, to control over the way in which our lives are spent in general.").
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effectively in a free society."516 More specifically, Article 13.2 provides:
"[P]rimary education shall be compulsory and available free to all [and]
secondary education... shall be made generally available and accessible to all [and] higher education
shall be made equally accessible to all,
5 17
capacity[.]
of
basis
on the
Article 14 refers more particularly to those States, like America in
the early eighteenth century, which have "not been able to secure... compulsory primary education, free of charge[.]" ' This had
been the situation in the colonies. Before the Revolution, education was
haphazard for everyone,1 9 particularly girls. ° The major opportunity for
52
education for girls in the north was through "adventure schools, '

which stressed "ornamental" accomplishments, such as music and fancy
sewing.'zEven these were generally only available to wealthy and middle-class urbanites.' z Southern girls had few opportunities unless they
were from wealthy families and their brothers had tutors.SU For slave
girls, any education was rare, 525 although "[a]s early as the 1750s, Sam-

516. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 8. Article 13 only requires the State to "recognize" or "respect" rights, and Article 14
does not refer to rights at all. See CRAVEN, supranote 117, at 26.
517. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 8.
518. Id. at 9. See generally FREDERICK EBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EDUCATION: IN
THEORY, ORGANIZATION, AND PRACTICE 238, 266-68 (2d ed. 1952) (describing the "dame
schools," the primary schools in New England which prepared pupils to enter grammar schools
where they would study reading and writing); HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION
INTHE UNITED STATES (Linda Eisenmann ed. 1998) (providing a collection of essays on the history of women's organizations and reform efforts).
519. See NORTON, supra note 233, at256.
520. See id. But see BERNARD BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY:
NEEDS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STuDY 21-45 (1960) (noting that formal education increased significantly in pre-Revolutionary America).
521. NORTON, supranote 233, at 259. These schools have been described as "often marginal
commercial enterprises [which] varied greatly in their merits." KERBER, supra note 6, at 202.
522. See, e.g., DE PAuv & HUNT, supra note 6, at 101 (noting that girls were taught basics
such as music, needlework, dancing, declamation, painting, and French).
523. See NORTON, supranote 233, at 260; WOLF, supranote 6, at 245.
524. See NORTON, supranote 233, at 260; see also vOODY, supra note 260, at 238-300 (providing a detailed account of the education of the Southern girls before 1800); id. at 277-78 (providing a tutor's own account of his duties in teaching two sons, a nephew, and five daughters in
1773 Virginia).
525. See, e.g., GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 561 (noting "[tihe laws against teaching slaves
to read and write").
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uel Davies found the slaves eager pupils when he sought to teach them
56
to read as part of his campaign to win converts.""

After the Revolution, public education was open to white girls as
well as boys 7 It was well recognized at the time that a participatory
democracy required an educated populace.'2 Democracy depended on
the consent of the governed, and the governed must be educated so that
its consent would be intelligent and informed. 29 In addition, education
would produce a more highly skilled workforce, better able to contribute to the growth of the new Republic. As historian Wood sums up:
"[P]rojected public educational systems would open up the advantages
of learning and advancement to all." 3 '
As discussed above, however, women were not among those whose
consent was required in the early American democracy."' Nor were they
to participate in the workforce,' 32 or to have "[e]qual opportunity ... to
be promoted.,1 33 The prospect of education for girls, accordingly,
brought all the troubling contradictions of the Lockean private sphere to
the fore. 4MAs feminists such as Mary Wollstonecraft had pointed out,
526. IeL at 565. See also BLASSINGAME, supra note 224, at 72 (noting that "[t]he Anglican
church... establish[ed] schools in Charleston, South Carolina and Williamsburg, Virginia to teach
young slaves to read" after the Great Awakening of the 1740s).
527. See DE PAUW & HuNT, supra note 6, at 101. There were also a few private academies
where girls could learn grammar and rhetoric in the 1780s and 1790s and a "proliferation of
schools for young ladies ... which offered special instruction in feminine accomplishments....
[such as] music, dance, painting, needlework, or a language." Id.
528. See WOLF, supra note 6, at 246. As Thomas Jefferson observed:
[It is] expedient for promoting the public happiness that those persons, whom nature
hath endowed with genius and virtue, should be rendered by liberal education ... able
to guard the rights and liberties of their fellow citizens, and without regard to wealth,
birth or other accidental condition or circumstances [should be] educated at common
expense of all.
Id. (alteration in original).
529. See FREDERICK EBY & CHARLES FLINN ARROWOOD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN
EDUCATION: IN THEORY, ORGANIZATION, AND PRACTICE

542 (1934) (describing the philosophy of

education of the leaders of the American Revolution, including their shared belief "that education
is the principal means by which governments can procure the welfare of the people").
530. WOOD, supra note 134, at 72. But see NEDELSKY supra note 48, at 7 (stating that the
Federalists "wanted the elite to rule. They treated the ability to govern as essentially fixed (rather
than as a capacity that could be developed) and as class-based. Thus they were not concerned with
expanding or enhancing the people's competence and involvement in public affairs").
531. See discussion supra Part V.B.1 (discussing the right to self-determination).
532. See discussion supra Part V.B.4 (discussing the right to work).
533. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 6.
534. See supra text accompanying notes 268-79.
These disparities in literacy [between women and men]-from the basic ability to
sign one's name and to read simple prose to the sophisticated ability to read difficult or
theoretical prose ... have enormous implications for the history of the relations be-
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education would enable women to "study medicine, politics and business," and to have options besides marriage for supporting themselves. 35 But opponents argued that education for girls should be discouraged for precisely this reason.536 Education would distract girls from
duties as future wives and mothers; it would masculinize
their proper
7
53

them.

While education in general was recognized as a good--conducive
to democracy and useful to the Republic---education for white women
and slaves in particularwas considerably more problematic. "Education" meant something quite different for white boys and for the white
girls who were to become their wives. 53 ' For slaves, education was gen-

erally prohibited, except when it served a particular slave owner's particular needs.5 39 Thus, education must be understood as a series of gendered and raced hierarchical oppositions.
The literacy gap between white men and white women closed
sometime between 1780 and 1850.s This reflected the popular consensus that women should be educated, but not in a way that would interfere with their responsibilities in the private sphere.54 Rather, it was accepted that educating girls was important to the nation because, as
tween the sexes. One of the most important measures of modernization in a society may
well be the degree to which print replaces oral communication. To the extent that female culture had relied on the spoken word, it was premodern at a time when male
culture was increasing its dependence on written communication.
KERBER, supranote 6, at 192.
535. See KERBER, supra note 6, at 224. Wollstonecraft continues: "[B]ut whatever they did,
they should not be denied civil and political rights[.]" Id.
536. See Gordon & Buhle, supra note 216, at 278. Mercy Otis Warren is said to have told a
"young woman that learning was useless to a lady (as useless as virtue to a gentleman, she
added)." Id. Judy Comett, who has written extensively on eighteenth-century feminism, assures
me that this remark was satiric; i.e., Warren expected her audience to know that virtue was indispensable to a gentleman. Letter from Judy Comett, to Barbara Stark (July 27, 1999) (on file with
author).
537. See KERBER, supra note 6, at 226; see also 1 THE HARPER AMERICAN LrrERATuRE 55556 (Donald McQuade et al. eds., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter HARPER] (providing a March 14, 1818
letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nathaniel Burwell which described a "plan of female education"
to include "French, dancing, drawing, music and household economy").
538. See Corr, supra note 6, at 199 (noting that "[tihe employments of man and woman are
so dissimilar").
539. See, e.g., NEWMAN & SAWYER, supra note 249, at 26-27 (describing the slave's "catechism," in which slave owners attempted, with decidedly mixed results, to impress upon slaves the
inevitability of their servitude).
540. See CoTr, supra note 6, at 15 (noting that women's literacy doubled between 1780 and
1840); KERBER, supra note 6, at 193.
541. See, e.g., Corr, supra note 6, at 119 (discussing Emma Hart Willard's proposal for a
female seminary in 1819, which "would differ as much from a school for men as women's character and duties differed from men's").
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Dr. Benjamin Rush explained in a lecture in 1787, they would later pass
on their knowledge to their sons. s" In addition, education would make

girls more marriageable! "' Thus, white girls were educated, but not in
the same way or for the same purposes that white boys were." The underlying justification for education-access to and participation in the

public sphere-remained as a trace in the education of girls, resulting in
recurring challenges to the limits imposed. 54
Since slave girls were not going to be mothers of future citizens, 6
there was no analogous justification for their education. Education was
therefore generally forbidden.M 7 Those slaves who nevertheless learned
to read were often forced to do so surreptitiously, sometimes at consid-

erable risk. " In 1860, Susie King Taylor, for example, was sent with
542. See DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 97 (noting that women need to be educated because they will educate their children based on this knowledge); BENJAMIN RUSH, THOUGHTS
UPON FEMALE EDUCAnON, ACCOMMODATED TO THE PRESENT STATE OF SOCIETY, MANNERS, AND
GOVERNMENT IN THE U.S.A (1787), noted in CoT, supra note 6, at 105 n.8. Benjamin Rush has
been called the "first major American theorist of women's education." Gordon & Buhle, supra
note 216, at 282. See generally Cornett, supra note 278, at 89 (discussing "complementarity theory," which held that "women's mental abilities, while not inferior to men's ...fitted them distinctively and solely for the domestic sphere").
543. See, e.g., COTT,supranote 6, at 110-11 (citing a passage from Sally Ripley's Journal in
which she describes a character in a school graduation play in 1800 who learns that "education
might help her acquire a better husband," to show that education of girls was linked to upward
social mobility).
544. See id.at 106 (noting that the purpose of women's education was to learn skills which
would enable them to be good mothers and wives). Judith Sargent Murray insisted that "women
were the intellectual equals of men and had the right to cultivate their minds; but she also argued
...that some intellectual freedom and opportunity would allow women to find more satisfaction
in their domestic occupations." Id.
Education for men in America had to increase in scope-had to be open-ended-in order to be functional.... Utilitarian education for women in America narrowed their
prospects because it was based on a limited conception of woman's role. "Every man,
by the Constitution, is born with an equal right to be elected to the highest office," the
Reverend John Ogden ...reminded his readers ... "[a]nd every woman, is born with
an equal right to be the wife of the most eminent man."
Id.
at 109 (quoting JOHN COSENS OGDEN, THE FEMALE GUIDE (1793)).
545. See, e.g., id. at 201-02 (explaining that "feminists at the end of the [eighteenth] century. .. brought into focus and then aimed their sharpest arrows at the belief that women were
inferior to men (in the all-important Enlightenment capacity of reason, especially), and protested
the neglect and restriction of women's minds"). "Improvements in women's education, although
impeded by criticisms ....did come. Between 1790 and 1830 facilities for girls' education expanded and improved, especially in the North .... KERBER, supranote 6, at 199.
546. See GIDDINGS, supranote 6, at 39; discussion supraPart V.B.8 (explaining that the children of slaves were slaves).
547. See GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 562 (describing how restrictions grew worse over
time).
548. See HARPER, supra note 537, at 515, 537. "Women and blacks made significant gains as
writers and readers during the years between 1776 and 1836. For blacks, a class deliberately kept
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other children to the house of a free widow, with "books wrapped in paper to prevent the police or white persons from seeing them." 9 Josephine White, trained as a "'sewing girl[,]' ... began to sit in the room
550
with the white children and thus learned to read" when she was nine.
Some children attended "midnight school[s,]" in which black women
from eleven or twelve at night until two o'clock in the
would teach
5 51
morning.
Articles 13 and 14, mandating education, 552 considered in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3, which explicitly prohibit gender discrimination in education,553 would have been invaluable tools for eighteenth
century women. White women could have challenged the universal ban
on women's admission to college, for example.5m Black women would
have been the most profoundly affected. History has shown the crucial
importance of education in dismantling the institution of chattel slavery.555 An education may well have enabled black women to make a
place for themselves in the new Republic." 6 Thus, Articles 13 and 14
would probably have been relied upon by those ready to dissolve, or at
least blur, the rigid distinctions between the public and private spheres,
whether the private sphere was understood as the home and family of
New England or the plantations of the South.
10. Article 15-The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life
Article 15 assures three distinct but interrelated rights. Specifically,
"the right of everyone: (a) to take part in cultural life; (b) to enjoy the
benefits of scientific progress and its applications; [and] (c) to benefit
from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from
uneducated in the new Republic, learning to read and write was largely a matter of fortitude." Id.
at 515.
549. BLACK WOMEN IN WHrrE AMRICA, supra note 202, at 28; see also GENOVESE, supra
note 252, at 565 (describing slaves being whipped for trying to learn to read).
550. BLACK WOMEN IN ,vHTrEAM RICA, supra note 202, at 30 (describing an interview with
Claudia White Harreld, Cambridge, Mass. (Jan. 1952)).
551. Id.at32.
552. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supranote 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 8-9.
553. See id. at 5; supra notes 262-95 and accompanying text.
554. See CoTr, supra note 6, at 6.
555. See generally BLACK WOMEN IN WHIE AmMRICA, supra note 202, at 75-82 (discussing
the advancement of African American education from the nineteenth century to modem times).
556. See, e.g., Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education After Forty Years: Confronting the
Promise, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 337 (1995) (discussing arguments on the continuing importance of education to the black community, and the continuing obstacles to its realization). Thus,

Articles 13 and 14 would have facilitated Jefferson's dream of a hierarchy of educational institutions from grammar schools to universities. See WOOD, supra note 134, at 426.
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'
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author."557
This Part will consider three specific examples which suggest the scope
of women's exclusion from cultural life. First, black women under slavery could be denied the right to preserve their African cultural traditions."' Second, all women were precluded from enjoying the benefits
of scientific progress and its applications by virtue of the limits on
women's education discussed in the preceding Part.559 Third, women's
relegation to the private sphere effectively precluded their participation
in the emerging literary and artistic life of the new Republic, with a few
conspicuous exceptions.5' 6 Rather, women's creativity was channeled
into unpaid
work for consumption in the private sphere of the home and
56

family. '

Each of these deprivations had profound and long-lasting consequences. More important perhaps, their cumulative impact was to exclude women from the emerging culture and consign them to gendered
and raced subcultures.
a. The Suppression of African Culture
From the earliest efforts of slave traders to separate their captives
from those who spoke the same language, 62 black women were denied
the right to their African heritage. While this was not systematic, and
practices varied widely among slave owners,6 it was always possible
and became increasingly common as the plantation system became increasingly institutionalized. 564 Slaves were "compelled to create a new
language, a new religion, and a precarious new lifestyle. 56' Every as-

557. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 36, 993
U.N.T.S. at 9; see also HuNT, supra note 40, at 63 (citing the Human Rights Committee's General
Comment on Article 24 of the ICCPR for the proposition that: "In the cultural field, every possible
measure should be taken to foster the development of their [children's] personality and to provide
them with a level of education that will enable them to enjoy the rights recognized in the Cove-

nant").
558. See infra text accompanying notes 562-73.
559. See discussion supra Part V.B.9.

560. See infra text accompanying notes 580-88.
561. See discussion supra Part V.B.4.d.
562. See JOYNER, supra note 202, at xx ("The earliest African slaves in South Carolina did
not constitute a speech community, as the term is used by sociolinguists. The slaves' various African languages were often mutually unintelligible."); WOLF, supra note 6, at 24-25.
563. See BLASSINGAME, supra note 224, at vii.
564. But see GARY B. NASH, FORGING FREEDOM: THE FoRMATIoN OF PHILADELPHIA'S

BLACK CoMMuNrry, 1720-1840, at 13-15 (1988) (accounting for an emerging black culture outside of the plantation system).
565. JOYNER, supra note 202, at xxi.
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pect of African culture 6 could be suppressed if the owner thought it
prudent for the very reasons that such practices are protected under the
Covenant; that is, because such practices are conducive to human dignity and flourishing, and therefore, inimical to slavery. 67
Notwithstanding the need to proceed in secrecy, slaves preserved a
wealth of African traditions.5 61 The Protestant Church, foisted upon
slaves by their white masters,569 was transformed into the Black
Church. s70 Traditional African forms, such as "call and response be-

[E]specially in the colonial period, a smattering of blacks practiced Islam and others
clung tenaciously to traditional African religions. All non-Christian religious activity
was discouraged by most slaveowners, who were as ethnocentric as they were concerned about the potential for unrest and rebellion they sensed in their slaves' participation in what to whites were strange and exotic rites.
MASTERS & SLAVES INTHE HOUSE OF THE LORD: RACE AND RELIGION IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH
1740-1870, at 2 (1988) (John B. Boles ed., 1988) [hereinafter MASTERS & SLAVES].
566. African culture, of course, was not homogenous and included a wide range of ethnic
groups, whose "only common thread... was their slavery and their blackness." WOLF, supra note
6, at 264. One ethnic group's "culture was reformulated in the colonies, incorporating bits and
pieces of Old World cultures." Id. For an account of a group like this, see MARGARET
WASHINGTON CREEL, "A PECULIAR PEOPLE": SLAVE RELIGION AND COMMUNITY-CULTURE
AMONG THE GULLAHS 29-63 (1988).
567. See generally Schachter, supra note 11, at 849-52 (discussing the meaning of human
dignity). As the commentary to Article 15 explains:
Perhaps the most neglected of the rights dealt with in this Article is the right of everyGiven the constantly growing awareness of the imone to take part in cultural life....
portance of cultural identity, especially for groups such as minorities, indigenous peoples, immigrants, and others whose cultural roots and traditions differ from those of the
majority, this right is often of the greatest importance.
Alston, supranote 185, at 70.
568. See MASTERS & SLAVES, supra note 565, at 4 (noting that the steady stream of new
slaves from Africa supported African customs until 1808, when African imports were banned).
569. "[S]laveowners before the mid-eighteenth century seldom attempted to Christianize their
slaves." MASTERS & SLAVES, supra note 565, at 3. However,
the half-century following 1740 was the critical period during which some whites broke
down their fears and inhibitions about sharing their religion with the slaves in their
midst, and some blacks--only a few at first-came to find in Christianity a system of
ideas and symbols that was genuinely attractive.
Id. at 5. But see GENOVESE, supranote 252, at 190 ("The strategy of using religion as a method of
social control could never have served its purpose had it been only that. The success of the political strategy for attention to the slaves' religious life paradoxically required a considerable degree
of genuine Christian concern by the masters .....
570. See MASTERS & SLAVES, supra note 565, at 6-7; NEWMAN & SAWYER, supra note 249,
at 31. Boles and others have described the similarities between West African religions and Christianity. The West African tripartite hierarchy of deities (nature gods, ancestral gods, and an omnipotent creator) was "roughly transferable to the Christian idea of the trinity." Id.
Luther Jackson divided the history of black Christianity in Virginia into three periods:
1750-1790, 1790-1830, and 1830-1860. During the first period ...colonial religion
took a popular turn, exhibiting an awakened consciousness and mass enthusiasm.
Blacks responded to the roughhewn frontier preaching and were, for the most part wel-
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tween leaders and congregation, for example,5 7' and the ring shout, a
'
shuffling group circle movement[,]" 572
were adapted to the new religion."
b. Denial of the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its
Application
As discussed above, 74 science was in an embryonic stage and its
applications were not always beneficial. At the same time, science generated a great deal of intellectual excitement. Human reason, linked
with empirical method, was going to transform the world. Pragmatic
Americans, like Benjamin Franklin, immersed themselves in lives of
rich discovery, focusing on practical applications 7
But the frontier of science was essentially closed to women in
America. 76 Their limited educations and their domestic duties, combined with the ubiquitous sense of a woman's place-and the interests
appropriate to that place-effectively foreclosed participation in the sciences. As Norton observes: "White American women recognized not
only that their domestic obligations were never-ending, but also that
their necessary concentration on those obligations deprived them of the
opportunity to contemplate 'any thing new and improving.""

coined as participants. No few blacks appeared as preachers and acquired followings
among both blacks and whites. The Baptists and Methodists who carried much of the
new religious drive often expressed hostility toward slavery and a hope that it would
vanish.
GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 185.
571. See BLASSINGAME, supra note 224, at 33 (noting anthropologist John F. Szwed's observation that "[the church songs and spirituals of the Negroes in the Southern United States closely
resemble west African song style, particularly in their strong call-and-response patterns") (quoting
MusicalAdaptationAmong Afro-Americans, J.AM. FOLKLORE LXXII, April-June 1969, at 115).
572. NEWMAN & SAWYER, supra note 249, at 31; see also BLASSINGAME, supra note 224, at
19 (describing the centrality of music to African culture and noting the rhythmic complexity of
traditional African music and the "elaborate, exhausting" African dances that mixed secular and
sacred elements).
573. See generally GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 184 ("[T]he mass of the slaves apparently
became Christians during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.").
574. See discussion supra Part V.B.8 (discussing Article 12).
575. See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 341 (J.A. Leo Lemay & P.M. Zall eds.,
1981) [hereinafter FRANKLm'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY]. His sister, Ann Franklin, became the first
woman newspaper editor in 1762. See WOMEN'S WRITING, supra note 15, at 950.
576. But see PATRICIA PHILLIPS, THE ScIENTIFIc LADY: A SocIAL HISTORY OF WoMEN's
ScIENTIFIc
ERESTS 1520-1918, at 67-74 passim (1990) (describing the journals and societies
specifically focusing on women's scientific pursuits in England during the same period).
577. NORTON, supra note 233, at 36 (citing an eighteenth century woman's diary). See generally RICHARD BEALE DAvIS, INTm.LECruAL LIFE INTHE COLONIAL SOuTH 1585-1763 (1978) (de-
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Science, moreover, was looked to for paradigms for cultural and

political debate. 78 Because women remained ignorant of science, the

Newtonian metaphors which shaped political debate of the time were

unavailable to them.579
c. Literacy or Artistic Production
Eighteenth century women were discouraged from any enterprise

that might have resulted in "literary or artistic production" subject to the
protections of Article 15(c)."' There were a few women of letters,58' but

most black women were illiterate, and most white women received a rudimentary education.5 Black poet Phillis Wheatley, whose work was

acclaimed on both sides of the Atlantic and who met George Washing55

ton,"H and white essayist Mercy Otis Warren,"' were rare exceptions. 8
While a few privileged women drew and painted,586 women were not

scribing various aspects of Southern colonial life: education, religion, science and technology, fine
arts, literature, and politics).
578. See Note, supra note 270, at 146.
579. See discussion supra Part V.B.9.
580. See, e.g., WOMEN's WRrrNG, supra note 15, at 952 (noting that not until Ms. Samuel
Slater in 1793, was a woman granted a patent for cotton sewing thread). Congress was authorized
"[lo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8.
581. See, e.g., DE PAUw & HuNT, supra note 6, at 128. Of the many women who wrote poetry, the most famous was Sarah Wentworth Apthorp Morton, whose first long poem, Ouabi: Or
The Virtues of Nature,was published in 1790. See id.
582. See supra note 526 and accompanying text.
583. See CROSSING THE DANGER WATER, supra note 153, at 39-47. See generally PORTRAITS
OF AMERICAN WOMEN, supranote 203, at 65-135. While Phillis Wheatley published the first book
of poems by an African American, Poems on Various Subjects, Religious and Moral, the first African American poet was Lucy Terry, who wrote Bars Fight, August 28, 1746. See WOMEN'S
WRITING, supra note 15, at 951.
584. See WOMIEN's WRITING, supra note 15, at 907-08. Mercy Otis Warren wrote poems and
plays in the early 1770s as well as the three-volume History of the Rise, Progress,and Termination of the American Revolution in 1805. See id. Hannah Adams was probably the first professional woman writer in the United States. Her works include the Alphabetical Compendium of the
Various Sects written in 1784. See id. at 951.
585. In 1793, Ann Eliza Bleecker provided an account of the American Revolution in The
Posthumous Works of Ann Eliza Bleecker. See id. at 953. Judith Sargent Murray wrote On the
Equalityof the Sexes in 1790. See id.
586. See DE PAUW & HUNT, supra note 6, at 127. Patience Lovell Wright is the only American woman known to have supported herself entirely through painting or sculpture between 1750
and 1815. See id. She achieved popular and critical acclaim for her realistic waxworks. See generally ETHEL STANWOOD BOLTON, AMERICAN WAX PORTRAITS 6-9 (1929) (briefly describing the
life and accomplishments of Patience Lovell Wright).
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admitted into art schools.5' Thus, although the household objects of the

time show that women had artistic talent and sensibilities,"' s few had the
time or materials, and only a handful were able to obtain any instruction
or encouragement.
d. Impact of the Denial of the Right to Take Part in Cultural
Life
Although each of these deprivations had a profound effect on at
least some women, their cumulative impact is more important here. As
this Article has shown, rights can only be understood in specific cultural
contexts. Because women were precluded in important ways from contributing to-or challenging-the emerging culture,"' it remained A
white male culture, in which white males were not only the primary

rights-holders, but through their cultural work explained what rights
meant." Thus, not only did white male Framers define rights, but rights
were shaped and given meaning by other white males, their contempo-

587. See DE PAUw & HUNT, supra note 6, at 127 (noting that not until 1800 was instruction
available for girls in art academies). Classes in painting and drawing were available at female
seminaries. See id. A handful of women were able to study with professional artists after the
Revolution. Hetty Benbridge, for example, learned how to paint miniatures from Charles Willson
Peale. See id. at 128; see also ROBERT G. STEWART, HENRY BENBRIDGE (1743-1812): AMERICAN
PORTRAIT PAINTER 19, 20 (1971) (discussing how Hetty Benbridge, Henry Benbridge's wife, was
also a portrait painter influenced by Charles Willson Peale).
588. See, e.g., ABBOTr LOWELL CUMMINGS, BED HANGINGS: A TREATISE ON FABRICS AND
STYLES IN THE CURTAINING OF BEDS, 1650-1850 (1961) (providing pictorial examples and descriptions of bed hangings made by New England women); FLORENCE M. MONTGOMERY,
PRINTED TEXTIES: ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COTrONS AND LINENS 1700-1850 (1970) (categorizing the styles of printed textiles from 1750-1850); NEEDLEWORK: AN HISTORICAL SURVEY 7
(Betty Ring ed. 1975) (describing various styles of needlework and attributing its artistic nature to
utilitarian uses of the needle).
589. The notion of a unitary, emerging culture is a simplification, of course, ripe for deconstruction. In what ways, for example, is it assumed that such a culture is most importantly emerging in the North? See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 577, at 1652-53 (noting New England character and
its Puritan moral code).
590. See THE RISING GLORY OF AMERICA 1760-1820, at 164-65 (Gordon S. Wood ed. 1971).
See, e.g., CULLER, supranote 2, at 51.
One of the founding works of American literature, for instance, is "The Legend of
Sleepy Hollow." The figure of Rip Van Winkle, vrites Leslie Fiedler, "presides over
the birth of the American imagination; and it is fitting that our first successful homegrown legend should memorialize, however playfully, the flight of the dreamer from
the shrew." It is fitting because, ever since then, novels seen as archetypically American-investigating or articulating a distinctively American experience-have rung the
changes on this basic schema, in which the protagonist struggles against constricting,
civilizing, oppressive forces embodied by woman.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting LESLIE A. FELDER, LOVE AND DEATH IN THE AMERICAN NOVEL xx
(1960)).
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raries, as well as later generations. 591' Thus, culture must also be understood in terms of gendered and raced hierarchical oppositions.
The privileged culture depended on subordinated subcultures--especially the subordinated subcultures of white women relegated to the
private sphere, and black women relegated to the similarly private, but
significantly less gendered, subculture of the slave community/9z Southern aristocrats depended on slave labor to assure themselves a privi-

leged standard of living, with more time for cultural pursuits than most

Americans would enjoy for 150 years. 93 The northern elites depended
upon white women to teach their sons to read and to revere the classics.
Thus, American culture remained white, male, and European594 until influences from the female and black subcultures were able to percolate.9
VI.

CONCLUSION

Deconstruction shows how each legal concept is in fact a "privi'
leging of one concept over another"596
and how the privileged conception is always dependent on the hidden, subordinated conception. In our
own constitutional jurisprudence, the hidden conception is the inalienable right to property, upon which civil and political rights depend. As
Madison understood, the right to property, in turn, depends on civil and
political rights. 97 Madison never defined the right to property because
he never had to define it. He was able to take it for granted, along with

the lesser economic rights included in the Framers' conception of property.
591. See, e.g., FRANKLIN'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 575, at 341; Foner, supra note 179,
at 9. For a sharp critique of Franklin, see D. H. LAWRENCE, STUDIES IN CLAssic AMERICAN
LITERATURE 9-21 (Phoenix ed. 1964) (1924). See generally JOHN DOS PASSOS, THE LIVING
THOUGHTS OF TOM PAINE 104-39 (1940) (espousing Thomas Paine's belief of the rights of man);
HARPER, supra note 537, at 515 ("Most literary historians have tended to dismiss the period between 1776 and 1836, as one put it, 'as a sort of blank space between the Revolution and the mature work of Irving, Bryant and Cooper."').
592. See GENOVESE, supra note 252, at 501.
593. See Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: THE OxFoRD AmNESTY LECTURES 1993, at 111, 121 (Stephen Shute & Susan Hurley
eds., 1993).
594. See HARPER, supra note 537, at 515, 527 ("In the first several decades following the
Revolution, newspapers continued as the staple of the American printing trade.... American
newspapers tried to reproduce a sophisticated, English literary tone ....).
595. But see GENOVESE, supra note 252, at xvi ("[M]any slaveholders even took some pride
and pleasure in their slaves' accomplishment; and ...they imbibed much of their slaves' culture
and sensibility while imparting to their slaves much of their own."). I do not mean to suggest that
there was not an ongoing process of cross-fertilization.
596. See discussion supraPart I.A.
597. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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This Article has shown that in fact the "right to property" may be
understood as an iteration of the economic rights set out in international
human rights law. It has used the Economic Covenant to invert Madison's hierarchy, which privileged civil and political rights, to show how
these rights were in fact dependent on economic rights and to examine
the role of eighteenth century women in assuring these rights. Finally,
this Article has shown how the thorough denial of economic rights for
the women of Madison's time made civil and political rights unimaginable for most of them. The legal denial of those rights was a redundant
affirmation of a reality most women could not even question.
As shown in this Article, however, some women did question that
reality. Whether they challenged the denial of their economic rights directly, like Jenny Slew598 and Mary Byrd,5 9 or indirectly, like the
anonymous slave women who preserved the African ring shout,' they
contributed to an increasingly broad conception of equality"l and a stilldeepening conception of rights.

598. See supra text accompanying note 281.
599. See NORTON, supra note 233, at 226.
600. See discussion supra Part V.B.8 (discussing Article 12).
601. See generally sources cited supra note 10 and accompanying text (analyzing arguments
that equal protection should apply more broadly to protect the poor).
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